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FOOLING ALL OF THE PEOPLE SOME OF THE TIME: 1990's
WELFARE REFORM AND THE EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN
VALUES
Kathleen A. Kost* and Frank W. Munger**

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1981, in the wake of President Ronald Reagan's rollback of
federal welfare entitlements, a story circulated in Washington, D.C.
that the handouts by White House security officers to beggars on
Pennsylvania Avenue constituted the administration's policy on the
homeless. Reagan's bare-knuckled assault on federal programs for the
relief of poverty left little doubt that he intended to offer less to those
who survived on handouts from deserving citizens who paid taxes.
Reagan's welfare reform policy was one element of a partisan attack
on a broad range of civil rights laws, regulatory agencies, and poverty
relief programs established since the New Deal that were portrayed as
costly and favoring "special interests."1
Since the early 1980s, however, the rhetoric of welfare reform has
taken a new turn. Liberals as well as conservatives proclaim the failure
of the federally supported welfare system to end poverty. In the 1990s,
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See Thomas B. Edsall with Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race,
Rights, and Taxes on American Politics 202-06 (1992).
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the public discourse of welfare reform communicates a consensus
across the political spectrum: welfare is the problem. Welfare not only
burdens taxpayers but also cheats the poor themselves of an
opportunity to achieve self-sufficiency. Reformers in both parties
advocate placing conditions on welfare to change the behavior of
welfare recipients. The new and powerful reform rhetoric is aiding a
successful effort to connect policy goals that used to stand in
opposition to one another: making the welfare system more effective
while severely cutting benefits to reduce the burden on taxpayers, and
ending poverty while dismantling federal entitlements and allowing
state programs to deny benefits to an increasing proportion of the
poor.
The message of more work and less welfare has been accepted by
both of the major political parties, and the sweeping reform enacted in
August 1996, which ended federal entitlements, has received
remarkably broad bipartisan support. 2 Because the public debate has
not addressed the causes of poverty and the purposes of income
support, however, critical questions about the need for reform and the
impact of reform proposals have been overlooked. For example, much
is assumed but few facts have been offered about who is poor or why
they are poor. Little attention is drawn to the plight of the working
poor, which includes eighteen percent of the fully employed labor
force, many of whom benefit from the programs reformers would
severely curtail or eliminate. Further, few reform advocates explain
what they mean when they claim that welfare has failed, and they
make little mention of the accumulating evidence that the welfare
2 See Jason DeParle, The Clinton Welfare Bill: A Long, Stormy Journey, N.Y. Times,
July 15, 1994, at Al, A18 (describing the Clinton reform agenda); Robert Pear, House
Backs Bill Undoing Decades of Welfare Policy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1995, at 1 (describing
the Republican welfare reform proposals).
New Democrats, including President Clinton, also have supported ending
entitlements-a politically savvy move to be sure, but unthinkable for a Democrat prior to
the 1990s. See Alison Mitchell, President Voices Optimism on Hopes for Welfare Bill, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 17, 1995, at I [hereinafter Mitchell, President Voices Optimism]. As the 1996
presidential election drew closer, Clinton's willingness to support an end to welfare
entitlements became clear and unambiguous. See Robert Pear, President Says Cuts Are Too
Deep in Republican Welfare Plan, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1996, at A21. In August 1996,
President Clinton signed legislation ending the sixty-year-old federal program that has been
the framework for poverty relief since the New Deal. Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill
Cutting Welfare; States in New Role, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1996, at Al.
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system neither undermines the desire to work for a3 living wage, nor
encourages early child bearing and single parenting.
In this article, we address some of these unasked questions. In Part
II we examine the reasons for the realignment of the political debate
about welfare reform and the political origins of the new consensus
about reform. First, we describe the New Deal origins of current
federal welfare programs and the distinction between programs for the
"morally deserving poor," those with a history of appropriate
attachment to the labor force through work or marriage, and programs
for the "morally undeserving poor," those whose poverty is considered
to result from a morally unworthy lifestyle, such as an unexcused
failure to work or to belong to a traditional nuclear family. The
deserving poor consistently receive higher benefits subject to fewer
conditions, while the undeserving poor receive below-poverty benefits
and continually are under surveillance for compliance with restrictions
on their income, status, and behavior. We note that debates about
welfare policy in America rarely challenge this two-track structure,
but rather focus on which of the poor are deserving and which are not.
The New Deal marked an emerging understanding among policy
makers that in a national economy the federal government alone has
the capacity to redistribute resources to relieve both the cyclical
poverty created by the national economy and the poverty of relatively
depressed regional economies. Since the New Deal, the public
consensus supporting the role of the national government in
guaranteeing minimum levels of well-being has grown stronger. Until
now, even the undeserving poor have been entitled to minimal federal
benefits under programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC"), Food Stamps, and Medicaid.
In view of the long standing role of the federal government in
poverty relief, how have welfare reformers been able to propose such
dramatic changes? The public debates about welfare in the 1990s have
taken downsizing or eliminating federal welfare programs as a starting
point. Although scholars have suggested that welfare policy has4
important latent functions, such as controlling working class protest,
3

See infra part III.

4 See Frances F. Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of
Public Welfare 449-66 (2d ed. 1993); Christopher Howard, Protean Lure for the Working
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responding to changes in the role of women and the family,5 and
scapegoating problems of the middle and working classes, 6 we believe
the success of current welfare reform can be explained by the
rhetorical strategies of politicians. We argue that political leaders have
a choice about how proposed policies are portrayed and that their
portrayals attempt to connect widely shared values to concrete benefits
for particular constituencies. Reformers have succeeded in
manipulating the categorization of deserving and undeserving poor,
claiming that the proposed reforms only target welfare recipients who
are undeserving: idle, shiftless, and irresponsible. Further, their
proposals advance a larger political agenda of federal government
cost-cutting and downsizing embraced by both parties, which is linked
to a concrete payoff in the form of genuine tax relief for the wealthy
and nominal tax reductions for the middle and working classes.
Finally, we see a critical link between this portrayal of welfare reform
and the interests of the most economically insecure mainstream
political constituencies. Although the explicit focus of welfare reform
discourse in the 1990s has been on welfare recipients and the welfare
system itself, we explain the success of reform rhetoric in terms of its
strong implicit message that welfare recipients simply are being asked
to make the same sacrifices for national prosperity already made by
the economically insecure American middle and working classes.
Welfare reform proposals have been put forward in a political
context in which the most important premises for refonn. have
remained unchallenged. The success of the ideological maneuvering
by reformers can continue only as long as these premises remain
unquestioned. In Parts III, IV, and V, we examine both the factual
premises for and the likely effects of contemporary welfare reforms.
Conservatives long have argued that welfare leads to dependency and
that the poor, for their own good, should be required to work. Liberals
now seem to agree that requiring work is the answer for many poor
persons who receive welfare under federal programs. Yet research
suggests that the poor who receive welfare do not lack a work ethic.
Poor: Party Competition and the Earned Income Tax Credit, 9 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 404,

417-22 (1995).
See Linda Gordon, What Does Welfare Regulate?, 55 Soc. Res. 609, 622-28 (1988).
See Herbert J. Gans, The War Against the Poor: The Underclass and Antipoverty Policy
7(1995).
5
6
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Poverty is not caused by laziness; it is caused by factors outside the
control of poor people, such as segregation 7 and the declining value of
the minimum wage. 8 Welfare does not cause poverty, nor does it
cause, contrary to popular perception, the problemn of teenage
pregnancy. 9 Thus, these are not valid reasons for decreasing welfare
benefits.
Further, even if empirical evidence justified behavior modification
as a means of ending non-work and non-responsibility for some
welfare recipients, this rationale seems quite limited, justifying at most
restrictions on welfare for those in need of such discipline. Current
welfare reforms will make sweeping changes in many federal
programs providing income support and poverty relief affecting a
broad cross-section of the working poor whether or not they receive
assistance under AFDC.
In Part III, we challenge the stereotypes employed by reform
advocates to describe the poor and welfare recipients. We describe two
of the programs that have been targeted for reform and the populations
they serve, AFDC and the Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC"). We
point out that, contrary to political rhetoric, AFDC recipients represent
a minority of the federal assistance beneficiaries who will be affected
by the proposed reforms. Further, only a tiny fraction of AFDC
recipients actually match the reformers' stereotype of an adolescent,
unmarried, African-American female.' 0 Neither work ethic nor sense
of family responsibility is at issue for most of the poor who will be
affected by welfare reform. Thus, there is a serious credibility gap
between the reasons advanced to justify welfare reform and the
7 Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass 118 (1993).
S

Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, America Unequal 128-30 (1995).

9 See Mark F. Testa, Introduction to Early Parenthood and Coming of Age in the 1990s
15-16 (Margaret K. Rosenheim & Mark F. Testa eds., 1992).
10 It might be argued that the young African-American male is an even more stereotypical
image of the problematic poor, but dependency on welfare is not the chief problem that
politicians or the public associates with this group. See generally Douglas S. Massey,
Getting Away with Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban America, 143 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1203 (1995) (discussing and proposing solutions to the increasinig rates of violent
crime and crime victimization among African-American men). Hence, the image that
dominates the discourse on welfare reform is generally, and historically, the female single
parent.
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proposals being made. Part III concludes with a comment on the
relationship between poverty and the declining opportunities for low
wage work in our economy.
In Part IV, we examine the likely effects of reform on the poor and
non-poor, including the working poor who do not rely on AFDC, but
who often rely on other federal poverty relief programs that the
proposed reforms will reduce or terminate. Recently enacted welfare
reforms will impose a lifetime limit on recipients, but what happens
when time runs out? Will there be work? The new law mandates work,
but are there jobs? Welfare reforms at the federal level encourage
states to impose conditions that address family formation and
parenting choices. Are such conditions likely to yield the desired
changes in behavior? And what of the reductions in other forms of
income support relied on by those who work but remain below the
poverty level-what will the effect be of these changes?
We then consider the likely effects of reducing federal financial
support of welfare. We discuss the impact of welfare reform on the
economies and taxpayers of states and municipalities. We examine the
fiscal and political dilemmas that the reforms will force upon states
and local governments. Some states will be required to make a choice
between reducing welfare and increasing the burdens of state and local
taxpayers. The choices will be posed most painfully in municipalities
with low average incomes or high percentages of poor persons, often
both, and in particular in areas where higher paying jobs have departed
and economic security has eroded as a result of domestic and
international market forces that other federal policies often encourage.
Can states be expected to maintain welfare benefits by increasing
administrative efficiency or use of their own resources when
necessary? The evidence provided by the states' use of discretion in
setting benefit levels under the existing AFDC program and in
modifying welfare regulations where federal regulations have been
waived on request, suggests that the promises reformers make to end
poverty and dependence on welfare are little more than empty
rhetoric.
In Part V we return to the question of values and the goals of
welfare reform. We argue that a false consensus underlies the
startlingly similar approaches of the major political parties. We
attempt to explain why the initially strong public support even now is
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rapidly eroding. In public opinion polls Americans do not agree with
the most punitive implications of the politically dominant behavior
modification theory underlying many proposed welfare reforms.
Perhaps it would not surprise members of the public to discover that
current welfare reform proposals are supported by superficial
arguments; Americans are skeptical of their politicians and the media.
What may be more surprising to Americans is how they are being
misled about the effects reforms will have on welfare recipients. They
will be still more surprised by the effects that welfare reform, when
carried to its logical extremes, will have on the middle and working
classes. Sentiments supporting tax relief and government downsizing
are based on the hope that smaller government and the growing private
economy will provide for American well-being; yet, as we argue
throughout, the extended logic of welfare reform threatens not only
programs that have reduced poverty, but also programs that help
support middle and working class families. The contradictions
between the current proposals and the most basic expectations of the
public regarding the role of the national government in insuring
economic security are becoming increasingly apparent.
We conclude by emphasizing the role of political choice in this
process. The premises for current reforms are false, the logic weak,
and many of the likely effects of reform will actually threaten the
well-being of many who are not on welfare. The situation is ripe for
yet another change in the political winds of welfare reform. The link
between the morality of self-sufficiency and poverty relief insures that
welfare policies will always create a dilemma for the public, and
provides openings for political leaders who find it useful to exploit the
vulnerabilities of recipients of welfare to serve particular policy
agendas, often only peripherally related to welfare and poverty relief.
The remedy for such policy instability, we believe, is a more informed
public. The solution requires that politicians have the courage to offer
more accurate portrayals of poverty, by describing the full range of
family and individual experiences encountered in living below the
poverty line. We trust the public, which judges politicians and the
poor alike, to accept the complexity of poverty, and to support reforms
that both complement the power of the modem economy to produce
great wealth, and offset the economic insecurities of the average, the
poor, and the poorest Americans.
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II. THE AMERICAN STATE AND THE DISCOURSE OF WELFARE REFORM

Twelve years after President Reagan's unsuccessful attempt to
dismantle federal welfare programs, President Bill Clinton assumed
office promising to "end welfare as we know it."' I With that
statement, Clinton not only promised change but also suggested the
existence of a consensus about welfare and welfare recipients. By
referring to a shared perception of the welfare system, Clinton invoked
stereotypical images of recipients and their position in society, as
surely as Reagan's references to "special interests" and "groups"
outside the mainstream in his statements about welfare in the 1980s
did so. 12 By using such language, Clinton straddled the traditionally
liberal and conservative positions on welfare reform; he addressed the
need to help the poor through proposals to "make work pay," while he
attacked welfare by implying that his proposals were aimed at a
burdensome group outside the mainstream. The subtle invocation of
popular views of welfare dependency helped Clinton make his case for
reform, as much as his vision of poverty relief.
Conservatives who took up Clinton's cause built their own case for
reform on Clinton's assumptions about poverty, welfare recipients,
and welfare dependence. Their proposals for time-limited welfare, 13 a
family cap, 14 school attendance incentives,' 5 and penalties for bearing
children out of wedlock, 16 further demonstrated their reliance on the
logic of welfare dependency. 17 The shadow of these images and the
1 See DeParle, supra note 2, at Al.
12 See Edsall with Edsall, supra note 1,at 203.

13 Newt Gingrich et al., Contract With America: The Bold Plan By Rep. Newt Gingrich,
Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to Change the Nation 66-67 (Ed Gillespie &
Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) [hereinafter Contract With America].
14 Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(a) (1995)
(proposed 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(48)) [hereinafter Personal Responsibility Act of 1995].
15 Id. § 101 (proposed 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)).
16 Gingrich et al., supra note 13, at 70-71.
17 See Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare
Reform Proposals, 102 Yale L.J. 719, 720 (1992). See also id. at 720 nn.6-10 (identifying
states where such programs have been proposed or implemented). Many of the plans by
individual states to impose behavior modification incentives or penalties are in proposals to
modify existing state programs that already have been submitted to the federal government
for approval. See Steve Savner & Mark Greenberg, The Clasp Guide to Welfare Waivers:
1992-1995 (Center for L. & Soc. Pol'y, Washington, D.C.), May 1995. One program that
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inferences they support about the blameworthiness of those who
remain poor has fallen on and endangered all federal programs for
poverty relief, including the Food Stamp Program, 18 Medicaid, 19 and
20
the EITC.
Clinton, pressured by his own rhetoric, has moved steadily toward
the conservatives' position on welfare reform. Although he had
previously refused to sign legislation ending the federal entitlement to
he
welfare, in August 1996, during his campaign for reelection,
21
capitulated to the political pressures he had helped create.
The current discourse of welfare reform is as much about
establishing starting points as it is about the ultimate course of
policies. What Americans "know" about welfare is shaped by their
beliefs about the causes and effects of poverty, and by the moral
values they apply in judging the poor's self-sufficiency or dependence
on others. Although Americans' values have been consistent with
many different types of poverty relief policies,2 2 political rhetoric has
quickly narrowed the range of policies under discussion by selectively
provides behavior modification incentives is Wisconsin's LEARNFARE program, which
requires adolescents who reside in a family receiving AFDC to attend school between the
ages of 13 and 19. Legis. Audit Bureau, Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Services, An
Evaluation of Leamfare Program Administration 2 (1990). From its inception in 1988
through 1990, more than 2000 students were sanctioned each month for failing to attend
school, resulting in a $120 per month average reduction in benefits for those AFDC
families. Id. at 5. Administrative problems in recordkeeping and staffing, at both the school
and county level, have made this program difficult to evaluate, however. Id. at 2-5.
18 See Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, supra note 14, § 501.
19 See S. 844, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
20 See Balanced Budget Act of 1995, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-350, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
1710 (1995) [hereinafter Balanced Budget Act of 1995]. This legislation was vetoed by
President Clinton in November 1995. The welfare reform legislation signed by Clinton in
August 1996 incorporates only minor changes to the EITC. See Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 910 (1996)
(amending 26 U.S.C. § 32) [hereinafter Reconciliation Act of 1996]. See also infra part III,
section C.
21 See Clines, supra note 2, at A22.
22 We discuss these values below. Of course, we do not claim that all Americans share the
same values or agree on the same policies. There is evidence, however, of a persistent and
remarkably broad consensus in the United States about the importance of the moral issues
of poverty, such as self-sufficiency. These broad value orientations are manipulated to
appear consistent with different welfare policies, depending on who is perceived as
deserving of public relief and who is not. See infra part II.
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emphasizing particular causes and effects of poverty, and connecting
those to the values of the populace. In the current welfare reform
debate, for example, the rhetoric has been about how welfare
programs have failed to end poverty, and have instead created
"welfare dependency." Politicians and the media have selected images
of welfare recipients that contradict mainstream values of selfsufficiency, work, and fairness. They suggest that poverty is selfinflicted and that receiving welfare benefits leads to continuing
poverty, although they do not provide the public with any facts
supporting these contentions. The causes of poverty and
unemployment are not discussed as part of the discourse. In this
rhetorical context, virtually all of the welfare reform proposals
ventured by both parties to limit or dismantle existing welfare
programs ignore a vast array of relevant information about welfare
recipients and the more widespread underlying problems of poverty.
Why, we must ask, has this rhetoric carried the day and successfully
narrowed the public discourse of welfare?
In the 1990s, welfare reformers in the United States are debating a
system of social provision unique among industrialized countries. 23
American programs for social provision do not provide benefits
uniformly, but rather limit benefits to those who make contributions to
society or who satisfy strict conditions of need. As a result, the United
States has no uniform, universal system of old age pensions, 24 no
national health care system, 25 and, unlike many European societies, no
23 Provision for the poor in the United States has been described as "residualist," because
it provides only temporary assistance as a last resort for those in extreme need. See
Theodore R. Marmor et al., America's Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent Myths,
Enduring Realities 25 (1990). Programs in England and Canada share some of the same
qualities as those in United States, but they employ different methods of financing and have
different scopes of coverage. See Ann S. Orloff, The Politics of Pensions: A Comparative
Analysis of Britain, Canada, and the United States, 1880-1940 20-21 (1993). Other
industrialized societies provide welfare on an "institutional" model, which embodies a
commitment to meeting the welfare needs of the entire population. Id. at 19.
24 One exhaustive analysis of the development of American social security policy
concludes that, "although [OASDI] has developed greatly since 1935, it is still marked by
selective coverage, uncertain protection, and regressive financing." Raymond Richards,
Closing the Door to Destitution: The Shaping of the Social Security Acts of the United
States and New Zealand 165 (1994).
25 See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism and Health Care
Reform, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 115, 115-17 (1995).,
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universal family allowance. 26 In the United States, welfare programs
are targeted to specifically defined groups, 27 offer support well below
the poverty level in all but two states, 28 and impose ongoing checks
29
for compliance with status, financial, and behavioral reqairements.
What Americans refer to as welfare is one part of a complex
system of social provision. We will follow the American practice of
using the term welfare to refer to poverty programs, and we will adopt
the term social provision to refer to the larger system of income
support, including social security, Medicare, and unemployment
insurance, as well as welfare. Understanding the political rhetoric of
welfare reform requires understanding the role that welfare programs
play in the larger system of social provisions.
A. The Structure Of Poverty Relief: The Deserving And Undeserving
Poor
In the United States, social provisions extended at the federal level
fall into one of two distinct categories. The first category provides its
recipients with long term benefits indexed to inflation with relatively
few conditions, and includes programs for old age pensions and
Medicare. 30 It guarantees benefits to those who either have maintained
an appropriate attachment to the labor force through work or a family
relationship to a worker, or who belong to a class of citizens
specifically exempted from work. 31 By far the largest amount of
32
federal spending on social provisions supports programs of this type.
26 Valerie Polakow, Lives on the Edge: Single Mothers and their Children in the Other
America 166 (1993).
27 Marmor et al., supra note 23, at 38-39.
28 Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Background Material and Data on
Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means 366-67 (Comm.
Print 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Green Book.] The Green Book is a report published for the
House Ways and Means Committee reporting data on government assistance programs.
29 See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20.
30 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (providing federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance benefits); §§ 1395-1395ccc (providing Health Insurance for the Aged and
Disabled).
31 Marmor et al., supra note 23, at 33-34.
32 Id. at 35-37.
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The second type of federal program is welfare, including AFDC, the
Food Stamp program, Medicaid, and a wide range of other programs
that primarily fund services rather than provide direct financial
support. 33 The beneficiaries of the second track are largely
underemployed and unemployed working age men and women and
their dependents. 34 This type of provision is intended to be transitional
rather than long-term, leading to self-supporting work and
independence. 35 Most programs of this type require substantial state or
local involvement to set benefit levels, place conditions on assistance,
and determine which applicants satisfy those conditions.
There are two types of federal social provision in the United
States, because American welfare programs are founded on moral'
judgments about the poor and the reasons for their poverty. Although
the specific perceptions of particular groups of poor and the
boundaries of the programs designed to help them have been reshaped
by politics, the distinction between the deserving and undeserving
poor has been the basis for poverty relief since at least the nineteenth
century, resulting in striking differences between poverty relief
programs for those deemed morally worthy and those deemed morally
unworthy.
33 Id. at 35-38. Means tested programs also include: child nutrition, earned income tax
credits, supplemental security income, title XX, low-income energy assistance, and
veterans' pensions. 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 1262-63.
34 There is an important residual category not covered by programs in these two tracks.
The remaining category, the poorest of the poor, consists primarily of single men and
women or childless couples, who are able-bodied but unemployed. Marmor et al., supra
note 23, at 40. Members of this group may receive federal assistance under the Food Stamp
Program and also may be eligible for Medicaid, but they receive no federal income support.
Id. As a result, they are dependent on state assistance and on locally funded General
Assistance where offered. Joel F. Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld, The Moral Construction
of Poverty: Welfare Reform in America 126-27 (1991); see infra note 248.
35 See Marmor et al., supra note 23, at 38-39. Federal welfare programs, such as AFDC,
clearly are not intended primarily to provide financial security. "[I]f ensuring a minimally
adequate income for all were the primary focus of American social welfare policy outside
the domain of social insurance, it could have been pursued more readily by other means,"
such as by enacting a minimum income support program for all who fell below a set
standard of need. Id. at 38. Instead, federally supported welfare is a collection of separate
programs, subject to individual means tests as well as to other restrictions that set benefits
levels and target them to people the policy makers believe need and deserve them. Id. at 39.
The obvious purpose of this complex array of means tested, limited benefit programs is to
create opportunities for the poor to become productive citizens by removing specific
barriers to self-sufficiency. Id.
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The earliest poor relief programs in the United States, followed the
English pattern, and were locally administered, aimed at minimal
relief of misery, and avoided interfering with the labor market.36 Local
administrators ensured that the conditions of relief were such that
neither strangers nor those in the community who were perceived as
37
having no morally worthy reason to not work, would seek help.
Thus, the amount of relief was always less than the lowest paid worker
could earn.38 The able-bodied who were destitute without morally
acceptable reasons were placed in poorhouses, required to work in
outdoor relief programs performing demeaning tasks such as breaking
rock, or, more typically, were denied relief altogether. 39 From an early
point in American history, then, poverty relief has reflected the labor
market and the moral code of the community, and benefits have been
denied to those who were able-bodied or without a morally acceptable
reason for their destitution.
As labor market conditions changed, the moral status of particular
groups of poor changed. For example, over the course of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, new categories of poor were
deemed deserving, and state programs provided benefits for their
permanent relief.40 Civil War veterans were the first to receive old age
pensions, 41 followed by civil service workers. 42 By the 1930s, many
states had created pension programs for the blind, deaf, mute, or
insane, but poverty in old age was still deemed by many to result from
36 Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 45-48. Economic depressions in the late
nineteenth century led to increased unemployment. Id. As a result, harsher poverty relief
policies, including forcing the poor into poorhouses, ensued. Id.
37 Id. at 45-47. This has been called the "hostage" theory of poor relief. Id. at 47. The
aged, widowed, and members of families where the husband was temporarily out of work
were deemed to have morally worthy reasons for their poverty. Id.
38 Id. at 47-48.
39 Id. at 46-47.
40 Id. at 47-48. Old age pensions did not expand during this period, however, because of
abuses in the Civil War veterans' pension program. The United States thus lagged decades
behind other industrialized countries in the creation of a relatively comprehensive old age
pension program. See Orloff, supra note 23, at 215-17.
41 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy
in the United States 102-03 (1992). Civil War veterans had earned their benefits by serving
the public. Id. at 151.
42 Richards, supra note 24, at 23.
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improvidence, not inability to work; thus old age pension programs
43
lagged behind other forms of support for the deserving poor.
Similarly, the poverty of single mothers was generally considered the
just reward of morally deviant women who violated the "domestic
code" of the early twentieth century, which emphasized women's
dependence on male breadwinners. 44 The fact that working class
women often worked outside the home only reinforced the middle
class value of female dependence embraced by the leading reformers
of the early twentieth century.45 Many states enacted mothers' pension
programs, however, so that "deserving" mothers, those who had lost
support through the deaths of their husbands, could meet their
46
children's needs.
Thus, long before the Social Security Act was enacted in 1935,
two fundamental principles of poverty relief were firmly established.
First, relief would be guaranteed only to those whose reasons for
failing to support themselves were morally acceptable. Second, for the
morally ambiguous poor: single mothers; the elderly with a marginal
work history; and childless able-bodied adults, the determination of
whether their poverty was morally worthy or not was based on past or
continuing conduct. Such judgments, and thus the control of benefits,
were left to local administrators who considered the legal criteria for
eligibility, the conduct of individual beneficiaries, and implicitly, the
47
costs and intangibles that mattered to local taxpayers and voters.
When massive unemployment hit during the Great Depression, local
governments experienced increasing difficulty in redistributing income
in order to provide minimum poverty relief.48 Although the Social
Security Act did not change the principles favoring provision for the
morally deserving poor and local administration of relief for the
43 Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 80.
44 See id. at 52. Early feminists who pushed broader programs did not win general
acceptance. See id. at 53-63.
45

See id. at 54-55.
46 See Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare,
1890-1935 37 (1994) [hereinafter Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled].
47 See Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 47.

Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse 213-14 (1986) [hereinafter Katz, In
the Shadow of the Poorhouse].
48
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undeserving poor, the Act recognized the expanding need for poverty
relief programs and the states' inability to guarantee them.
B. FederalResponsibility ForSocial Provision
The modem American welfare state emerged during the New
Deal, and the' enactment of the Social Security Act was one of the
most significant markers of its arrival. The programs created by the
Social Security Act displayed remarkable continuity with the values
and structure of existing poverty relief.49 On one hand, the Roosevelt
administration and its business allies fought successfully to create
federally guaranteed and administered old age pensions on a carefully
limited ideological basis that reinforced the work ethic by
guaranteeing benefits to those who "earned" them through their
contributions from wages. 50 On the other hand, under the Old Age
49 Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 90. The Social Security Act was debated in a
context of "traditional attitudes toward relief policy and labor discipline .... ." Id. The
Roosevelt Administration was unwilling to resist business' demands that states take the
primary responsibility for administering relief programs so that the employed would be
pressured to remain working and relief payments could be kept below prevailing wages. Id.
At Roosevelt's insistence, the Social Security Act rejected European models of national
insurance for the unemployed, in favor of unemployment compensation that was
administered locally with no minimum national standards. See id. at 91-93. Again at
Roosevelt's urging, old age pensions established by the Act were based on an insurance
model, under which benefits were "earned" by paying a portion of wages into a fund, rather
than on alternative proposals for universal old age support that would benefit the poor as
well as the middle and working class elderly. See id. at 105. Categorical assistance under
the Act, for the aged not covered by the pension program and for single mothers with
children, was left in the hands of state and local administrators. Id. Little was done to
challenge entrenched state or local prerogatives, although the Aid to Dependent Children
Program broadened some guidelines for assisting children in single parent families and
required statewide administration of benefits, in effect extending benefits to many
minorities in counties without local welfare programs. Id. at 104.
50 See Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, supra note 48, at 236-37. Roosevelt's
limitations prevailed despite the Council on Economic Security's recommendation to enact
a much broader, redistributive program of social provision to reach all elderly persons. See
id. Roosevelt was opposed to any program which resembled the dole and which was
redistributive. See id. at 236-37. He argued that legitimacy of the pension program would be
enhanced by shielding recipients from the stigma of the dole. See id. at 236. Further, tying
benefits to contributions would reduce the likelihood of demands for increased benefits. Id.
Agricultural and domestic workers, who were disproportionately African-American, were
excluded to satisfy the political interests of Southern states. Jill Quadagno, The
Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State 11516(1988).
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Assistance ("OAA"), Aid to Dependent Children ("ADC"), and
Unemployment Insurance ("U") programs created by the Social
Security Act, the administration of welfare for the morally ambiguous
poor remained in the hands of state and local administrators who could
create discretionary standards, such as being a suitable parent or
having a good reason for unemployment. 51 Thus, federal social
provision under the Social Security Act was built upon the pre-New
Deal moral foundation for welfare; the deserving "earn" benefits that
are relatively generous, long term, and secure, while the undeserving
receive short term, conditional benefits consisting of services and
below-poverty financial support administered by local officials who
exercise a great deal of discretion.
Passage of the Social Security Act changed the outlook of
politicians in ways that have influenced the welfare debate greatly
since 1935. It established that the national economy, specifically
52
capitalism, was the "problem" as well as the "solution" to poverty.
The Social Security Act, among other New Deal initiatives, signaled
the realization by elites that the federal government had to manage this
"solution" because state and local regulators had neither the will nor
the capacity to do so. 53 Thus, under the Act, the national government
assumed responsibility for a redistributive role that the individual
states could not fulfill by guaranteeing the economic security of retired
workers who played by the rules of the capitalist economy, and by
contributing to funding for at least minimal relief for less deserving
categories of poor.
Roosevelt successfully resisted efforts to make social provision for
the deserving poor universal and more redistributive, while preserving
the character of welfare as a locally administered, highly regulatory
51 Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34 at 103-04. OAA had a great deal of support. Id. at
102. Another old age assistance program, which, unlike OAA, was fully federalized, also
had strong backing but was resisted by the Roosevelt administration. Id.
52 Id. at 128.
53 President Roosevelt established commissions to define the new character of national
development in light of and in relation to the nation's urbanization. See Kenneth Fox, Better
City Government: Innovation in American Urban Politics, 1850-1937 163, 166 (1977). The
University of Chicago sociologists who wrote the final report to Roosevelt, and who were
the leading urban experts of that time, concluded that the federal government would have to
assume a substantial and permanent role to maintain urban economies that had lost the
capacity to sustain themselves. Id. at 167.
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program. But Roosevelt's theory that old age insurance beneficiaries
were deserving because they "earned" benefits through contributions
from wages, 54 -inverted popular thinking about social provision. In
1935, many educated, middle-class Americans already believed that
the elderly deserved benefits because they were in need despite the
fact that they had worked. 55 Although, as Roosevelt predicted, the
payroll tax inevitably reinforced workers' sense of entitlement,
increasingly, a broader concept of reciprocity took hold. Citizens who
were productive workers throughout their lives, or who would have
been but for their age or disability, believed they should enjoy no less
than a minimum standard of living in old age. 56 Indeed, the
entitlement itself has been expanded continually both to provide
minimum benefits to all elderly Americans whether or not they meet
the qualifications for old age pensions, and to include benefits beyond
direct financial support.57 Though the number of Social Security
beneficiaries was initially relatively small, today nearly all Americans
will receive Social Security benefits at some point in their lives, many
under more than one program. The idea that federally guaranteed
entitlements have been "earned" by most Americans is accepted by a
broad and powerful coalition of interests that the Social Security Act,
58
and its subsequent administration, helped bring into existence.
C. Post-New Deal Growth In Entitlements
Since the New Deal, the federal old age insurance and welfare
programs established by the Social Security Act have evolved along
separate lines. The Roosevelt Administration's preference for
contributory social insurance, and its simultaneous disapproval of
welfare programs, was reflected in its expansion of the old age

54 "Earned" was a powerful ideological tool for defining and delimiting the deserving. In
truth, social security benefits have never been established on a strict actuarial basis. See
Bruno Stein, Social Security Pensions in Transition: Understanding the American
Retirement System 244 (1980).
55 See Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, supra note 48, at 204-05.
56 See Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 106-110.
57 See id.
58 See infra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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insurance program. 59 Administrators of the program were committed
to making the program more popular than non-contributory welfare.
Coverage regularly was extended or benefits raised, sometimes prior
to corresponding increases in contributions. Increases often occurred
when public interest in non-contributory welfare rose. 60 By the mid1950s, old age insurance supported more beneficiaries than did noncontributory welfare programs under the Social Security Act, and
enjoyed the support of solid constituencies in Congress and among the
public. 61 Social security was supported not only by the elderly who
received benefits, but also by the families who otherwise would have
had to take care of them, and by younger workers whose retirement
62
plans began with an expectation of Social Security payments.
Growth of federal programs for the elderly illustrates not only the
success of federal administrators' coalition-building in support of
programs for the deserving, but also the spread of two broad popular
understandings. First, the public supported the idea that the elderly
deserved a minimum quality of life, free from the kinds of harassment
that typified state-administered welfare programs. 63 Second, the public
equated such guarantees with the federal program. 64 Suggesting
rollbacks of federal funding and administration for the elderly quickly
became a form of political suicide. 65 Following the initial slow growth
of the Old Age Assistance program, federal standards and federal
administration were made universal in the early 1970s. 66 With the
passage of the Supplemental Security Act in 1974, however, benefits
for the elderly and disabled poor who were not covered by old age
59 It is ironic that about 17% of social security beneficiaries are the spouses and children
of retired or disabled workers, and thus persons who did not earn their benefits through
contributions. See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 34-35. The families of favored
workers are treated in ways that contrast sharply with the treatment of the families, and the
children in particular, of disfavored AFDC recipients. See infra part III, section B.
60 Orloff, supra note 23, at 307.
61

Id.

62

Id.

63 Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 109; Orloff, supra note 23, at 307-08.
64 Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 109; Orloff, supra note 23, at 307-08.
65 See Richards, supra note 24, at 158.
66 Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 108-09.
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insurance were fully federalized and indexed to the cost of living. 67 An
emerging national consensus that the elderly poor were "deserving,"
not simply improvident workers, and that their welfare was the
responsibility of the federal government made the Supplemental
Security Income and Medicaid programs politically feasible.
In sharp contrast, Aid to Dependent Children ("ADC") remained a
much less generous, and often politically contested, program for
persons whose poverty was morally ambiguous. 68 At its creation in
1935, it was considered a white widow's program, not a general relief
program for single mothers or poor women. 69 "Suitable home"
requirements often enabled local administrators to exclude mothers
who were unmarried or who did not lead exemplary lives.70 Indeed,
when ADC was added to the legislation that became the Social
Security Act, the Roosevelt administration thought the need for ADC
would remain quite limited. The realities, however, were that many
single mothers were not the widows of working males, and that single
parenting would increase over time. The plight of poor women and of
single mothers were not seriously considered or deliberated when
and
ADC was incorporated into the Social Security Act, and the state
71
intact.
largely
left
were
poverty
their
local limits on the relief of
The tension between the conflicting purposes of the ADC
program, to aid children and to provide benefits only to mothers who
meet particular moral tests, was heightened further in the 1960s when
it became apparent that an increasing proportion of beneficiaries were
unmarried, African-American mothers and their children. Poverty
among African-Americans who had arrived recently in northern cities
67 Id. at 108.
68 The irony of treating this program as relief for the undeserving is that the chief
beneficiaries, in both spirit and numbers, are children. This is the primary reason for the
public's ambivalence about adding harsh conditions and limitations to modify the behavior
of parents. See infra part V, section A.
69 Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Welfare Undermined the War on Poverty
119 (1994) [hereinafter Quadagno, The Color of Welfare]. See Gordon, Pitied But Not
Entitled, supra note 46, at 256-57, 271; Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, supra note
48, at 237.
70 See Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from
Colonial Times to the Present 318 (1988).
11 See Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled, supra note 46, at 280-81.
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initially was poorly understood. Contemporary accounts by journalists
and academics described the terrible effects of discrimination and
dislocation, however, which created a widespread understanding that
conditions in the ghetto fostered a distinct "culture of poverty" that
prevented the poor from entering the mainstream. 72 One response to
this new understanding was the poverty policy of the Johnson
Administration, which established a wide variety of programs
providing services, skills, and even work and other forms of social
participation, to address the lack of economic opportunities and other
barriers to obtaining mainstream jobs.7 3 Funding for the Great Society
programs soon peaked, however, and since the 1960s, such programs
74
have been subject to progressive cutbacks or to elimination.
Acceptance of the culture of poverty theory also made other
arguments possible. Conservatives argued that the behavior of the poor
was different from the behavior of citizens in the mainstream, and that
as a result, the poor lacked a work ethic suitable for mainstream jobs;
in their view, the behaviors induced by the culture of poverty result in
continuing, self-inflicted poverty. 75 Popular beliefs that character
differences existed between the poor and the mainstream, made easier
by the perceived racialization and feminization of poverty in America,
lay behind the introduction of work requirements in the AFDC
Program in 1967, and the increasing emphasis on work and other
regulatory requirements that have attached to welfare benefits from
1967 to the present. 76

72 See Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on
Welfare 16-18 (1989) [hereinafter Katz, The Undeserving Poor]; Oscar Lewis, A Study of
Slum Culture 4-17 (1968). See generally Daniel P. Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case
for National Action, reprinted in Lee Rainwater & William L. Yancey, The Moynihan
Report and the Politics of Controversy: A Transaction Social Science and Public Policy
Report 40-125 (1967).
73 See Katz, The Undeserving Poor, supra note 72, at 79-81.
74 See Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 133-34.
75 See, e.g., Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 186-91
(1984). See also Katz, The Undeserving Poor, supra note 72, at 151-65 (analyzing Losing
Ground); Walter B. Miller, Focal Concerns of Lower-Class Culture, in Poverty in America
396, 396-405 (Louis A. Ferman et al. eds., 1968) (examining the lower class culture).
76 Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 132-142.
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While AFDC, the best known federal welfare program,
increasingly has become the target of conservative reformers, income
support programs for the deserving poor have fared much better. In
1973, Congress sought to remove many federal programs from
political infighting, including Social Security, Supplemental Security
Income, and Food Stamps, by indexing them to inflation. 77 In
addition, the enactment of the EITC in 1975 provided poor wage
earners with a small earnings enhancement,78 and the program has
79
grown steadily without public comment since that time.
In the 1980s, Reagan's reform proposals introduced two new and
significant themes that we will discuss at length below: cost cutting
and reducing the size of the federal government.80 As part of his
welfare reform package, Reagan considered making AFDC an entirely
state-directed program, thus ending the federal entitlement to welfare,
but the proposal was dropped when it appeared to be politically
unfeasible.8 1 Instead, Reagan submitted a package of reforms to create
block grants in the place of several categorical programs funding
welfare related services, which would have resulted in reduced AFDC,
Medicaid, child nutrition, and Food Stamp benefits.8 2 Although
Reagan only made incremental modifications to the existing programs,
the modifications rendered ineligible a substantial number of welfare
recipients by reducing "disregards" for income earned by recipients
who were employed but earning wages that left them well below the
poverty level. 83 The struggle to enact appropriate work requirements
appeared to end in consensus with the enactment of the Family
Support Act in 1988 ("FSA"), a sweeping reform of AFDC that made

77 Aaron Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process 293-96 (2d ed. 1988).
78 Howard, supra note 4, at 406-07.
79

Id. at 404.

80 Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?: Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of
Retrenchment 13-17, 115-125 (1994).
81

Id. at 120.

82 Timothy Conlan, New Federalism: Intergovernmental Reform from Nixon to Reagan
114-17 (1988).
83 See David Stoesz, Poor Policy: The Legacy of the Kerner Commission for Social
Welfare, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1675, 1680-1681 (1993).
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transition to work a primary goal of welfare. 84 The Job Opportunities
for Basic Skills ("JOBS") program enacted as part of the FSA
mandated support services and transitional benefits to make work a
realistic possibility. 85 Significantly, Congress appropriated only a
small amount of funding for services and transitional benefits under
JOBS, and a large number of states still have not fully implemented
the program.8 6
D. How Welfare Ideology Has Shaped Welfare Reform In The 1990s
In 1993, President Clinton introduced a new work transition
program, The Work and Responsibility Act ("WRA"), the central
feature of which was a time limit on welfare payments. 87 While
Clinton's proposal was carefully balanced with provisions to extend
the time limit and provide support services and child care, its effect
was to breach the dike that had been restraining more radical welfare
reform. For the first time, a Democrat proposed cost containment,
transition to work, and time limits on welfare entitlements as principal
goals of welfare reform. After the Republican landslide in off-term
congressional elections in 1994, however, the WRA quickly was
superseded by more extreme proposals. 88 Republicans extended the
logic of Clinton's suggested reforms and proposed, among other
limitations, time limits, prohibiting payments to mothers under
eighteen with illegitimate children, requiring that adolescent mothers
live with an adult, and barring welfare for legal aliens.8 9 Furthermore,
84 See Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families With Dependent Children:
The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 457, 458
(1987-1988) (discussing the Family Support Act of 1988).
85 Id. at 503-505.
86 In 1993, Congress allocated a total of one billion dollars for the states to implement
their JOBS programs. 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 349. As of May 1993, all
jurisdictions had implemented the JOBS program statewide, although only 16 states had
claimed the entire amount of their federal funds. Id. at 356. On average, only 16% of nonexempt AFDC adult recipients required to participate in the JOBS program did, although
there is some suspicion that these figures were overstated. Id. at 356-59.
87 See Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 104
(1994) (proposing to amend 42 U.S.C. § 617(a)).
88 See, e.g., Gingrich et al., supra note 13, at 65-74.
89

Id.
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Republicans proposed radical reductions in the federal role by
proposing to eliminate the entitlement to welfare and to convert AFDC
to a block grant program. 90
While the Republican proposals were more extreme than President
Clinton's initial proposal, they share important underlying premises.
Both Democrat and Republican proposals have adopted the moral
logic of self-sufficiency. 91 Both parties' proposals have emphasized
the limited responsibility of government for the poverty of the ablebodied, 92 and have reduced the federal commitment to welfare by
cutting funding, limiting eligibility, and transferring far greater
discretion to state administrators. As the 1996 presidential election
approached, Clinton's initial rejection of the Republican efforts to end
the federal entitlement to welfare altogether 93 was replaced by his
willingness to sign a bill that contained many of the essential features
of the Republican block grant proposal. 94 Within just two years,
congressional Republicans maneuvered President Clinton into signing
legislation that he had opposed initially and that contained key
elements of the broad conservative reform agenda, including an end to
AFDC, the sixty-year-old framework guaranteeing welfare
entitlements and open-ended federal subsidies for state welfare
programs.

90 Id. at 66-67; see supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
91 The power of the moral logic of self-sufficiency underlying contemporary welfare
reform may be measured by the vast scope of the proposed reforms, which extend well
beyond repealing the AFDC program to include cutbacks in Medicaid, Food Stamps, school
lunch programs, Head Start, child care assistance, and a variety of other programs that offer
nutritional supplements, medical care, or other services. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility
Act of 1995, supra note 14, § 501(b), This logic has also been extended to EITC which for
the first time is being characterized by Republican reformers as a handout because it
includes some working welfare recipients and childless adults and because, like many
poverty relief programs, it benefits some families who are marginally above the official
poverty threshold. See, e.g., Frank James, Tax Credit Plan in Peril: Program Helps Lowest
Earners, Chicago Trib., Oct. 9, 1995, at 1.
92 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
93 See Mitchell, President Voices Optimism, supra note 2; See Robert Pear, Senate
Approves Sweeping Changes in Welfare Policy, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1996, at Al
[hereinafter Pear, Senate Approves Sweeping Changes in Welfare Policy].
94 See Clines, supra note 2, at Al.

VirginiaJournalof Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 4:3

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, enacted in August 1996, less than a year after Clinton
vetoed similar legislation in November 1995 and January 1996,
introduced the most sweeping changes in welfare since the New
Deal. 95 This historic legislation not only reduces and caps federal
spending for welfare, 96 but as its centerpiece it eliminates the AFDC
program's guarantee that all eligible persons will receive welfare. 97 By
replacing AFDC with a new block grant, the Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families ("TANF") block grant, the new law greatly reduces
the federal government's role in setting program priorities and
overseeing standards for eligibility, and it ends automatic federal costsharing as welfare rolls rise or fall in98 response to economic and
demographic changes in particular states.
In 1988, the Family Support Act ("FSA"), which also emphasized
work-for-benefits, was enacted with broad bipartisan support. 99 The
FSA increased the federal commitment to assist recipients who were
able to make the transition to work while maintaining support for the
rest who were not. 100 Only five years elapsed between the adoption of
the Family Support Act and the revolution that began with Clinton's
1993 proposal to "end welfare as we know it" and that unleashed the
more conservative proposals inspired by the Contract With America.
Why did an altered political rhetoric about the importance of ending
95 See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20. Less than a year before signing this
legislation, Clinton vetoed the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 in November 1995, and the
Personal Responsibility Act in January 1996, both of which would have replaced AFDC
with a block grant program very similar to the one created in August 1996. Clines, supra
note 2, at Al.
96 See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 603(a)(3)(E)).
97 See id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608).
98 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1)).
Polakow, supra note 26, at 60.
100 Handler, supra note 84, at 503. The meager funding appropriated for the FSA programs
revealed that the new consensus was much more concerned about limiting the scope of the
federal commitment to welfare than with providing welfare recipients with a realistic
opportunity to work. See Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 234-35. The FSA also
placed much greater emphasis on self-sufficiency than on changing the conditions under
which welfare recipients exist, and emphasized ending handouts more than ending poverty.
Id. at 235.
99
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welfare emerge so quickly, and what allowed it to succeed? Advocates
for welfare reform have manipulated the moral logic underlying
American welfare for their own purposes. Politicians often say that
they are simply following the polls or that welfare reform reflects the
deeply entrenched views of the public.' 0 ' Of course, this is true in the
sense that welfare policy is broadly framed by deeply felt moral
values. 10 2 The ideology of welfare insures that certain values will be
present in the public discussion of welfare; but values alone do not
determine political outcomes. It is the combination of those values and
the highly selective images of welfare recipients and welfare
dependence that give meaning to "welfare as we know it."'10 3 Nor can
the media be blamed for pressuring politicians to propose particular
programs. The media, like the welfare policies themselves, reflect
images and issues that have acquired their importance and power
cycle of selective political advocacy and popular
through the
04
response. 1

101 For example, the New York Times reported that Clinton's campaign promise to end
welfare and his administration's subsequent reform proposals originated in campaign polls
that suggested that the public strongly supported such measures. DeParle, supra note 2, at
A 1,A18. At the same time, as the subsequent development of those promises suggests, the
initiative to end welfare was subject to radically divergent interpretations within the Clinton
administration and was ultimately directed by the ideology of the dominant faction among
the President's advisors. Both parties regularly cite polls or election results to justify
policies, but they rarely acknowledge their own broad power to shape policies.
102 See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
103 See Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, supra note 48, at ix-xiv; Orloff, supra note
23, at 306-10. See generally, Frank R. Baumgartner & Bryan D. Jones, Agenda Dynamics
and Policy Subsystems, 53 J. Pol. 1044 (1991) (examining the interaction between policy
images and policy action).
104 See Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse
Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1159, 1168-69 (1995)
[hereinafter Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers] (providing an illustration of this
phenomenon). There is a large amount of literature exposing the strong bias of the ideology
of American welfare policy towards employment, self-sufficiency, patriarchy, and racial
supremacy, reflecting deeply ingrained patterns in our history. Some scholars claim that
welfare policies reflect these ideologies because they reflect fixed features of American
cuilture. See, e.g., Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency" Tracing a
Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, J. Women Culture & Soc'y 309, 325-31 (1994);
Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 22-27; Skocpol, supra note 41, at 31-34. Yet such
ideological determinism underestimates the importance of the role of politics in shaping
policies throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, sometimes with strong dissents
and competition between quite different proposals. Ideological determinism also makes it
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There are enormous gaps in the logic of contemporary reform. By
focusing public attention on the qualities that distinguish the
stereotypical welfare recipient from the mainstream, reform advocates
have been able to shift the emphasis of public discourse away from
poverty, to the deviant behavior of recipients. If the public debate had
focused on the issue of poverty, the development of policies assisting
the large number of working Americans experiencing a loss of
economic security would be the central issue in welfare reform.
Serious examination of the extent and causes of poverty would expose
the weakness of arguments that depend on the incorrect, negative
stereotypes of welfare recipients, and would draw attention to the
impact of welfare reform on the twenty million working poor in
America. Such inquiry also would highlight the fact that the working
poor are among those who receive welfare, and the fact that a
substantial proportion of welfare recipients typically cycle between
low-wage work and welfare.
If there are so many serious gaps in the premises for welfare
reform, why has the rhetoric been so effective in controlling public
reaction to such extreme proposals, and what are the limits of its
power? Poverty is a moral issue, and, as a result, the ideology of
welfare always has stressed the need for self-sufficiency. Only those
excused from supporting themselves receive welfare, and they are
subject to continuing scrutiny because of their status. The critical issue
in the public debate about welfare reform is who the beneficiaries are.
The images invoked by advocates for reform are selected in order to
evoke moral judgments such as outrage and contempt, or sometimes
sympathy, but are not chosen to illuminate the complex causes of
poverty.' 0 5 Historically, characterizations of welfare recipients have
overshadowed close scrutiny of the causes of poverty, precisely
because personal qualities carry heavy moral implications about the
reasons for poverty. For example, the recipients of the ADC program
proposed in 1935 as part of the Social Security Act were
presumptively white widows and their legitimate children. 10 6 This
characterization made their need and worthiness self-evident and also
difficult to explain the social movements that have, from time to time, put forward radically
different visions of welfare. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 24, at 173.
105 See Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers, supra note 104, at 1191-95.
106 Id. at 1175.
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justified placing conditions on ADC to assure that benefits could be
denied to most unmarried and working poor mothers.'1 7 As the
character of American poverty changed in the 1960s, an increasingly
visible minority of recipients were Xfrican-Ameritan amd umarried,
and images of these welfare mothers began to dominate the rhetoric of
reform, linking welfare to teen pregnancy, illegitimacy, and ghetto
poverty. 10 8 As a result, widespread assumptions about ghetto poverty
governed reform discussions.10 9
Although the powerful welfare recipient stereotype, established by
the public discourse of welfare in the 1960s, as an unemployed,
African-American, unmarried, illiterate, teen-age resident of the
ghetto, still pervades the reform advocacy today," l0 arguments about
the link between poverty and welfare dependence have taken a new
turn. The stereotype still leads to inferences about the self-infliction of
poverty as before,"' but it also stands for further widespread and
uncontested assumptions: the welfare system has "failed," and
receiving welfare is itself the chief cause of continuing poverty. This
conclusion was the foundation for the August 1996 law that ended the
federal entitlement to welfare and reduced spending for many poverty
relief programs.
The respectability of the argument for ending national welfare
programs altogether can be attributed largely to Charles Murray's
Losing Ground, 1 2 a forceful attempt to provide an empirical basis to
reduce benefits for the poor. 113 Murray principally relies on the
showing that the poverty rate stopped declining after the AFDC
program expanded in the 1960s, and has remained at about the same
level since that time. 1 4 Murray concluded that welfare and affirmative
107 Id. at 1175-76.
108 Id. at 1180-81.

109 Id. The Kemer Commission described at length the mischaracterizations of AfricanAmericans that prevailed in the media, and which had become the folk wisdom upon which
legislators and the public drew. Id. at 1181-82.
110 See id. at 1185-88.
ill Seee, s pxtes

75-76 and ae¢cmpayirtkg text.

112 See Murray, supra note 75, at 189.

113 See Katz, The Undeserving Poor, supra note 72, at 151-152.
114 Murray, supra note 75, at 56-65.
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action have undermined the work ethic and self-esteem of the poor and
have contributed to social problems like adolescent childbearing.' 15 As
a solution, he recommended ending both affirmative action and
welfare." 6 Although Murray's failure to take into account the drastic
decline in the real dollar value of welfare benefits since the 1970s
renders his inference invalid,' 17 this flaw has not weakened the strong
appeal of his argument, 118 or altered the fact that it underlies the
reforms put forward by both political parties. The puzzle remains why
such a flawed inference has dominated the welfare reform debate.
Murray's social vision has continuing power, notwithstanding his
flawed inferences and the mounting empirical evidence that work
requirements will not end welfare." 9 The appeal of Murray's vision is
explained in part by its consistency with the widely held public
stereotype, which is a product of the selective emphasis of gossip,
popular memory, and media depictions of welfare recipients.1 20 The
underclass stereotype remains forceful in spite of its distortions
because it serves other purposes, such as scapegoating the welfare
poor for high taxes and social decay.1 21 But the appeal of this theory
may be greater now than ever before for historically specific reasons.
The justification for contemporary proposals is that welfare is being
reformed for the benefit of recipients: reforms will offer the "tough
love" that welfare recipients need.' 22 But why is "tough love" a
115 Id. at 156-62.
116 Id. at 227-30.

117 David T. Ellwood, Poor Support: Poverty in the American Family 58-61 (1988)
[hereinafter Ellwood, Poor Support].
118 See, e.g., Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers, supra note 104, at 1174 (quoting
the Report From the White House Working Group on the Family, which accepted the
welfare stereotype as evidence of welfare recipients' behavior notwithstanding statistical
evidence to the contrary).
119 See James Q. Wilson, But Who Will Find Them Work?, The Times Literary
Supplement, Sept. 20, 1996, at 15.
120 See Katz, The Undeserving Poor, supra note 72, at 151.
121 Gans, supra note 6, at 7.
122 See Malcolm Gladwell, The Poor, Apparently, Will Always Be With Us, Wash. Post
Nat'l Wkly. Edition, Dec. 11-17, 1995, at 23 (stating that "[t]he goal [of welfare reform] is
to bring about a spiritual rejuvenation of the underclass, not a physical rejuvenation of the
streets where they live").
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predominant theme of welfare reform rhetoric? Not coincidentally,
this stance fits well with another appeal to constituents that welfare
reform will not only end the federal government's misguided previous
interventions but will also cut costs and reduce tax burdens at the same
time. 123 Welfare reform is obviously a rollback of social programs that
have been described by conservatives for a decade as favoring "special
interests." But ending poverty and improving conditions in the
ghetto--the most important goals of welfare reform in the 1960s-are
far from the current welfare reform agenda. 124 Most importantly,
proposals requiring work, imposing conditions on child-rearing and
penalizing childbearing reinforce values that many Americans cling to
as they struggle to maintain their own quality of life, even 25while
particular welfare reform proposals strike many as too extreme. 1
Thus, the welfare reformers of the 1990s are indeed addressing the
problem of poverty, but indirectly and by speaking to the needs of
their constituents who feel the threat of poverty rather than the needs
of citizens who are poorest. In the present climate, proposals for
welfare reform link poverty and government spending in two ways.
First, the proposals appeal to taxpayer self-interest: because the
123 See Gingrich et al., supra note 13, at 65, 74. The contemporary political appeal of
Murray's theory can be better understood in the context of several decades of conservative
criticism of welfare, which appealed to those voters who saw themselves struggling
economically while "special interest" groups were favored by national social programs.
Edsall with Edsall, supra note 1, at 8-10. Conservative electoral strategy in the 1980s linked
resistance to civil rights, affirmative action, and tax burdens to big government and liberal
programs of the 1960s. Id. at 12. At the same time, liberals failed to offer an alternative
explanation for the declining well-being of many American families or a commanding
vision of the future. Katz, The Undeserving Poor, supra note 72, at 139. While the public's
support for national social programs has remained strong, see Times-Mirror Center, The
People, The Press & Politics: The New Political Landscape 32 (Oct. 1994) [hereinafter
Times-Mirror Center], the national political leadership of each party ironically has placed
priority on cutting back social programs. Thus, whether or not Democrats agree with
Murray's social vision, their increasing fiscal conservatism drives their policies toward the
outcomes Murray advocates. With cost cutting as the primary motive, and with defense and
social security untouchable, Congress has had little choice but to cut welfare and related
programs. The primacy of cost cutting, and the lack of alternative programs to cut, makes
welfare reform rhetoric seem to be an exercise in hypocrisy, but as we explain in the text,
cost cutting and poverty relief are connected by more than convenience and are in fact each
part of a powerful implicit economic theory employed by reform advocates. See infra part

IV.
124

See Gingrich et al., supra note 13, at 65-73.

125 See infra part V.
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government must reduce unnecessary spending to relieve the burdens
on the middle and working classes, it can no longer afford to provide
charity for the undeserving poor. Second, drawing on the theory of
political economy underlying Murray's arguments, reformers suggest
that poverty--everyone's poverty, not just the poverty of the welfare
poor-will be solved through the private economy, not through more
government spending. 126 Most simply stated, to favor greater
individual well-being is to oppose government intervention. The
theory is driven by a broad moral vision of society, and argues that
government intervention has undermined individual initiative and selfsufficiency. The argument appeals to those whose economic security
has been seriously eroded in the past two decades and who, at the
same time, have felt excluded from and even oppressed by the social
and economic costs of highly racialized national social policies
Party, such as
associated with "big government" and the Democratic
127
civil rights, affirmative action, and poverty relief.
The goals of Clinton's welfare reform proposals illustrate how
extending this logic undermines the social programs the Democratic
Party once helped to build. Although his proposal to help welfare
recipients attain self-sufficiency is logically consistent with
government support for the creation of job opportunities and adequate
assistance during the transition to work, in the political environment of
the 1990s, the proposal is heard primarily as a call to end handouts, an
interpretation strongly suggested by Clinton's own phrasing-an "end
to welfare as we know it." Further, the message is also clearly
intended to valorize the experience of the working poor and the
economically declining middle class who have had to be satisfied with
the moral rewards offered by jobs that no longer provide economic
security. Not coincidentally, these middle and working class voting
groups have become increasingly critical constituencies in presidential
128
electoral campaigns.
126 Blaming government programs for social problems or linking the growth of the private
economy to reducing the size of government is historically familiar in conservative
thinking. See, e.g., Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited 265-72 (1974);
George F. Gilder, Wealth and Poverty 105-13 (1981).
127 See Edsall with Edsall, supra note 1, at 22-23.
128 Id. at 28, 181. See Richard L. Berke, Clinton Showing Strength Among Michigan's
Voters, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1995, at Al, A14; Frank I. Luntz, They'd Rather Fight Than
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Thus, Murray's theory has ascended largely because it satisfies so
many political and ideological needs. It has provided a context of
assumptions and starting points for reform proposals by Democrats
and Republicans alike who find that the self-interest of the members of
the economically insecure mainstream makes them unusually receptive
to the suggestion that poverty is self-inflicted, because the poor behave
in ways--early single parenthood, ghetto immersion, failure to
complete school, refusal to work--that conflict with mainstream
values, and are readily attributed to individual choice. All the
stereotypes are implicitly associated with racial minorities, 129 an
impression reinforced by the media's selection of issues and contexts
that confirm public preconceptions about recipients. 130 Discussion of
the causes of poverty is short circuited because each of the morally
stigmatizing characteristics of the stereotype carries its own
implications about dependency and the causes of poverty.
In addition to suggesting that welfare dependence is self-inflicted
by behavior that distinguishes welfare recipients from the mainstream,
the moral lens through which the stereotype is viewed narrows the
range of solutions that are proposed. Because in this view the
problems of welfare recipients are caused by the recipients' character
flaws, not by poverty, work at any wage level and under any
conditions is viewed as beneficial to rebuilding character and as a
stepping stone to self-sufficiency; generous welfare without conditions
that force changes in behavior only hurts the poor. Thus, the ideology
of welfare provides a behavioral theory justifying reductions,
conditions, and ultimately non-entitlement. In the 1990s, welfare once
again has become primarily a matter of policing the poor not because
the poor pose a danger to the public, but because the discipline
proposed on the poorest reminds many contemporary wage earners
that they are rich in moral virtue if short on income.
Enacted on the eve of the 1996 presidential election, the overhaul
of federal welfare has been shaped by the way politicians have
Switch, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1996, at A21; Adam Nagoumey, With Images and Ideas,
Dole Shifts His Appeal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1996, at A13.
129 See Shanto Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues
59-61 (1991).
130 Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers, supra note 104, at 1168-71.
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described the nature of the problems to be solved by and the way they
have connected shared beliefs about our society with the proposed
reforms. The rhetoric of welfare failure and welfare dependency has
succeeded in establishing a framework of unexamined assumptions
about the need for reform, on which both major parties have based
their proposals; thus, the public has had little assistance in reaching a
deeper, richer, and more accurate understanding of present or
proposed poverty policies.
III. STEREOTYPES AND REALITIES: WELFARE RECIPIENTS AND THE POOR

By manipulating the moral framework of American poverty relief,
advocates for welfare reform have focused the public's attention on
welfare dependency; they argue that welfare keeps people poor
because it encourages habitual dependency. The massive welfare
reforms enacted in August 1996, limit poverty relief not only for
welfare recipients, however, but also for a much larger group of
working poor families. The General Accounting Office has estimated
that more than two-thirds of all working poor families who do not
receive AFDC rely on one or more additional type of non-cash
131
assistance.
Reformers support their argument that poverty is self-inflicted
through welfare dependency by pervading the rhetoric with references
to "babies having babies" and "the ghetto poor," and by encouraging
the public to draw inferences from those descriptions. 32 Advocates
and the media reinforce the image of the welfare recipient as an
adolescent, minority, never-married mother who is unwilling to work.
In Part III, we address such stereotypes and the misperceptions of the
poor they encourage. First, we describe the poor, and show that they
are not like the stereotypes depicting them. Importantly, most of the

131 U.S. Gen. Acct. Off. Rep. to the Chairman, Subcomm. on Dep't Operations, Nutrition
and Foreign Agric., House of Representatives Comm. on Agric., Welfare Programs:
Opportunities to Consolidate and Increase Program Efficiencies 13 (1995) [hereinafter 1995
GAO Report].
132 According to a 1993 poll, a broad cross section of the public accepts the generally
negative views of welfare and welfare recipients that reformers have invoked to justify
cutting back welfare programs. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers, supra note
104, at 1172 n.69.
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poor live in families with working adults, 133 and thus welfare reforms
designed simply to compel welfare recipients to work are not
appropriate for the vast majority of the poor. Second, we describe two
of the programs that will be terminated or reduced by the recently
enacted welfare reforms, AFDC and the EITC, and the persons who
receive these benefits.134 We describe the age, ethnicity, family size,
and employment of AFDC and EITC recipients to show that the vast
majority differ from the stereotypical welfare recipient in important
ways.
We describe the beneficiaries of poverty programs to demonstrate
that the current rhetoric of welfare reform fails to address the needs of
most of the poor in our society. For example, AFDC recipients
comprise just one-third of all those living in poverty. 135 As a result,
there is a decidedly disingenuous quality to many of the current
welfare reforms, which target dependency by reducing and placing
strict limitations on benefits. This solution is based on the assumption
that welfare recipients cause their own poverty by choosing
dependency over self-sufficiency, work, school, forming a two parent
family, and responsible childbearing. Further, reforms have been
proposed as if the problem of poverty involved only welfare
recipients, and as if all welfare recipients are malingering adults taking
advantage of welfare by avoiding work. In reality, however, nearly
two-thirds of all welfare recipients are children. 136 Thus, welfare
restrictions will affect primarily poor children.

133 Isaac Shapiro & Sharon Parrott, An Unraveling Consensus?: An Analysis of the Effect
of the New Congressional Agenda on the Working Poor (Center on Budget & Pol'y
Priorities, Washington, D.C.), July 1995, at 5-6.
134 Contrary to popular opinion, domestic programs that assist poor families constitute a
very small part of the federal budget. In 1995, three of the major welfare programs targeted
for change, AFDC, Food Stamps, and Supplementary Security Income ("SSI") accounted
for only 3.4% of the federal budget, or $51.2 billion dollars. 1994 Green Book, supra note
28, at 1255. In contrast, the EITC is a tax expenditure, or revenue loss, and as such does not
even appear as a budget item. The expenditure for EITC in 1995 was predicted to be $5.1
billion dollars and was expected to increase to only $5.8 billion dollars in 1996. U.S. Dep't
of Com., Statistical Abstract of the United States 336 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Statistical
Abstract].
135 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 409, 1154.
136 Id. at 399.

Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 4:3

We are not suggesting that poverty is an easy problem to solve, nor
that any particular method is the best way. We are instead pointing out
that the proposed reforms do not address the underlying economic
causes of poverty. Reform proposals redefine the problem of poverty
in terms of dependency and try to fit it into the federal budget, while
avoiding the issues of corporate welfare, affordable housing, and a
living wage. Furthermore, the proposals side-step the hard reality of
those living in poverty and pretend that a tax cut to those earning
$200,000 or more will somehow trickle down to those earning
$20,000 or less. Real reform works to resolve the problem; it does not
make the problem worse.
We conclude this part of our article by placing the reforms in the
context of the low wage labor market. We suggest that poverty is not
caused by the perverse incentives of welfare, but is instead the result
of the lack of educational and employment opportunities for the poor.
A. Who Are the Poor?
Being poor in America is neither about having a hundred dollars to
buy your child a pair of new Nikes, nor about being able to buy a
home. It has nothing to do with being able to buy tickets to a movie or
a fast food dinner, even though these may constitute a poor family's
night out on the town. Rather, poverty is about being unable to afford
a dozen oranges, or basic telephone service, now that deregulation has
taken the lid off of affordability. Poverty is about being unable to go
to the doctor, to repair cracked windows, leaky faucets, and broken
furnaces, or to afford the ever-increasing cost of public transportation.
It is about growing wage inequality, a lack of jobs for those without a
college education, unaffordable day care, and the increasing cost of
health care.
1. Measuring Poverty and the Number of Poor
An important issue in the current debate on the government's role
in helping the poor is the definition of poverty. Currently in this
country, that definition is based on the poverty threshold. The poverty
threshold is defined as three times the income needed for a basic level
of nutrition for a specific family size; families with an income below
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the threshold are officially poor. 137 In 1992, the poverty threshold for
a four person family was $14,335; the threshold for a family of three
was $11,186.138 This official poverty threshold is calculated using all
sources of income including cash transfers through such programs as
Unemployment Insurance, AFDC, Supplemental Security Income, and
Social Security. 139 As a consequence, the pre-transfer poverty rate
differs considerably from the post-transfer rate. For example, in 1979,
when the country was in the midst of a long recession, the pre-transfer
poverty rate was 19.2%, while the post-transfer rate was just 11.6%.140
By 1992, the pre-transfer rate had risen to 22.5%, while the posttransfer rate was 14.5%;141 it was estimated that the cash transfers
helped over twenty million more people stay above the poverty
threshold that year than would have without the transfers. 142 Even
using the post-transfer poverty rate, ten million more people lived in
poverty in 1993 than in 1980.143 It is curious that Congress is seeking
to abandon the poor at a time when post-transfer poverty is on the rise.
The official definition of the poverty threshold has been the source
of intense debate, particularly in the last decade, because there are
many ways to measure poverty. 144 The calculation of the poverty
threshold, for example, emphasizes income and ignores the role of
assets. It is criticized for not taking into account geographic
differences in the costs of housing and utilities, 145 as some of the
137 Id. at 1152.
138 Id. at 1155.

139 1994 Statistical Abstract, supra note 134, at 444-45.
140 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 1172.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1171.

143 See Richard May, 1993 Poverty and Income Trends, (Center on Budget & Pol'y
Priorities, Washington, D.C.), March 1995, at 11.
144 Nat'l Res. Council, Measuring Poverty: A New Approach 97-158 (Constance F. Citro &
Robert T. Michael eds., 1995) [hereinafter Measuring Poverty]; Patricia Ruggles, Drawing
the Line: Alternative Poverty Measures and Their Implications for Public Policy 31-62
(1990).
145 See Nicholas Eberstadt, A Poor Measurement, Wall St. J., April 22, 1996, at A22
(arguing that poverty rates should be based on material deprivation and not income, because
the ability to purchase goods and services more accurately identifies the poor, since most
Americans' incomes fluctuate yearly).
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alternative measures do. 146 Further, the threshold is linked only to the
number of people in a family and does not account for differences in
the age or gender of children or adults younger than sixty-five years of
age.
Several alternative measures that more accurately would reflect the
needs of families have been proposed. According to these alternative
measures, the minimum income needed by a family of four ranges
from a low of $13,700 (the cost of a subsistence diet, shelter, clothing,
and utilities), 147 to $22,308 (based on one-half the median before-tax
income of a four-person family). 148 Some of the alternative measures
adjust for assets, geography, after-tax income, or some combination
thereof. 149 Because most of the alternative measures are higher than
the official poverty threshold, 150 many more people would be
considered poor if these alternative measures of poverty were used.
The recently enacted welfare reforms will affect both officially poor
families, and near poor families whose incomes, although above the
official poverty level, are low enough that they would be considered
poor under an alternative definition of poverty. We will limit our
consideration here to the families that fall below the official poverty
threshold.
2. The Welfare Recipient Stereotype Versus the Reality of Poverty
Relying on little more than stereotypes, welfare reformers have
targeted programs that benefit poor families, and have reduced or
eliminated them. The reformers have suggested that the poor remain
poor through their own actions, especially non-marital childbearing
and failure to work. Further, by focusing on welfare recipients, the
reformers have avoided discussing the poverty of the majority of the
poor, i.e., those who are not AFDC recipients. The picture of poverty
painted by advocates of reform has not distinguished between a typical
poor person and the stereotypical welfare recipient. By linking this
welfare stereotype to the poor, advocates have been able to promote
146 See, e.g., Measuring Poverty, supra note 144, at 143.
147 Id. at 152.
148 See id. at 142.
149 Id.

150 See id.
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the image of someone with a marginal education, with little or no
employment experience, who lacks motivation to assist herself or her
family to escape poverty. But is this a true description of the poor in
America?
In 1992, as shown in Table 1, there were 7.96 million American
families with incomes below the poverty line, including 6.1 million
families with children under the age of eighteen. 5 ' Nearly one out of
every five American families with children was poor.152 Over half of
all poor families with children were single parent families; 153 forty15 4
three percent of such families were headed by a married couple.
Nearly 10.5 million- families in America, both poor and non-poor,
were headed by one parent in 1992.155 Nearly nine-tenths of these
families were headed by women, 156 and more than sixty percent of the
children of these families lived below the poverty line.' 57 In 1993, the
average family in the U.S. had 3.16 members,15 8 while the average
poor family in 1992 was only slightly larger with 3.51 members. 159

151 1994 Statistical Abstract, supra note 134, at 479.
152 May, supra note 143, at 23.
153 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 1154.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1111.
156 Id.

157 1994 Statistical Abstract, supra note 134, at 476.
158 See id. at 63.
159 Id.at 478.
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Table 1
Characteristics of Poverty Population and Welfare Recipients in
1992160

Welfare

Poverty
Individual
(36.88 mil)

Household
(7.96 mil)

Individual
(13.63 nil)

Household
(4.77 mil)

Age
Under 18

39.6%

67.7%

11-18

N/A

N/A

19-25

N/A

10.7%

33.2%

26-34

N/A

12.6%

38.9%

35+

N/A

7.8%

24.0%

15-24

N/A

13.2%

18-24

11.8%

N/A

25-34

15.0%

35-44

35-44

10.7%

23.9%

45-54

6.1%

11.3%

55-64

5.9%

8.3%

65+

10.8%

11.0%

3.8%

160 This Table was compiled by the authors from the figures in 1994 Green Book, supra
note 28, at 401-02, 409-11; 1994 Statistical Abstract, supra note 134, at 476-79; May, supra
note 143, at 15. Columns may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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Poverty
Individual
(36.88 mil)

Welfare

Household
(7.96 mil)

Individual
(13.63 mil)

Household
(4.77 mil)

Ethnicity
Caucasian

66.5%

38.9%

African-American

28.8%

37.2%

Hispanic 161

18.0%

17.8%

Other Ethnicities

4.7%

6.2%

Northeast

16.9%

17.2%

20.6%

Midwest

21.6%

21.0%

23.8%

South

40.0%

41.7%

31.8%

N/A

West

21.4%

20.1%

25.4%

N/A

Families w/ children

67.6%

Headed by one adult

36.7%

Region

Household Type

53.7%

Never married

N/A

48.0%

Separated/Divorced

N/A

22.8%

Headed by two adults

30.9%

Married
Other Households

7.1%
42.5%

32.4%

No adult present I

3.8%

7.5%
1

14.0%

161 "Hispanic origin may be any race; therefore numbers add to more than 100 percent."

1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 1160 n.3.
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Poverty
Individual
(36.88 mil)
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Household
(7.96 mil)

Individual
(13.63 r)

Household
(4.77 mil)

Average Size Family

3.5

2.9

Average # of children

2.2

1.9

No High School Diploma

38.1%

23.7%

High School Diploma

30.7%

22.4%

Some College

13.7%

6.8%

Bachelor's Degree or
more

4.2%

0.5%

Unknown

N/A

46.6%

in families w/ children
Education of
Household Head

(no college)

Household Head w/

55.1%

6.4%

children employed at
least part-time

a. Age
In contrast to the stereotype, which emphasizes the poverty of
young female heads of households, in 1992 about forty percent of the
poor were children younger than eighteen years of age. 162 At that time,
the elderly, people sixty-five years of age or older, comprised 10.8%,
or nearly four million of those in poverty. 163 Thus, slightly more than
one-half of all poor people were either over sixty-five or younger than
eighteen years of age; neither of these groups is normally expected to
work and support a family. In addition, contrary to the rhetoric and
162 Id. at 1154.
163 Id.
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stereotypes, a majority of the heads of AFDC families are not teenage
mothers, but adults older than twenty-five years; 164 fewer than ten
percent of families with incomes below the poverty line have
65
adolescent heads of household.1
Nearly twenty-two percent of all children in the United States live
in poverty.166 Despite this national disgrace, the proportion of children
living in families with incomes below seventy-five percent of the
poverty level for more than six years has increased between 1972 and
1986.167 What is striking about this trend is that the decade of the
1980s was a period in which education and high school completion
increased while family size decreased.' 68 Both of these demographic
changes were expected to reduce poverty. 69 Instead, the risk of living
in a persistently poor family has increased. The proportion of AfricanAmerican children living in families with incomes below seventy-five
percent of the poverty threshold for six years or more increased from
16.1% in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to 26.3% between 1981 and
1986.170 The risk of living in a poor family is not as great for
Caucasian children; only about one percent of all Caucasian children
lived in families with low incomes for six years or more through the
late 1960s and early 1970s. 171 However, these children also
experienced a deterioration in their circumstances, and by the mid1980s, about three percent lived in persistently poor families. 72 Only
a portion of this deterioration is due to the continued growth in the
cause is
proportion of female headed families, however; the principal
73
the increase in inequality of the earnings of wage-earners.
164 Id.

at411.

165 Id. at 1144, 1146.
166 Id. at 1158.
167 See Greg J. Duncan & Willard Rodgers, Has Children's Poverty Become More

Persistent?, 56 Am. Soc. Rev. 538, 543-44 (1991).
168 Id. at 545, 547.
169 Id.

170 Id. at 543-44.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173

See Danziger & Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 104-110.
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b. Ethnicity and residence
The stereotype suggests that the typical poor person is urban and
African-American. While nearly forty-three percent of poor persons
live in central cities, 174 about one quarter live in non-metro areas, and
the remaining thirty-two percent live outside central city
neighborhoods. 175 The relative concentration of urban poor in large
northeastern central cities masks the distribution of poverty across the
country. While only about seventeen percent live in the Northeast,
in the Midwest, and
forty percent live in the South, twenty-one percent
76
1
West.
the
in
percent
the remaining twenty-two
About two-thirds of the poor are Caucasian, and less than thirty
percent are African-American. 177 The proportions of poor who are
Caucasian and African-American have been relatively stable over the
past twenty years. 178 As of 1992, the poor were eighteen percent
Hispanic; 179 this proportion has increased since 1975.180 Therefore, in
sharp contrast to the stereotype, the majority of poor people live
outside the urban ghetto and are white.
c. Family size and structure
Although the stereotypical poor family is large and headed by a
single minority woman, poor families are about the same size as the
average American family with children. Two-thirds of poor families
forty-five percent of poor
have two children or less.' 8 ' More than
182
families are headed by a married couple.
Why, then, has so much attention been paid to the poverty of
single mother families? The proportion of mother-only families, both
174 See May, supra note 143, at 29.
175 See id.
176 See id. at 29, 33.
177 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 1160.
178 Id.
179

Id.

180 Id. According to the Census Bureau, Hispanics can be of any race and thus may be
included in the figures for Caucasians and African Americans. See id. at 1160 n.3.
181 May, supra note 143, at 25.
182 Id. at 14.
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non-poor and poor, continues to increase.183 For example, in 1960, just
seven percent of all families were headed by a mother, while today
more than twenty-five percent of all families are so comprised. 184 This
demographic change is the result of large economic and social forces
that prompted women to seek careers and that changed the
expectations of men and women at all income levels. 185 Families
headed by females are more likely to be poor than other family
types.186 In addition, nearly one-half of these families are poor. There
are at least three causes for their poverty: (1) the comparatively low
earnings of female household heads; 187 (2) lack of contribution from
other adult family members, such as non-custodial fathers; 188 and (3)
who do not qualify for
inadequate public transfers to single mothers
189
survivor benefits through Social Security.
The political rhetoric largely has neglected the poverty of twoparent families even though forty-three percent of all poor families are
composed of a married couple with children. 190 A small proportion of
families with children are headed by a single male, while about
twenty-two percent of the poor are unrelated adults. 191 Although
families headed by females are more likely to be poor, a poor child is
just as likely to grow up in a two-parent family as in a single-parent
family.

183 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 1111; Ellwood, Poor Support, supra note 117, at 45.
184 1994 Statistical Abstract, supra note 134, at 62.
185 See Ellwood, Poor Support, supra note 117, at 47-52.
186 See Irwin Garfinkel & Sara McLanahan, Single Mother Families, Economic Insecurity
and Government Policy, in Confronting Poverty: Prescriptions for Change 205 (Sheldon H.
Danziger et al. eds., 1994).
187 For example, women who lack high school degrees earn 58% of what men with similar
levels of education earn. Rebecca M. Blank, The Employment Strategy: Public Policies to
Increase Work and Earnings, in Confronting Poverty: Prescriptions For Change, supra note
186, at 173.
188 Only approximately 40% of absent Caucasian and 19% of absent African-American
fathers pay child support. Irwin Garfinkel & Sara S. McLanahan, Single Mothers and Their
Children- A New American Dilemma 24 (1986).
189 Id. at 25-26.
190 See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 1154.
191 1994 Statistical Abstract, supra note 134, at 476, 478.
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d. Education and employment
As Table I shows, the heads of poor households typically have
achieved only low levels of education. 192 More than two-thirds of the
heads of poor households have no college experience, and more than
one-third have not graduated from high school or received their
General Equivalency Degrees. 193 The limited education of the heads of
poor households affects the labor-market opportunities available to
them. The demand for less-skilled workers has declined faster than the
size of the low-skilled work force, and employers are hiring more
skilled workers even though they demand higher wages. 194 Therefore,
given the current emphasis on education, a majority of the heads of
poor households face decreasing employment opportunities. "[I]t was
'
harder to escape a poor education in 1992 than it was in 1979. 195
Notwithstanding the declining job market for those with low
education and low skills, in 1993, nearly fifty-six percent of the poor
and two-thirds of all people living in poor families with children lived
in households where someone worked. 196 About twenty-four percent
lived in households with someone who worked full-time but could not
earn enough to escape poverty. 197 Once again, the stereotype does not
hold true. More than one-half of all poor people live with workers who
cannot lift their families out of poverty due to a lack of education and
due to declining job opportunities, not because of lack of effort. We
discuss the job market in greater detail below.' 98

192 Id. at 478.
193 See id.
194 Rebecca M. Blank, Outlook for the U.S. Labor Market and Prospects For Low-Wage
Entry Jobs, in The Work Alternative: Welfare Reform and the Realities of the Job Market
33, 43-45 (Demetra S. Nightingale & Robert H. Haveman eds., 1995) [hereinafter Blank,
Outlook for the U.S. Labor Market].

195 Id. at 43.

196 Shapiro & Parrott, supra note 133, at 5.
197 Id.

198 See infra part II, section D.
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3. Why Do the Poor Remain Poor?
Although the current welfare reform debate ignores poverty, recent
evidence suggests that poverty is more persistent than in the past. 199
The likelihood of exiting poverty has decreased for all groups but is
particularly difficult for female-headed families. 200 Half of those who
escape poverty begin another spell within five years. 20 1 Fewer than
one-third of families who have had periods of poverty of five years or
more remain out of poverty for the five years following their exit from
welfare. 20 2 At any given point, nearly twenty percent of poor families
are in the middle of a long spell. 20 3 Intuitively this makes sense: the
longer a family can stay out of poverty the more likely it is to have
secured an income that provides enough to sustain it through financial
difficulty, and the less likely the family is to experience another spell
of poverty. 204 While a majority of poverty spells last less than eight
months,205 single parents and their children are more likely to be poor
20 6
twelve months out of a year as compared to two-parent families.
Reformers say the poor remain poor because they lack a work
ethic, but the data do not support this description of the vast majority
of the poor in the United States. The typical poor family is likely to be
white and live in a southern city, with one or two children. A poor
child is just as likely to live with both parents who are married, as she
or he is to live with one parent. But regardless of the number of
parents that reside in the home, at least one of those parents works.
199 Duncan & Rodgers, supra note 167, at 542-44.
200 See Ann H. Stevens, The Dynamics of Poverty Spells: Updating Bane and Ellwood, 84
Am. Econ. Rev. 34, 37 (1994).
201 Id.
202 Id.

203 Peter Gottschalk et al., The Dynamics and Intergenerational Transmission of Poverty
and Welfare Participation, in Confronting Poverty: Prescriptions for Change, supra note
186, at 91.
204 This is not to say that these families earned enough to move them from the lowest
quartile in the income distribution. Income mobility has been relatively stable throughout
the 1970s and 1980s; only 20% of all poor persons move to a higher quartile from one year
to the next. See Danziger & Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 123; Gottschalk et al., supra note
203, at 92.
205 Ruggles, supra note 144, at 95-98.
206 Id. at 93-95.
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Welfare reformers are correct in their claims that poverty persists in
spite of rising welfare expenditures, but they are not correct about the
causes of poverty. Although most poor households have a wage
earner, full-time low-skilled jobs are becoming increasingly scarce,
and real wages are declining. Many of the problems of poverty persist
because of the scarcity of jobs above the minimum wage available to
persons who lack a college degree. We return to the economic causes
of poverty below, but next we describe recipients of welfare under the
AFDC program.
B. The AFDC Programand Welfare Recipients
The federal cash assistance program AFDC has been the primary
focus of reform efforts. AFDC recipients have been held up explicitly
as examples of all that is wrong with welfare. Conservatives have
argued that AFDC contributes to the deterioration of social mores, the
breakdown of two parent families, and male irresponsibility towards
family and society. Reformers across the political spectrum have
presumed that a majority of AFDC recipients are trapped in a cycle of
dependency and will remain continuously on the welfare rolls for
years.
The recently enacted reforms not only will terminate AFDC, the
long-standing federal framework for welfare, but also will reduce or
terminate many other federal entitlement programs.2 °7 These other
programs are being modified because they are perceived as providing
"handouts" to persons like those who receive "welfare," i.e., AFDC
recipients. Reform proposals not yet enacted also would reduce the
availability of the EITC, an income supplement explicitly for the
working poor, because the supplement is likewise characterized as a
"handout" to the poor. 20 8 Like the EITC, many of the programs that
207 See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20. The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ends the federal government's historic obligation to
assist poor families. Not only does it eliminate the federal entitlement to cash assistance
through AFDC to poor families, but its nine titles also reduce or terminate access by poor
families and individuals to: Supplemental Security Income, id. §§ 201 et seq. (amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq.); child care programs, id. §§ 601 et seq. (amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9858 et seq.); child nutrition programs, id. §§ 701 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1757 et seq.);
Food Stamps, id. §§ 801 et seq. (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014 et seq.); and Medicaid, id.
§ 114 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396).
208 See infra part IV, section F.
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have been terminated or cut back, including the Food Stamp program,
child care and nutrition programs, and Medicaid, assist both AFDC
recipients and the non-AFDC poor. 209 For example, since its
establishment in 1965, the Food Stamp program has provided coupons
to eligible poor individuals and families for the purchase of nontaxable
food items. 21 0 It is the only means-tested program whose benefit level
is based solely on need and not on residence or family structure.
Nearly 7.4 million households received food stamps in 1992.211
Approximately one-half of these households also received AFDC,
about one-quarter received Supplementary Security Income ("SSI"),
more than one-quarter received Social Security, and more than onefifth received Medicare. 212 The federal government currently pays the
entire cost of Food Stamp benefits and shares administrative costs with
the states. 213 Currently, benefits allocate an average of eighty cents per
meal for recipients; changes to the Food Stamp program reduce this
benefit to an average of sixty-six cents per meal for families receiving
cash assistance in a state program, including families with children,
the elderly, the disabled, and the working poor. 214 In addition, the
Reconciliation Act of 1996 eliminates the eligibility for traditional
welfare benefits of legal immigrants seeking citizenship, 21 5 and limits
eligibility of poor, childless adults between fifteen and sixty years of
age.

2 16

209 For example, the Medicaid program provides health care coverage to poor families with
children and to poor individuals including the elderly and the disabled. See 1994 Green

Book, supra note 28, at 333-34. In 1992, 31.15 million people were enrolled in the Medicaid
program. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Social Security Admin., Annual

Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin 320 (1993). Although a majority of
recipients are poor children and their parents, nearly 70% of Medicaid costs are for care to
the elderly and disabled. 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 805-06.
210 Id. at 768.
211 Id. at 755.
212 Id.

213 Id. at 759-760.

214 The Depth of the Food Stamp Cuts in the Final Welfare Bill (Center on Budget & Pol'y
Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 12, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter The Depth of the Food Stamp
Cuts]. Many households may receive income from more than one of these sources. See
1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 774.
215 Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 401(a) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1611).

Id. § 815 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)). Individuals between 15 and 60 years of age
are ineligible for Food Stamps benefits if they fail to register for work or refuse to
216
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Because reform rhetoric rests heavily on assumptions made about
the character of welfare recipients inferred from popular stereotypes,
we will compare those stereotypes with data about poor families and
families receiving welfare under AFDC.
1. Aid to Families with Dependent Children
The AFDC program originated in the Social Security Act of
The program never was intended to end poverty for poor
families; rather it was designed as a safety net to provide support for
poor children living in fatherless homes. 218 Assistance was extended to
1935.217

the adult head of the household in 1950.219 Throughout this early

period, never-married mothers rarely were eligible for benefits
because they were considered morally unfit to receive aid. 220 Families
that had moved recently also were not eligible for assistance because
local legislators believed that taxpayers should not have to support
transients. 221 Although two-parent families who were poor because of
one parent's unemployment have been eligible to receive benefits
through the AFDC-Unemployed Parent ("AFDC-UP") program since
1962, until the Family Support Act ("FSA") made these benefits
mandatory in 1988, only twenty-six states participated in the twoparent program. 222 Since 1990, all states have been required to provide
assistance to eligible two-parent families for at least six months in a
223
thirteen month period.

participate in state employment related services. Id. § 815(a) (amending 7 U.S.C.
§ 2015(d)(1)). They also are ineligible if they have a child support arrearage, id. § 823
(amending 7 U.S.C. § 2015(n)), or are a convicted felon, id. § 814 (amending 7 U.S.C.
§ 2015(b)(1)(iii)). In addition, eligible persons between 18 and 50 may not receive Food
Stamps for more than three months in any 36 month period. Id. § 824 (amending 7 U.S.C.
§ 2015(o)(2)).
217 Diane M. DiNitto, Social Welfare: Politics and Public Policy 168 (1995).
218 Id.
219

Id.

220 Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, supra note 48, at 253.
221 Michael R. Sosin, Legal Rights and Welfare Change, 1960-1980, in Fighting Poverty:
What Works and What Doesn't 267-271 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds.,
1986).
222 DiNitto, supra note 217, at 169.
223 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 326.
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The Work Incentive Now ("WIN") program, enacted in 1967,
required AFDC recipients to register for work. 224 This requirement
reflected the changing expectations for women with children and
tracked the increased work effort of mothers occurring throughout
society. 225 This work requirement was strengthened by the FSA,
which created the Job Opportunity for Basic Skills ("JOBS") program.
JOBS required recipients with children over the age of three to
participate in employment related activities, including job search,
226
education, and on-the-job training, to increase their self-sufficiency.

224 DiNitto, supra note 217, at 178-79.
225 See Ellwood, Poor Support, supra note 117, at 48-49.
226 The Supreme Court handed down decisions in this period that made it easier for single
mothers and their children to collect welfare benefits. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968) (striking down marital status based restrictions on welfare); Lewis v. Martin, 397
U.S. 552 (1970) (prohibiting states from including the income of a non-adoptive parent
when determining the amount of a child's AFDC assistance). The Contract With America
and subsequent Republican legislative proposals specifically would have banned assistance
to never-married mothers and their children who were born outside of marriage. See, e.g.,
Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, supra note 14, §101 (proposing to' amend 42 U.S.C.
§ 605(a)(4)). While the Reconciliation Act of 1996 does not prevent a state from providing
cash assistance to never-married mothers, it does limit assistance to adolescent mothers.
Only adolescent mothers who reside with either their parents or legal guardian, or who live
in "second-chance" adult supervised homes, can receive cash assistance. Reconciliation Act
of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(5)).
In addition, in 1969, the Supreme Court struck down restrictions on eligibility due to
length of residence in a locality, making it possible for poor families who had recently
relocated to receive assistance. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see Sosin, supra
note 221, at 270-71. This latter change acknowledged the federal role in providing support
by insuring poor people's right to travel. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-31. Recently, some states
have reinstituted minimum residency requirements. Courts have struck down some of these
requirements. See, e.g., Aumick v. Bane, 612 N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); Mitchell
v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1081 (1994). Other states
are limiting the benefits available to new residents to the level available in the state of their
former residence, unless the former state provided a higher level of benefits. The
Reconciliation Act of 1996 expressly allows the states to do this for new residents' first 12
months in the state. Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 604(c)). For example, if a family of three moved from Illinois to Wisconsin, and
applied for AFDC, the maximum benefit they would receive is $367, the Illinois level,
rather than the $517 Wisconsin benefit level. See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 36869.
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2. Program Funding, Benefits, and Eligibility
Federal matching for AFDC benefits ranges from fifty to eighty
percent; 227 a few states, like New York, share their remaining costs
with counties. 228 The federal government has established general
guidelines for administration and eligibility, but the states have
discretion to determine their own Standards of Need and level of
benefits. 229 Contrary to popular opinion, AFDC benefits have declined
in value since 1974, while the number of female-headed families has
continued to rise. 230 In 1993, the last year for which data are available,
the average monthly AFDC benefit was $373.231 When adjusted for
inflation, this average benefit is just fifty-five percent of the value of
the average benefit in 1970.232
State administrators set the Standard of Need, the amount of
money they believe a family needs to survive in that state. The
maximum benefit awarded in most states is well below the Standard of
233
Need, although the proportion varies considerably among states.
Table 2 provides examples of the Standard of Need and maximum
benefits for a family of three in which the head of household does not
work. In 1993, the poverty threshold for such a family was $11,521,
which produces a monthly income of $960.234 Thus the benefit levels
in the three states we compare would be reduced if the family had any
outside income, whether in the form of earned income or monetary
gifts from relatives.
In 1994, the maximum AFDC benefit for a family of three in
Alabama, a low benefit state, was $164, or twenty-four percent of its
$673 Standard of Need, and just seventeen percent of the poverty

227 Id.

228 See id. at 386-87.
229 Id. at 324.
230 See Sara McLanahan & Gary Sandefur, Growing Up With a Single Parent: What Hurts,
What Helps 139-40 (1995).
231 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 325.
232 See id. at 324.
233 See id. at 366-67.
234 Id. at 367 n.4.
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threshold. 235 Colorado, considered a median benefit state, provided a
maximum of $356 per month to such a family, about eighty-five
percent of the $421 Standard of Need, which was thirty-seven percent
of the poverty threshold.23 6 In sharp contrast, New York, a high
benefit state, provided 100% of its $703 Standard of Need in Suffolk
237
county, which was seventy-three percent of the poverty threshold.
In all three states, the combined monthly AFDC and Food Stamp
benefits are less than the monthly official poverty threshold and the
monthly income from a full-time minimum wage job. 238 As Table 2
shows, adding Food Stamps to the benefit package has been important
to reducing poverty.
Table 2
The Standard of Need and Benefits for a One-Parent Family of
Three in Selected States, 1994239
Alabama

Colorado

New York

Standard of Need

$673

$421

$703

Max AFDC Benefit

$164

$356

$703

AFDC + Food Stamp
Benefits

$459

$645

$904

.$1245

$779

$1301

Gross Income Test

$960

Monthly Gross Income At the Poverty Level
Monthly Gross Income at Minimum Wage

235

See id. at 366.

236

Id.

237

Id.

238

See id.

239

Id. at 366-67.

1

$731240

Calculations by the authors based on a minimum wage of $4.25 per hour, for 40 hours a
week, and 4.3 weeks per month.
240
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Food Stamp benefits also have had an impact on state funding for
AFDC because states have taken into consideration the value of the
241
Food Stamp benefits in determining the maximum AFDC benefit.
In part because Food Stamp benefits are funded solely by the federal
government, unlike AFDC benefits, which are partially funded by the
states, most states have allowed the value of their AFDC benefits to
erode over time, knowing that federally funded Food Stamps will
make up part of the difference. Notwithstanding the offsetting
increases in Food Stamp benefits, the real value of the combined
AFDC and Food Stamp benefits for a family of four declined twentysix percent between 1972 and 1992.242
To be eligible for assistance, a single parent family must meet two
income tests: a gross income or asset test, and a counted or net income
test. The gross income test considers the amount of money the
applicant is currently making. In 1994, for example, gross income
could not exceed 185% of the Standard of Need. 243 Thus a singleparent family would not qualify for assistance if its gross income was
greater than $1245 in Alabama, $779 in Colorado, or $1301 in New
York's Suffolk County. 244
The rules governing eligibility for an AFDC-UP family include
both the income tests mentioned above as well as an employment test;
the principle wage earner, usually the father, must be attached to the
labor force as demonstrated with a recent work history.2 45 The wage
earner must have earned income in at least six quarters in any thirteen
calendar quarters, or have been eligible for or received unemployment
compensation within one year of application. 246 Thus if a father has
exhausted his unemployment insurance and has been out of work for
two years, the family will not be eligible for assistance under this
federal program. In addition, AFDC-UP families lose their eligibility
if their principal earner works more than 100 hours in a month.247 As a
241 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 334.
242 McLanahan & Sandefur" supra note 230, at 139-40.
243 See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 366.
244 Id.
245 See id. at 332.
246 Id.
247 Id.
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last resort, the family might be eligible for welfare funded exclusively
by the state or local jurisdiction, known as General Assistance
("GA").248 Benefits under GA programs usually are significantly
below the poverty line, however, and often are available only for short
249
periods of time.
3. AFDC Recipients: Stereotypes and Realities
Recall that the stereotype suggests that the average AFDC
recipient is an adolescent, minority mother, content to live and raise
her many children in the squalor and destitution of an urban ghetto. In
1992, the program served approximately 4.8 million families, or 13.6
million people.2 50 In this section we use the information provided in
Table I and other data about the characteristics of those who receive
AFDC benefits to determine whether this stereotype of the welfare
recipient is supported by the facts.
248 General Assistance is a state or locally financed income maintenance program for
persons in need who do not qualify for economic assistance under the federal AFDC and
Supplementary Security Income programs. There are no federal mandates or regulations
requiring states to implement GA or governing its administration. The program provides
assistance primarily to poor single adults and childless couples. Lewin/ICF & James Bell
Associates, State and Local General Assistance Programs: Issues and Changes 10-13
(1990). Historically, state administrators also have used GA as interim support for
individuals awaiting SSI verification and for two-parent families who are not eligible for
AFDC. Id. Some states provide GA benefits for women in their first two trimesters of
pregnancy. Marion Nichols & Kathryn Porter, General Assistance Programs: Gaps in the
Safety Net (Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), March 14, 1995, at 13.
Benefits range from cash assistance to fire wood, a bag of groceries to a bus ticket. In 1989,
24 states had ongoing or short-term programs without categorical limits for these groups,
while 16 states had ongoing or short-term programs with categorical limits. Lewin/ICF,
supra, at 11. Administration, eligibility, and benefits vary between and within states that
have GA programs. See id. at 10-27. State and local expenditures for GA programs in 1989
ranged from a high of over one and a half billion dollars in New York state, to just under
$2000 in South Carolina. Id. at 14. Because the cost of these programs is borne entirely by
states or by local jurisdictions, their elimination increasingly has been suggested as a way to
reduce expenditures in an effort to balance budgets. See Sandra K. Danziger & Sherrie A.
Kossoudji, University of Michigan, What Happened to Former GA Recipients?, The Second
Interim Report of The General Assistance Termination Project 1 (1994) (describing the
termination of GA in Michigan). In fiscal year 1992 alone, nearly 450,000 recipients lost
assistance as programs were cut or eligibility was changed. Nichols & Porter, supra, at 49.
The impact of these cuts on recipients was not considered; it was assumed that recipients
would find employment. Id. at 41.
249 Id. at 16-17.

250 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 399, 409.
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a. Age
The most seriously distorted perception of welfare recipients, that
most are the heads of households, when in fact two-thirds of all AFDC
recipients are children. 251 Almost half of the children supported by
AFDC are of pre-school age, i.e., five years of age or less, 25 2 and

253
nearly one-quarter of these children are under the age of three.

In sharp contrast to the stereotypical adolescent mother, less than
five percent of AFDC household heads are younger than eighteen, and
half are older than twenty-five. 254 The median age of a male
25 5
household head is thirty-four.

b. Family size and structure
In 1992, the average size of an AFDC family was 2.9 persons;
nearly seventy-five percent of families had only one or two
children. 256 The average size of an AFDC-UP family, which is by
definition a two-parent family, was 4.6 persons. 257 The stereotype of a
welfare household with many children does not hold true for either
single parent families or two-parent families receiving welfare. Large
families are not the norm but the exception.
While the majority of AFDC households are composed of a single
mother and her children, AFDC also assists foster children whose
families meet the eligibility criteria. About fifteen percent of
households that received AFDC assistance in 1992 were children
25 8
living with no adult, and seven percent were two-parent families.
Much of the rhetoric in support of welfare reform focuses on the
stereotype of never-married mothers. However, about sixty percent of
all mothers who receive AFDC for the first time are divorced or
251 See id. at 399.
252 See id. at 401.
253 Id.

254 See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 411.
255 Admin. for Children and Families, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services,
Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipients FY 1993 1-2 (1995).
256 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 401.
257 Id. at 409.
258 See id.

1996]

Fooling All of the People Some of the Time

separated, about thirty percent have never been married, and about ten
percent are widowed. 259 Thus, the majority of women who receive
AFDC for the first time have been married previously.
c. Residency, ethnicity, and education
The stereotype of a welfare recipient as a minority urban ghetto
dweller conjures up the image of vast, public housing projects in
northern cities such as New York, Chicago, and Detroit. Yet once
again, the data do not support the stereotype. The typical AFDC
family lives in private housing. 260 Fewer than twenty-five percent live
in public or subsidized housing, and fewer than five percent own their
own homes. 26 1 A majority of welfare recipients live in the South.262
Thirty-nine percent of AFDC recipients are Caucasian, thirty-seven
percent are African-American, nearly eighteen percent are Hispanic,
and the remaining six percent are Asian, Native American, or another
263
ethnic group.
Although the educational achievement of AFDC household heads
has increased since the late 1960s it remains low. In 1969, at least
264
sixty percent of these mothers had not graduated from high school.
By 1986, only one-half of all mothers who received AFDC for the first
time had more than eleven years of education. 265 AFDC household
heads' limited education gives them a distinct disadvantage in today's
labor market.
259 See David T. Eilwood, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Targeting "WouldBe" Long-Term Recipients of AFDC 42 (1986) [hereinafter Ellwood, Targeting "WouldBe" Long-Term Recipients of AFDC). These numbers differ considerably from those in
Table 1, which take into account only those recipients who currently are receiving
assistance. Never-married mothers, on average, remain on AFDC longer than mothers who
have been married and therefore comprise a greater proportion of those currently receiving
assistance than their initial proportion at entry. See id. at 43.
260 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 409.
261 Id.

262 Id. at 391.
263 Id. at 410.
264 Id. at401.

265 Ellwood, Targeting "Would-Be" Long-Term Recipients of AFDC, supra note 257, at 42.
Using 15 years of data from the PSID, Ellwood estimated that nearly 10% of first time
recipients had less than nine years of formal education, about 38% had at least some high
school experience, and 53% had more than 11 years of school. Id.
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d. Length of time on welfare
As stated earlier, the reform rhetoric concentrates on dependency,
a code word for the length of time a recipient remains on welfare.
Because the stereotype suggests that recipients remain on the dole for
most of their lives, reforms seek to impose life-time limits on the
length of time aid is available to families. Recent analysis indicates
that forty-two percent of new recipients will be on AFDC for two
years or less, while about one-third will remain on the rolls for five
years or more. 266 About twenty-seven percent will receive assistance
267
for twelve months or less.
In a study conducted by Kathleen M. Harris based on PSID data
for 1984-86, more than half the welfare recipients in the sample had
multiple spells of welfare within a two-year period. 268 The mean
length of the first spell for those who exited welfare to work was 10.4
months, whereas the mean length of the first spell for those who
worked their way off welfare, that is, they worked while on welfare,
and will continue to work off welfare, was 12.7 months. 269 Harris
further found that many former recipients returned to welfare for short
270
periods when they were unable to maintain permanent employment.
The average length of this return spell was approximately six
months. 27'

266 See Ladonna Pavetti, Who is Affected by Time Limits?, in Welfare Reform: An
Analysis of the Issues 31, 33 (Isabel V. Sawhill ed., 1995).
267 Id. at 32.
268 Kathleen M. Harris, Work and Welfare Among Single Mothers in Poverty, 99 Am. J.
Soc. 317, 327 (1993) [hereinafter Harris, Work and Welfare Among Single Mothers in

Poverty].
269 Id. at 335.
270 See id. at 334.

271 See id. at 335. About 44% of all spells that were reported monthly ended within 12
months, 51% ended within 18 months, and nearly 64% ended within two years. Id. at 336.
In the year that they exit welfare, more than half the women report family incomes below
the poverty threshold. Kathleen M. Harris, Life After Welfare: Women, Work, and Repeat
Dependency, 61 Am. Soc. Rev. 407, 413 (1996) [hereinafter Harris, Life After Welfare].
After remaining off welfare for a year, however, women are less likely to return. Id. at 41213. Those beginning welfare will receive AFDC for 6.2 years, on average. Mary Jo Bane &
David T. Ellwood, Welfare Realities: From Rhetoric to Reform 64 (1994).
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Recall that many families have a difficult time working their way
out of poverty, and that many of those that escape it are likely to fall
back into poverty once they leave. The same can be said of AFDC
families, who may be considered a high-risk subset of this poverty
population. 272 In contrast to the stereotype, approximately forty-two
percent of recipients who return to AFDC have been employed
recently,2 73 but either could not earn enough to sustain their family, or
lost their jobs and could not find others. 274 Few of these former
recipients qualify for compensation under the current rules governing
Unemployment Insurance. Nearly forty-six percent who return to
AFDC are disabled, adding to the problems they already have
experienced in the job market.275 For such recipients, welfare is a
safety net that helps them supplement their low earnings or helps them
through periods of unemployment. They neither want nor expect to
276
remain on welfare for their rest of their lives.
e. Employment and work effort
Finally, we address the image of welfare recipients as "slackers"-people who not only shirk their responsibility to support their children,
but also expect the rest of society to support them. Efforts to
encourage welfare recipients to enter the labor market date back to
1967 to the Work Incentive Now ("WIN") program, which provided
economic incentives to recipients who worked. 277 Since 1988, families
272 The group identified as being most at-risk for long term dependency is young, nevermarried mothers 'who receive AFDC for the first time when they have a child younger than
three years. See Ellwood, Targeting "Would-Be" Long-Term Recipients of AFDC, supra
note 259, at 50. These women are also less likely to have either graduated from high school
or to have an employment history. Id.
273 Bane & Ellwood, supra note 271, at 44.
274 See id.
275 Id. at 44-45.

276 Kathryn J. Edin, The Myths of Dependence and Self-Sufficiency: Women, Welfare, and
Low-Wage Work, 17 Focus 1, 6 (1995); Kathryn J. Edin, Surviving the Welfare System:
How AFDC Recipients Make Ends Meet in Chicago, 38 Soc. Probs. 462 (1991).
277 With the initiation of WIN, AFDC recipients were allowed to keep $30 of their earnings
in what was called an income disregard. 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 328. Their
benefits were reduced $.67 for every dollar they earned over $30; a benefit reduction rate
that was in effect a marginal tax rate of 67%. Id. In 1981, under the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act ("OBRA"), the Reagan administration limited both the income disregard
and the benefit reduction rate. Id. at 328. Eligibility for AFDC was also tightened,
effectively eliminating the ability of working poor families who had previously qualified for
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have had access to transitional child care funding through the JOBS
program and through Medicaid for the first twelve months of earned
income. 278 Conservative reform proposals require employment after
two years and a lifetime limit on welfare benefits. But are welfare
recipients slackers who deserve such treatment, or are they simply
disadvantaged, low-skilled workers?
Research sharply contradicts popular notions of welfare, and
provides strong evidence that many welfare recipients are attempting
to support themselves and their families despite the disadvantages they
face in the labor market because of their limited education and skills.
More than one-half of the parents in Harris' sample worked while on
welfare. 279 Women with welfare spells of six months or less were
likely to work about one and a half months, or twenty-five percent of
the time they received welfare, and mothers receiving welfare for
seven to twelve month spells worked thirty-eight percent of that
time.280 Furthermore, more than two-thirds of all welfare exits are due
to employment. 281 Some recipients are severely disadvantaged in the
job market because of their extremely low education and limited work
experience. Those who receive welfare the longest are the most
disadvantaged in the competition for low-skilled jobs. More than sixty
assistance. Id. at 328. In 1984, the income disregard of $30 was reinstated for up to 12
months of earnings while the benefit reduction rate was reinstated for up to four months of
earned income. Id. at 329. As Table 2 indicates, it does not take much income for a family
to lose its eligibility because of earnings.
278 See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 549. After 12 months of consecutive
employment, the family would have been eligible for child care assistance through the AtRisk Child Care block grant. See id. at 550-51. The parent or parents would have lost their
Medicaid eligibility, but children under age 19, who were born after September 30, 1983,
would remain eligible until her family's income exceeded the federal poverty level. Id. at
784-85.
Eligibility for transitional child care through both AFDC and the At-Risk Child Care
Block Grant was eliminated as of October 1, 1996. Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note
20, §§ 103(c) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 602), 116(a)(4) (stating that the amendment in
§ 103(c) will take effect on October 1, 1996). If a state chooses to participate in the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, it is not required to submit a state plan until July
1, 1997. Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §116(a)(l)). It thus remains to be seen how
states will treat previously entitled poor families and their children.
279 Harris, Work and Welfare Among Single Mothers in Poverty, supra note 268, at 329.
280 Id. at 330.
281 Id. at 333.
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percent of household heads who receive assistance for five years or
these
more have not graduated from high school, and only one-half of
282
long-term recipients worked the year prior to receiving welfare.
4. Conclusion
The stereotype of the AFDC recipients as an adolescent, nevermarried, minority woman with several children, who resides in an
urban ghetto and has little interest in bettering her situation, is not
supported by the facts. The typical family receiving welfare is as
likely to be Caucasian as African-American. By definition, it will be
headed by a single parent, but this parent is likely to have been
married and to be in her late 20s.
Unlike the image portrayed by the stereotype, the typical head of
an AFDC family works for at least a portion of the time her family
receives cash assistance. In fact, she is likely to rely on welfare only
when work is unavailable, or when she desires to combine work and
welfare during the one to two consecutive years the family receives
welfare. However, given her limited education and the skill demands
of the labor market, she probably earns the minimum wage or a little
more, without health benefits. Because of her child care
responsibilities and the cost of day care, once transitional benefits end,
she is likely to work only part-time. Furthermore, the combination of
the loss of child care funding, lack of employer-provided health
insurance, and low income, will make it difficult for the family to
to the welfare
survive. 283 As a result, this family is likely to return
284
rolls at least once more for at least a short period.
The benefits a welfare recipient receives are not generous. She
cannot save for a "rainy day" once welfare ends. In fact, if she works
while on welfare, she bears an effective marginal tax rate of sixtyseven percent on her benefits. 285 In most cases, she is using her
282

Pavetti, supra note 266, at 33.

283 Welfare recipients face a tax rate of 63.7% in 1994, the first year of a full-time
minimum wage job under the EITC rules, and a rate of 53.8% if the 1993 amendments are
phased in during 1996 as currently planned. See Gene Steuerle, Economic Perspective:
Combined Tax Rates and AFDC Recipients, Tax Notes, Oct. 23, 1995, at 502 (hereinafter
Steuerle, Combined Tax Rates].
284 See Harris, Life After Welfare, supra note 271, at 412-13.
285 See supra note 277.
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meager welfare check to pay for fair market rent, and not the reduced
rent available only in subsidized housing. Her Food Stamps will not
cover the cost of shampoo, laundry detergent, diapers, or toilet paper
because these are taxable items. She is not living off the fat of the
land; she is struggling to survive on the scraps we provide.
C. The EarnedIncome Tax Credit
A second program targeted for reform is the Earned Income Tax
Credit ("EITC"). Unlike AFDC, the EITC has been supported
historically by both conservatives and liberals as a way to assist poor
working families. 286 Also unlike the AFDC program, which has an
extensive federal and state bureaucracy scrutinizing eligibility, the
EITC is administratively inexpensive because it operates through the
tax code. Adopted as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, the credit
was designed to supplement the wages of the working poor, in part to
offset the rising burdens of regressive taxes such as the Social Security
tax and excise taxes such as the gasoline tax. In order to receive the
tax credit, a household head must be working and have at least one
dependent child who lives with the taxpayer for more than half the
year. 287 Approximately thirteen million families with children received
benefits from the EITC in 1990.288
1. EITC Program Administration and Benefits
A principal feature of the current EITC is that the credit is paid
whether or not it is greater than the actual tax on the taxpayer's earned
income, and thus it supplements the low wages of many workers. 289
As originally proposed, the credit equaled ten percent of earnings up
to a maximum credit of $400 and phased out with incomes between

286 See Howard, supra note 4, at 404.
287 Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., I st. Sess., Background Material and Data on
Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means 1053 (Comm. Print
1993) [hereinafter 1993 Green Book].
288 Id. at 1061.

289 See John K. Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, Compliance, and
Antipoverty Effectiveness 29-30 (Inst. for Res. on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 1020-93,
1993).

1996]

Fooling All of the People Some of the Time

$4000 and $8000.290 In 1978, the maximum benefit was increased to
$500, and the phase-out range was extended to $10,000.291 Changes to
the EITC program in 1986 resulted from reports by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) and the Treasury Department determining
that many of the tax and budget policies instituted by the Reagan
Administration disproportionately and adversely affected poor
families. 292 These reports highlighted traditional American concerns
about distributional neutrality and fairness. The reports noted that the
Reagan
incomes of wealthy taxpayers had increased since President
293
took office, while poor families' incomes had decreased.
As a result, in 1990, the EITC was increased to cover the cost of
child care for workers supporting families. The maximum tax credit
was scheduled to increase over a four-year period, from $953 in 1990
to $1702 in 1994.294 In addition, for the first time the credit was
295
indexed for family size.
In 1993, changes to the EITC were introduced as part of a deficit
reduction package that increased gasoline taxes. Congress and the
Clinton Administration again cited the American tradition of
distributional neutrality to protect poor families as justification for
increasing the EITC. 296 By 1996, a family of three will receive a
thirty-four percent credit on its first $6340 in income, producing a
maximum credit of $2158.297 That maximum credit will remain
constant until the family's income surpasses $11,620, at which time
the credit will decrease, eventually phasing out at $25,109.298 Families
of four will receive a forty percent credit for earnings up to $8900,
290 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 1052. The EITC was reauthorized periodically, until
the Revenue Act of 1978 made it a permanent part of the tax code. See 26 U.S.C. § 32.
291 Howard, supra note 4, at 416.
292 Id. at 417-22.
293 Id. at 432.
294 Id.
295 Id.

296 Id. at 432-33.
297 Robert Greenstein, The Earned Income Tax Credit: A Target for Budget Cuts? (Center

on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), June 1995, at 6 [hereinafter Greenstein,
The Earned Income Tax Credit].
298 Id.
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producing a maximum credit of $3560.299 The maximum credit will
apply until the family's income reaches $11,620, and then the credit
will decrease until it phases out at $28,524.300
One criticism of the AFDC program is that it provides little
incentive for recipients to work because of its high marginal tax rate,
which makes it difficult for recipients to work their way off of
welfare. So as not to exacerbate this problem, the 1993 legislation
extended the EITC to families on welfare who worked for at least a
portion of the year, but disregarded income received through EITC in
determining welfare eligibility. 30 1 This change was expected to
provide an incentive for welfare recipients to work. In addition to
these changes, the 1993 legislation provides a tax credit for working,
childless individuals with low incomes between twenty-five and sixtyfour years of age. 302 It is estimated that taxpayers in the bottom twenty
percent of the income distribution have experienced a thirty-eight
percent increase in their tax burden since 1980, while childless
taxpayers in the top twenty percent have experienced a three percent
30 3
decrease in their tax burdens.
2. Anti-Poverty Effectiveness of the EITC
As the above discussion indicates, many poor and near-poor
working families with children, and poor, working, childless
individuals, will be eligible for the EITC if the 1993 amendments are
fully phased in during 1996. Approximately eleven percent of income
tax returns in the United States claimed the credit in 1990.304
The effectiveness of the EITC in reducing poverty for working
families is significant. About half these credit payments go to families
299

Id.

300 Id. The Reconciliation Act of 1996 reduces the maximum income level at which the
highest credit is granted from $11,620 to $11,610. Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note
20, § 909(a)(3) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 32(b)).
301 See Greenstein, The Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 297, at 26-27. The credit
previously counted as income and often caused a family to become ineligible for AFDC.
1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 328.
302 Greenstein, The Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 297, at 27.
303 Id. at 27-28.

304 1993 Green Book, supra note 287, at 1061.
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who earn less than the poverty threshold for their family size. 30 5 Recall
that there are about 6.5 million poor families with children under
eighteen years of age. 30 6 This subsidy will take twenty-five percent of

these EITC eligible families out of poverty, effectively closing the
poverty gap between their earnings and the poverty threshold for their
family size. 307 These latest changes to EITC, combined with the Food
Stamp program before the 1996 reforms, would have provided a large
enough subsidy to lift all poor families with a full-time worker out of
30 8
poverty.
3. Why Is the EITC Under Attack?
Like the AFDC program, the EITC has been criticized recently by
conservatives who argue that the program encourages rampant abuse
and fraud. These charges stem from a recent GAO report that cited the
tax credit's noncompliance with the tax code. However, GAO also
found that EITC noncompliance was less than that of self-employed
taxpayers. 309 The administrative costs associated with EITC fraud are
about one percent of the cost of the program.310 Both the Treasury
Department and the Internal Revenue Service have instituted changes
in their accounting procedures to limit the risk of EITC
noncompliance. 31 '
The EITC is thus a potentially important part of America's
antipoverty policy. Unlike AFDC, the EITC is a provision in the tax
code and applies only to those who work. 312 Therefore, the EITC does
not carry the stigma of a welfare program even though it has the same
effect of reducing poverty. EITC beneficiaries are low-income,
working taxpayers. 31 3 In this respect, conservatives' efforts to brand
the EITC as a welfare program seem unlikely to convince the
305 See Scholz, supra note 289, at 30.
306 May, supra note 143, at 23.

307 Authors' calculations based on estimates in Scholz, supra note 289, at 33-34.
308 Blank, Outlook for the U.S. Labor Market, supra note 194, at 61.
309

Greenstein, The Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 297, at 19.

310 Id.

311 Id. at 15-18.

312 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 700.
313 Id.
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public. 314 Perhaps because the public favors helping the working class,
and the EITC is a reward for working, the revised welfare reform
legislation, enacted in August 1996, omitted the provisions in prior
bills to reduce the availability of the EITC to the working poor. As the
following discussion demonstrates, in the present labor market the
typical family head who benefits from the EITC has little opportunity
to raise his or her income above the poverty level without the
assistance of this tax credit.
D. DecliningLabor Market Opportunity and the Erosion of Wages
Our descriptions show that neither the typical working poor nor
typical welfare families, who also may work, are like the stereotypes
on which welfare reformers rely. We do not think that these families
could escape poverty if they just worked harder. The increase in
income inequality during the 1980s and 1990s primarily is due to an
erosion of wages for less-skilled workers, technological changes,
continued deindustrialization, and the increased use of contingent
workers. 315 None of the proposed reforms addresses these labor
3 16
market problems facing low-skilled workers.
1. Declining Labor Market Opportunity
Although changes in labor market opportunity are different in rural
and urban areas, they threaten workers' security everywhere. Many
rural areas in the South and West experienced an expansion of
manufacturing and industrial jobs throughout the 1970s, but economic
314 A recent Times-Mirror survey showed that 68% of the public would oppose ending the
EITC. Times-Mirror Center for the People & the Press, Strong Female Opposition to GOP
Lifts Clinton Chances 45 (1995).
315 See Danziger & Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 127-148. In 1973, the median male worker
who lacked a high school degree earned $24,079 in 1989 dollars. Scholz, supra note 289, at
1. By 1989, this same worker's income had decreased to $14,439. Id. The median male
worker with only a high school degree also suffered a loss in income during this period,
dropping from $30,252 in 1973, to $21,650 in 1989. Id.
316 It is truly surprising that the advice of William Julius Wilson, America's most
knowledgeable sociologist of ghetto poverty, has had such little impact on the discussion of
the continuing poverty of welfare recipients and the underclass. Wilson's principal finding,
based on extensive empirical research, is that the continuing poverty and isolation of the
poor is the result of ghetto conditions that make employment extremely difficult. William
Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy
140-164 (1987).
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downturns in the 1980s reversed much of the growth that had occurred
in farming, energy, and mining, leaving a less diverse economy that
provides little opportunity for advancement. 317 About forty-two
percent of rural workers earned less than $11,600 in 1987 (the poverty
threshold for a family of four), compared to only twenty-nine percent
3
of urban workers. 18
In contrast to the rural expansion during the 1970s, many cities in
the Northeast experienced severe cutbacks in their industrial work
force throughout the 1970s and 1980s, likewise reducing the
employment opportunities of low-skilled workers. 3 19 For example,
across the country, domestic employment in manufacturing declined
from twenty-six percent in 1970 to eighteen percent in 1990, and is
expected to decline to just twelve percent by the year 2005.320 The
sharp decline in manufacturing and wholesale jobs in the central cities
of the Northeast and Midwest was accompanied by an increase in
service sector jobs during the 1980s. 32 1 Many firms in the service
sector use contingent labor, however, so that they can pay lower
hourly wages, and forgo providing benefits such as retirement plans
and health benefits. 322

317 See Cynthia M. Duncan, Persistent Poverty in Appalachia: Scarce Work and Rigid
Stratification, in Rural Poverty in America 111, 117 (Cynthia M. Duncan ed., 1992); Lucy
Gorham, The Growing Problem of Low Earnings in Rural Areas, in Rural Poverty in
America, supra, at 22-23.
318 See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 1155 (providing the 1987 poverty threshold for
a family of four); Gorham, supra note 317, at 24. Many people employed on farms fulltime, for example, are paid less than minimum wages, and do not receive compensation for
room and board. Cornelia B. Flora, The New Poor in Midwestern Farming Communities, in
Rural Poverty in America, supra note 317, at 206.
319 See Danziger & Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 125.
320 See 1994 Statistical Abstract, supra note 134, at 412-13.
321 See McKinley L. Blackburn et al., The Declining Economic Position of Less Skilled
American Men, in A Future of Lousy Jobs?: The Changing Structure of U.S. Wages 31, 42
(Gary Burtless ed., 1990); John D. Kasarda, Economic Restructuring and America's Urban
Dilemma, in The Metropolis Era: A World of Giant Cities 56, 61-67 (Mattei Dogan & John
D. Kasarda eds., 1988); John Bound & Harry J. Holzer, Industrial Shifts, Skills Levels, and
the Labor Market for White and Black Males, 75 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 395 (1993).
322 Bennett Harrison & Barry Bluestone, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and
the Polarizing of America 44-46 (1988).
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2. The Erosion of the Minimum Wage and Low-Wage Income
The erosion of the value of the minimum wage has contributed
further to this increased poverty. Since the end of World War II, the
minimum wage had been between forty-five and sixty percent of the
average hourly wage. 323 As inflation increased in the 1970s and early
1980s, its value began to erode. 324 Prior to its increase in 1987, the
minimum wage had fallen to just thirty-eight percent of the average
hourly wage. 325 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a family head who
worked full-time and earned the minimum wage was able to keep a
family of three above the poverty threshold. Today, the minimum
wage is twenty-six percent less than its average value in the 1970s,
leaving many working people and their families in poverty. 326 Today,
a person who works at the minimum wage full-time, year round, has a
gross income of $731 a month, or about $8800 a year, $300 less than
the poverty threshold for a two-person family, or nearly $2400 less
than the poverty threshold for the average poor family.
323 Howard, supra note 4, at 424 n.64; Shapiro & Parrott, supra note 133, at 11-15.
324 Howard, supra note 4, at 424.
325 Id. at 424 n.64. Not all industries are required to pay their workers minimum wage. For
example, many workers in agriculture, small retail trade establishments, and the service
sector are not guaranteed minimum wages. See Isaac Shapiro, No Escape: The Minimum
Wage and Poverty (Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), June 1987, at
7, 20. President Clinton signed legislation that will raise the minimum wage to $4.75 an
hour on October 1, 1996, and to $5.15 an hour on September 1, 1997. See Pub. L. No. 104199, § 2104(b), 110 Stat. 1755 (1996) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)). This 90 cent
increase, along with the current EITC refundable credit and Food Stamp benefits, should
raise a family of four with one full-time worker to the poverty level by 1998. Robert
Greenstein, Raising Families with a Full-Time Worker Out of Poverty: The Role of An
Increase in the Minimum Wage (Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.),
June 28, 1996, at 5. However, both the EITC and the Food Stamp program have been targets
for reform. While the EITC did not undergo the major changes originally proposed by
reformers, the income thresholds and phaseout amounts were slightly reduced,
Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 909(a)(3) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 32(b)(2)), and the average food stamp benefits will be reduced by $394 in fiscal year 1998
and by $488 by fiscal year 2002. The Depth of the Food Stamp Cuts, supra note 214, at 4.
The amount of the reduction varies across states. If we use our earlier state examples for
these years, the average Food Stamp household in Alabama will have their yearly Food
Stamp benefit cut by $253 in 1998 and $356 in 2002 compared to what they received prior
to the changes. Id. In Colorado, the average family's yearly benefit will be reduced by $344
in 1998 and $443 in 2002, and in New York the household will experience a loss of $629 in
1998 and $704 in 2002. Id.
326 See Shapiro & Parrott, supra note 133, at 14.
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The erosion of wages has occurred across all educational levels
and within all industrial sectors. Employers across industrial sectors
are hiring more college graduates, leaving those with less education,
regardless of their employment histories, unemployed or
underemployed. 327 Changes in the distribution of incomes, particularly
those of male heads of households, increased poverty between 1973
and 1991.328 The increase in the incidence of low earnings was
greatest for minority men, and occurred regardless of their educational
attainment. In durable manufacturing, for example, college educated
African-American and Hispanic men's earnings declined by four
percent and six percent respectively between 1979 and 1987, while the
earnings of male Caucasian college graduates increased by ten
percent. 329 Recent reform efforts make no attempt to address the low
earnings of men, many of whom are the heads of households. And
many non-federal employment programs have been less successful in
helping men than women. 330
A simple comparison of the minimum wage to the poverty level
for a single parent family of three illustrates the effect of a low wage
job on family poverty. A single parent with two children working full
time year round at the minimum wage has a gap of more than $2000
between what she earns and what she should have for her family to
survive according to the official poverty threshold. In addition, she can
expect to spend about twenty-seven percent of her income for child
care. 331 In sharp contradiction to the stereotype, poor single parent
families derived less than thirty-two percent of their income from
welfare sources in 1990.332
327 See Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Industrial Change and the Rising Importance of
Skill, in Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality In America 101, 120-129 (Sheldon Danziger &
Peter Gottschalk eds., 1993).
328 See Danziger & Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 108-110.
329 Gregory Acs & Sheldon Danziger, Educational Attainment, Industrial Structure, and
Male Earnings, 1973-1987 18-19 (Inst. for Res. on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 945-91,
1991).
330 See Nichols & Porter, supra note 248, at 31-33 (noting that employment programs for
men have not been as successful as those for women).
331 U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Child Care: Child Care Subsidies Increase Likelihood That LowIncome Mothers Will Work 2 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 GAO Report on Child Care].
332 Robert Haveman & Barbara Wolfe, Children's Prospects and Children's Policy, 7 J.
Econ. Persp. 153, 158 (1993).
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3. Income Inequality and Marginal Tax Rates of the Rich and Poor
Table 3 provides information on the distribution of income in 1993
by quintiles. The program changes we have discussed affect those in
the lowest and second lowest quintiles of the income distribution. As
the table indicates, those near the bottom of the income distribution
have seen a decrease in their incomes over the last thirteen years
compared to those in the highest two quintiles; with the lowest quintile
experiencing the greatest decline. 333 The proposed reforms do not
address the disparity. of income within quintiles for different ethnic
groups, nor will they reverse the erosion of income that has occurred
for those in the lowest quintiles compared to a nearly twenty-three
334
percent increase in the incomes of those in the highest quintile.
Table 3
Distribution of Income for the Average Family, 1993335
Quintiles:

Lowest

Second

Third

Fourth

Highest

Average

$9735

$23,378

$37,056

$54,929

$107,471

Caucasian

$11,452

$25,529

$39,270

$56,987

$110,774

AfricanAmerican

$4438

$11,694

$21,572

$35,931

$75,426

Hispanic

$6315

$14695

$23,687

$36,003

$73,354

Change
1980-93

-10.0%

-3.8%

0.7%

7.5%

22.9%

One reason for the deterioration of earnings for the lowest quintile
is that workers in the lowest two quintiles have been affected
disproportionately by corporate downsizing. Heads of households in
the lowest quintile experienced forty percent of all reported weeks of
333

See May, supra note 143, at 59 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population

Reports, unpublished data, March 1994 and prior reports).
334

Id.

335

Id. at 59-62.
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unemployment in 1991.336 These workers are more likely to have a
limited education, and thus are less able to compete for scarce jobs
with people with some college education. Nearly twenty-five percent
of adults who did not complete high school earn less than five dollars
an hour.337 Because the welfare reform proposals target programs that
provide benefits and services to families below the poverty level as
well as to those at 185% of the poverty threshold, they will worsen the
economic situation of those in the lowest two quintiles. This is a clear
violation of the principles of economic neutrality and fairness valued
by most Americans.
Although there is evidence that other industrialized countries have
experienced similar trends in the distribution of earnings, nowhere is
the disparity between those at the bottom and those at the top as great
as in the United States. 338 For example, Canada and the United States
had similar poverty rates throughout the 1970s. 339 However, when
these countries both experienced economic downturns in the 1980s,
the Canadian government increased public transfers to poor families
by 9.6% in order to offset their decrease in income, while the United
States government decreased public transfers to these families by
6.4%.340

Another reason for the deterioration of the income of the lower
quintiles is that workers in the lowest two quintiles face higher
marginal tax rates than those in the other three groups. 34 1 As we have
noted, social welfare policies and programs use a piecemeal approach
to helping the poor and near poor. As a result, those with low incomes
face high marginal tax rates when the loss of benefits is combined

336 Blank, Outlook for the U.S. Labor Market, supra note 194, at 37.
337 Id. at 43.

338 See Danziger & Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 118-20.
See Maria J. Hanratty & Rebecca M. Blank, Down and Out In North America: Recent
Trends In Poverty Rates in the U.S. and Canada 15-24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working
Paper No. 3462, 1990). It should be noted that Canada had a substantially higher growth
rate during this period. Id. at 16.
339

340

Id. at 23.

See Gene Steuerle, Economic Perspective: The True Tax Rate Structure, Tax Notes,
Oct. 16, 1995, at 371.
341
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with federal income tax and Social Security tax payments. 342 In fact, a
single mother with two children under the age of eleven may face an
incremental tax rate as high as twelve percent, as the income from her
full-time employment increases from 150 to 200% of the minimum
wage, and when the loss of AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid is
combined with the EITC, allowable transportation, child care
deductions and credits, Social Security taxes, and federal income
tax. 343

The 1996 welfare reforms do nothing to address the lack of jobs
for those with few skills, nor do they address income inequality or the
high tax burdens of the poor. They do nothing to address the needs of
poor children living in families that have been affected by the
economic trends we have discussed. "The problem [low skilled
workers and welfare recipients] face is not a surplus of bad jobs, as
widely assumed, but a surplus of less-skilled workers in a market
requiring more skill than ever. '344 Conservative welfare reform
legislation only exacerbates the problems of poverty created by the
present labor market.
IV. TRE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM: WHO BENEFITS?
By claiming that poverty is caused by dependency, welfare
reformers have justified the broadest possible cutbacks in federal
poverty relief programs. After resisting the efforts of majorities in
both the House and the Senate for over a year, in August 1996,
President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of 1996, welfare reform legislation that eliminates the
federal entitlement to cash assistance by replacing AFDC with a block
grant program. 345 The block grant will cap federal funding for welfare,
place a greater emphasis on work while eliminating the mandate for
employment related services, place a lifetime limit on receiving
welfare, and give the states much greater control over eligibility and
342 Id. Because states vary in their use of state income taxes, these are not included in our
discussion.
343 Steuerle, Combined Tax Rates, supra note 283, at 501-03.
344 Gary Burtless, Employment Prospects of Welfare Recipients, in The Work Alternative,
supra note 194, at 94.
345 See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103.
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funding of welfare. 346 But the attack on welfare does not stop with the
AFDC program. Majorities in the House and Senate not only would
place more conditions and harsher limits on welfare and end the
federal entitlement to AFDC, but also would terminate a broad range
of federal entitlement programs that address nutrition, infant and
maternal health, child care assistance, energy assistance, and many
other needs of a much larger class of working poor Americans. 347 As
we noted in Part III, more than fifty percent of all working poor
Americans who do not participate in AFDC receive at least one type
of assistance that would be affected by the proposed welfare
reforms. 348 Conservatives have pushed Congress to apply the same
reasoning to the EITC. Under proposals that Congress so far has been
unable to persuade Clinton to sign, the EITC supplement for the
working poor would be rolled back, and the childless working poor
also receive welfare benefits would be made
and those who work and
34 9
EITC.
the
ineligible for
In Part II, we showed that welfare reform advocates claim that
everyone will benefit from the proposed cutbacks in federal programs.
They claim that taxpayers will benefit because less money will be
spent, and therefore taxes will be reduced. States will benefit by
regaining the authority to set spending priorities. Most importantly,
they claim, the poor will benefit because the tough new limits will
help them end their habitual dependency on welfare. Yet the federal
role in poverty relief has expanded continuously since the 1930s in
response to the inability of individuals, businesses, and states to
manage poverty relief, particularly in depressed regional economies.
In Part III, we described two programs targeted by reform
advocates: AFDC, which supports poor families, and the EITC, which
346 Id.

347 In addition to programs terminated or reduced by the Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Congress attempted to reduce an even broader range of programs in legislation vetoed by
the President. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, supra note 14, §§ 501 et seq.
(proposing to amend the Food Stamp Program).
349 1995 GAO Report, supra note 131, at 13.
349 See Balanced Budget Act of 1995, note 20, § 13701 (proposing to amend 26 U.S.C. § 32
to make individuals without qualifying children ineligible for the EITC); § 13702(b)
(proposing to amend 26 U.S.C. § 32 to make Social Security benefits included in gross
income for purposes of determining EITC eligibility).
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supplements the incomes of the working poor. As we demonstrated,
the welfare poor and the working poor overlap because most poor
families have a member who works but cannot earn enough to raise
the family out of poverty. The stereotypes invoked to support welfare
reforms are woefully misleading in view of the actual composition and
experience of the two groups.
Part IV examines the impact of welfare reforms on welfare
recipients and the working poor, as well as on others who will be
affected. First, we describe the program which will replace AFDC on
July 1, 1997, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(hereinafter TANF) block grant. 350 Although nearly identical
legislation was vetoed by Clinton in November 1995, 35 1 the 1996
TANF block grant contains many elements that have been accepted in
principle by moderates of both parties as well as by conservatives.
Second, we examine the probable effects of the block grant's work
mandates, time limits, and behavioral conditions, intended to force
young recipients to stay at home and go to school, and to discourage
recipients from having additional children. Third, we consider the
effects of restructuring welfare financing in the form of block grants.
Finally, we discuss the broader impact of the TANF block grant and
other provisions of the Reconciliation Act on American society, the
working poor, the economically insecure near-poor, and state and local
taxpayers.
A. The Temporary Assistance ForNeedy Families Block Grant
Federal welfare programs, such as AFDC, Food Stamps, and
Medicaid, are categorical grant programs that make federal funds
available to the states for specific purposes. 352 States choose whether
350 Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et
seq.).

351 See Robert Pear, As Welfare Compromise Emerges, Clinton Aide Says Veto is Certain,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1995, at Al. After voicing support for the more moderate Senate bill
ending welfare entitlements, Clinton refused to sign the more extreme House and Senate
bill. Id. at Al, A20. A shift in public opinion after the release of an Office of Management
and Budget Report that projected that the reforms would move at least 1.2 million children
into poverty apparently influenced Clinton to veto the bill. See Alison Mitchell, Greater
Poverty Toll Is Seen in Welfare Bill, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1995, at A27.
352 See Welfare Reform in the 104th Congress: Goals, Options and Tradeoffs, Forum I:
Welfare Block Grants: Advantages and Disadvantages 22-24 (Inst. for Res. on Poverty
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to participate in grant programs, but by accepting federal money, a
state becomes bound by federal regulations. 353 Regulations for the
eligibility criteria, types
AFDC program, for example, specify many
54
requirements.
of benefits, and procedural
AFDC has been the program at the eye of the hurricane because it
creates an entitlement-all applicants who meet eligibility criteria
must receive welfare. Under the program, the federal and state
governments must each provide part of the support for these benefits
as specified by a formula under which a state receives a higher
355
proportion of federal funding the lower its per-capita income.
Federal funding for AFDC is thus open-ended because every eligible
applicant is entitled to benefits. Moreover, federal regulations
notwithstanding, states determine their own income eligibility
thresholds and maximum benefit payments. 356 Thus, while federal
regulations create an entitlement to welfare, each state can regulate its
overall financial commitment, and that of the federal government, to
the AFDC program. 357 Because AFDC provides open-ended federal
Special Report No. 61, 1995) [hereinafter Inst. for Res. on Poverty Special Report No. 61].
States are not required to participate in or accept money under categorical grant programs.
Although all states participate in the AFDC program, for example, optional categories of
spending are sometimes refused because of matching cost requirements or administrative
burdens that states cannot meet. A formula tied to average income levels determines the
proportion of each state's program expenses to be paid by the federal government. Cong.
Res. Service, Welfare Reform: Financing Welfare Through Block Grants 2 n.3 (1995)
[hereinafter Financing Welfare Through Block Grants]. For example in Fiscal Year 1995,
the federal government paid nearly 79% of Mississippi's AFDC expenditures and 50% of
the expenses of high income states. Id. at 1. No upper limit is placed on the dollar amount
that will be spent. See id. at 2. See generally, Thomas J. Madden, Terms and Conditions of
Federal Grants, 18 Urb. Law. 551 (1986) (analyzing the jurisprudence of congressional
grants).
353 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 326-27, 333 n.34 (1968); see also Townsend v.
Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
354

The states set need and benefit levels. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.

355 Financing Welfare Through Block Grants, supra note 352, at 2, 6.
356 Id. at 4.
351 The federal government's commitment to Shale up to 93% of thz vot of -wefar,

depending on a state's income level, intentionally creates an incentive to extend benefits to
recipients, because each dollar spent by a state has much more than a dollar of impact when
augmented by the automatic federal contribution. See id. at 2-3. Further, the federal
government pays half of all state administrative costs. Id. at 3. In 1993, the federal share of
administrative costs was $1.5 billion, or 12% of all federal AFDC expenditures. See 1994
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support for AFDC benefits, the program operates as a form of federal
financial assistance to each state when poverty rises during economic
recessions or as a result of demographic changes. 358 The potential
counter-cyclic role of AFDC was part of the motivation for including
the program in the Social Security Act in 1935.
Conservatives won the long battle to end the entitlement to welfare
guaranteed by AFDC when President Clinton signed the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in August 1996, converting
the federal welfare program to a block grant. 359 Block grants provide
the states with funding for programs addressing a range of social
policy goals, but give the states broad discretion in determining how
the goals are to be achieved and how block grant funding will be
spent. 360 The welfare block grant replaces the existing categorical
program by making a lump sum available to each state with few
strings attached to be used for the same types of benefits and services.
The TANF Block Grant terminates AFDC, ends the federal
entitlement to benefits, caps federal funding, and leaves the states free
36 1
to establish welfare goals and funding priorities within broad limits.
In addition to replacing the AFDC program, the TANF eliminates the
Job Opportunities for Basic Skills program (JOBS),362 a job training
and placement program enacted by the Family Support Act of 1988.
The TANF block grant does not require states to maintain prior levels
of state spending for welfare; states may use the block grant to replace
363
a substantial portion of state funding.
Green Book, supra note 28, at 389. The average annual federal administrative costs for the
period 1984 to 1993 amounted to 9.7% of the 1993 total federal outlay. Id.
358 For example, independent of economic trends, the number of families headed by single
women grew at an annual rate of 2.3% between 1987 and 1991. Wayne Vroman, Rainy Day
Funds: Contingency Funding for Welfare Block Grants, in Welfare Reform: An Analysis of
the Issues, supra note 266, at 11-12. Indeed, changing demography is the chief cause of
fluctuations in welfare payments. Id.
359 See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
et seq.).
360 See Financing Welfare Through Block Grants, supra note 352, at 7-8.
361 See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20,
§§ 601, 603).
362 Id. § 110(n) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq.).

§§ 601

§ 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.

363 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604(e)). The states would be required to spend at
least 80% of the amount spent during 1995. The maintenance of effort requirement is only
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The TANF is not entirely free of strings, however, and its
requirements are important in assessing the costs of state funding for
administration and benefits under the block grant. While giving states
a great deal of freedoom to set goals, alloeate furnds, establish rules and
regulations, and administer welfare, the block grant requires
compliance with significant new limitations on eligibility, including
work requirements, 364 time limits, 365 and mandatory school3 66 and
adult supervision for teen welfare recipients under eighteen, 367 among
other restrictions. 368 In addition, the TANF block grant creates a
strong financial incentive to reduce a state's "illegitimacy ratio," the
proportion of illegitimate children born in a given year, by increasing
that achieve a simultaneous
the block grant funding received by states
369
abortions.
and
illegitimacy
in
reduction
Less obvious, but potentially costly for the states, the TANF block
grant diminishes the redistributive role of the federal government, a
role fundamental to poverty relief since the New Deal. The TANF
block grant freezes annual federal funding for welfare for five years at
the fiscal year 1994 level of $16.4 billion. 370 The change from openended cost sharing to a capped block grant has important
consequences for states facing shrinking revenues due to increased
pressure from local taxpayers to reduce tax burdens. To meet
75% for states meeting the TANF's work participation requirements. Id. § 103 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7)).
364 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(I)(A)(ii), 607(a)-(d)).
365 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(9)).
366 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(4)).
367 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(5)).
368 Among the most controversial limits are the restrictions on providing welfare to legal
immigrants. Id. § 403 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1613). We do not propose to consider the
effects of those limits here.

369 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 403(a)(2)).
370 For each state, TANF funding is based on recent federal spending for the state's AFDC,
AFDC administration, JOBS, and Emergency Assistance programs. Reconciliation Act of

1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(3)). Each state will receive
the highest of three alternative amounts described in the statute. Id. The Congressional
Budget Office calculated the amount of the grants to all fifty states under this formula to be
$16.4 billion each year until Fiscal Year 2002. Letter from Congressional Budget Office to

Hon. Pete V. Domenici, Chairman, Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate, Aug. 1, 1996
(on file with authors).
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extraordinary economic contingencies due to changing economic
conditions or to changing the demography, the block grant contains
two small contingency funds from which states may borrow a limited
371
amount of additional funding subject to repayment.
We discuss the probable effects of four principal welfare reforms
of the TANF block grant: work requirements, mandatory time limits,
behavioral conditions mandated for welfare recipients, and nonentitlement funding. With respect to each proposed reform we find
insufficient attention has been paid to the probable effects on welfare
recipients and on state and local administrators. The net result, we
think, is that the poor will not find work, poverty will rise, and, if
current benefits are to be maintained, welfare will become much more
troublesome and costly for many states. The negative outcomes that
we describe should come as no surprise. There is considerable research
on poverty, welfare recipients, and the impact of previous block grants
that point to these conclusions. The problems these block grants will
create already are being anticipated at the state level, and state leaders
have objected to some of the most significant changes. 372 The relative
indifference of reformers to the effects which can be foreseen
underscores the strong ideology which underlies the legislation. 373

371 Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(b)).
372 Mark Greenberg, Welfare Reform in an Uncertain Environment, in Planning a State
Welfare Strategy Under Waivers or Block Grants 17, 27-29 (Sheila Kamerman & Alfred
Kahn eds., 1996).
373 This indifference is demonstrated by two TANF incentives to reduce welfare spending.
The first is a provision that allows a state to lower the costs of meeting the federal work
participation rate in a given year by reducing its caseload in any period beginning with
fiscal year 1995. Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 607(b)(3)). For example, by changing the eligibility for cash assistance, a state
may make some families ineligible, thus reducing the caseload in its TANF funded
program. This caseload reduction credit takes the form of a reduction in the state's required
work participation rate, which is based on the number of recipients it had between
September 1, 1995 and the year in which it applies for the credit. See id. § 103 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)(3)). The second incentive to spend less is a provision
allowing states to reserve or save current TANF monies for future fiscal years without
limitation. Unlike the AFDC program in which a state was required to spend its federal
allocation in the fiscal year received, TANF legislation provides an incentive for a state to
delay spending by enabling the state to earn interest income from the TANF funding it
reserves for the future. Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604(e)). Both examples
demonstrate possible state tactics to divest funding from currently eligible beneficiaries. We
return to this theme in part V, infra. See also Mary B. Sanger, Welfare Reform Within a
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B. What Happens When There Is an Employment ProgramBut No
Jobs?
The TANF block grant eliminates the employment related
assistance and transitional benefits provided through the JOBS
program and requires that the household head of an AFDC family
obtain employment after twenty-four months. Under the block grant,
states are no longer required to assist recipients required to work by
providing training, job search support, or education, nor are they
374
obligated to continue cash assistance where no job is available.
Welfare recipients will be required to move into the job market
quickly since they can receive welfare for only twenty-four months
without working. 375 In addition, the statute establishes mandatory
goals for progressive program implementation requiring each state to
have fifty percent of all eligible single parent AFDC recipients
participating in work activity by the year 2002,376 a participation rate
which far exceeds the performance by the states under the current
377
JOBS program.
The JOBS program provides for important job-related education
including basic remediation and job skill training, as well as job
development and placement activities for welfare recipients. The
program targets those heads of household who are most at risk of
becoming long-term recipients as well as those who are currently

Changing Context: Redefining the Terms of the Debate, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 273, 308-316
(1996) (analyzing the effects of proposed welfare reforms on the state level).
374 The Reconciliation Act of 1996 repealed the JOBS program, which required that such
services be provided to recipients required to work. Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note
20, § 110(n) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq.) Moreover, those who do not find work,
for whatever reason other than inability to obtain child care, may have their aid reduced or
terminated. Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(1)).
375 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii)).
376 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)(1)).
377 See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 340-41. The TANF block grant does not require
states to provide any type of education or training to recipients, nor does it require them to
place recipients in unsubsidized work activity. Unlike the JOBS program, the TANF grant
limits the number of recipients eligible to be placed in vocational training to 20% of their
caseload. Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(2)(D)). Further, under TANF,
states may require adults between the ages of 20 and 51 to obtain their high school diploma
or GED as a condition of eligibility. Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6040)).
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long-term recipients. 378 As noted in Part III, all AFDC recipients with
children older than three are required to participate in a job related
activity unless exempted by the state. 379 In addition, the JOBS
program mandates transitional benefits, a mandate based on the results
of employment demonstration projects administered during the early
1980s that recommended giving states discretion in designing their
welfare to work programs to match local job markets. 380 These studies
were
further found that child care assistance and health insurance
381
employment.
maintain
to
ability
mother's
single
a
to
crucial
Since its inception in 1988, the JOBS program has provided
discretion to state administrators to design employment programs
responsive to their individual labor markets. The federal government
382
provides fifty to ninety percent of the cost of the programs.
Although the federal government made one billion dollars available to
states for this purpose in 1993,383 the states have found it difficult to
fully implement the JOBS program due to constraints on their own
budgets. In 1993, only sixteen states used their full federal allocation
for the program, and only eighteen states had placed fifty percent or
more of their mandatory AFDC recipients in some JOBS related

378 See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 342.
379 See id. at 340-41.
3S0 Judith Gueron & Edward Pauly, From Welfare to Work 10-12 (1991).
381 See, e.g., id. at summary (providing information about the welfare to work evaluations
conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation); David Greenberg &
Michael Wiseman, What Did the OBRA Demonstration Do?, in Evaluating Welfare and
Training Programs (Charles Manski & Irwin Garfinkel eds., 1992) (detailing the results of
24 welfare to work demonstrations across the country). Evaluations of employment
programs have shown that services providing job search assistance for AFDC recipients
have not been as effective in the long-term in increasing the earnings of those who are the
least job ready, i.e., long-term recipients, as programs that provide cash management and
more intensive employment related services. See Kathryn H. Porter, Making Jobs Work:
What The Research Says About Effective Employment Programs For AFDC Recipients
(Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), March 1990, at 36-40.
382 See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 342.
383 See id. at 356. States exempted household heads with transportation difficulties, such as
when there was no public transportation to available job sites or training centers; child care
problems, such as when there were inadequate placements available; and disabilities. Id. at
341.
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activity. 384 In 1992, some states exempted seventy to eighty percent of
AFDC recipients from JOBS participation, evidence of the states'
unwillingness to assume full responsibility for job training and
placement activities for welfare recipients in a tight low-wage labor
market. 385 In fact, only seven percent of all adult recipients
participated in the JOBS program nationwide that year. 38 6 As we
demonstrated in Part III, the current labor market has little to offer the
millions of low-skilled mothers with limited work histories and low
levels of education who have limited employment options due to child
care responsibilities.
The TANF block grant requires recipients to work after receiving
benefits for twenty-four consecutive months, and the states may
require participants to work as a condition of eligibility after two
months of assistance. 387 This solution does not address the education
and training needs of welfare recipients, many of whom lack a high
school diploma, 388 nor does it require states to provide assistance with
job searches or placement. Every head of household, regardless of the
age of the youngest child, the availability of adequate and safe child
care, or the availability of transportation to employment, is required to
obtain a job after receiving welfare for two years.
The average long-term recipient, i.e., one who receives assistance
for five years or more, is likely to be a high school dropout in her
early to mid-twenties with little or no work history. 38 9 Full time
earnings for these women fell nearly twenty percent between 1979 and
1989, and have continued this downward trend in the 1990s. 390 In Part
III, we showed that the children of these recipients are likely to be less
than six years of age and in need of child care if the mother is to
secure and retain full-time employment. Participants in the JOBS
384 See id. at 356-59. Mandatory recipients are those required to be in the JOBS program by
federal regulations, i.e., all non-exempt AFDC recipients. See id. at 340.
385 Bane & Ellwood, supra note 271, at 24-25.
386 Id. at 25.
387 Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(I)(B)(IV)).
388 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
389 See Pavetti, supra note 266, at 33.
390 Burtless, supra note 344, at 72.
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program could receive child care assistance for one year after
obtaining employment.39' After that year they could have been eligible
for child care assistance through the At-Risk Child Care Program or
the Child Care and Development Block Grant. 392 These transitional
benefits are eliminated in the TANF block grant, and most recipients
will be unable to replace these services without subsidy. A recent
GAO report noted that poor families who pay for their own child care
spend approximately twenty-seven percent of their income on that
393
service.
The low-earnings capability of these recipients will make it
difficult for them to support their families at a subsistence level. About
one-half of all women who received AFDC between 1979 and 1981
would earn less than ninety percent of the poverty level today if they
worked full-time year round. 394 Long-term recipients who find work
are likely to earn only the minimum wage, or less, per hour. 395 This is
not to say welfare recipients should stay on the dole, nor that they
should not have to obtain employment to support their families.
Rather, welfare recipients need education, training, transitional
services, and support while their incomes increase to a subsistence
level. Many who find jobs remain in poverty because of their limited
level of education, lack of support from other family members, and
low earnings. A majority of low-skilled jobs involve communication
skills and cognitive activity such as writing, computation, and
computer skills. 396 Because most former AFDC recipients lack such
391 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 343.
392 Sandra Clark & Sharon Long, Child Care Block Grants and Welfare Reform, in Welfare
Reform: An Analysis of the Issues, supra note 266, at 25-26.
393 1994 GAO Report on Child Care, supra note 331, at 2. The block grant does not provide
transitional assistance for child care. Parents with children younger than six years of age
must prove that they have been unable to find child care in order to be exempt from the 24
month work participation requirement. See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(2)).
394 Burtless, supra note 344, at 85.
395 See id. at 86.

396 Harry J. Holzer, Job Availability for Long-Term AFDC Recipients, in Welfare Reform
in the 104th Congress: Goals, Options and Tradeoffs, Forum III: Strategies for SelfSufficiency: Jobs, Earnings, Child Support and the Earned Income Tax Credit 17 (Inst. for
Res. on Poverty Special Report No. 65, 1995) [hereinafter Inst. for Res. on Poverty Special
Report No. 65].
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skills, they are likely to experience long periods of unemployment and
high job turnover.397 Given our discussion of the availability of lowskilled employment, it is unlikely that many of these mothers will
compete successfully for scarce jobs.
C. What Happens When There Is No Job and Time Runs Out?
Another important aspect of the TANF block grant is its
imposition of time limits on receiving welfare. Reform advocates have
claimed that welfare creates dependency. Yet, as we demonstrated in
Part III, many recipients who leave welfare in order to work often
return to the rolls when the job is lost. The TANF block grant does not
require states to provide assistance to needy families for any minimum
length of time, nor does it require states to assist recipients to find
work. In addition to its failure to address the training, job search, and
transition needs of recipients, the block grant limits the time that
recipients can receive welfare without being in a work program to
twenty-four consecutive months. If a recipient is unable to find
employment, she may be eligible for additional assistance if she is
willing to work in exchange for her benefits. However even this
workfare option is limited. The TANF block grant also places a five
year cumulative lifetime limit on federally funded welfare. 398 States
may exempt only twenty percent of their caseload from these
restrictions and then only in cases of extreme hardship. 399 The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that, even with the twenty
percent hardship exemption, by 2004, between 2.5 and 3.5 million
children will be adversely affected by the, sixty month lifetime limit on
receipt of welfare. 400
The implicit assumption underlying the time limits is that without
welfare, poor single mothers will either work or get married. States are
397 Id. at 17-18.
398 Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 608(a)(7)(A)). Within the first year of enactment, a state may require a mother to
participate in a minimum of 20 hours per week. Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 607(c)(1)(A)).
399 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C)).
400 David A. Super et al., The New Welfare Law (Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities,
Washington, D.C.), Aug. 14, 1996, at 6.
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not required to provide a safety net, however, for recipients who
remain unemployed after five years on welfare, despite their searches
for work. The reforms do not address the lack of jobs and affordable
in the present labor market for women with limited
day care 401
education.
In Part III, we noted that until 1988, only twenty-six states
participated in the AFDC-UP program, which provides assistance to
poor, two-parent families. As Table 1 in Part III indicated, because of
eligibility restrictions, few two-parent families currently receive
assistance through this program. Yet in 1993, forty-six percent of all
40 2
the poor in families lived in households headed by a married couple.
The TANF block grant requires states to phase in work requirements
more quickly for two-parent families than for single parents, but
leaves states free to continue the eligibility restrictions that limit the
the
impact of the AFDC-UP program. None of the reforms address
40 3
declining employment prospects of the men in these families.
When all their welfare spells are included, nearly forty percent of
AFDC recipients, or 1.9 million families, have been on welfare for
sixty months or more. 40 4 Under the TANF block grant, these families
have exceeded their life-time limit for assistance. Regardless of the
ages of the children, states would not be permitted to use block grant
funds to assist them. About ten to fifteen percent of these families may
be able to secure an adequate income through work. 405 However, these
household heads are unlikely to receive any state assistance for child
care because states often prioritize availability, thereby limiting
assistance to low-income workers. 40 6 As a consequence, at least some
mothers would be forced to leave their children at home alone while
they work. In addition to those who find work, another seventy
401 These reforms also do not address another major part of the problem of family poverty,
namely the decline in employment opportunities available to low skilled men, many of
whom are the fathers of children receiving welfare.
402 May, supra note 143, at 14.
403 See supra part III, section D.
404 Robert Haveman, The wage Labor Market, in Inst. for Res. on Poverty Special Report
No. 65, supra note 396, at 33.
405 Id. at 34.

406 See Clark & Long, supra note 392, at 25, 26.
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percent of families who lose their eligibility because of the five year
lifetime limit will survive but will be severely disadvantaged. 40 7 The
remaining ten to fifteen percent of the terminated welfare recipients
will be destitute; between 300,000 and 400,000 women and children
will fall into this last category.40 8 Furthermore, the elimination of the
Emergency Assistance program, which provides a one time grant to
families experiencing a crisis, suggests that these families will have no
safety net, making it likely that at least some will become homeless.
Recent analysis predicts that many of the children in these families
will be removed from their homes, increasing the numbers of children
in the foster care system.409
D. What Happens When a ParentBreaks the Parentingor
ChildbearingRules?
The TANF block grant provides the states with relative freedom to
design welfare programs without federal oversight, but, as we have
described, the legislation also imposes severe limits on the use of
block grant money. 4 10 We have described the provisions designed to
force welfare recipients into the job market as quickly as possible. In
addition, the TANF block grant imposes conditions intended to force
adolescent recipients to stay at home and to remain in school, and to
require states to deal with issues such as childbearing and abortion.
With limited exceptions, TANF funds may not be used to provide
welfare to a recipient eighteen or younger who is not in school or not
living under adult supervision.411 Finally, the block grant creates an
incentive for improving a state's "illegitimacy ratio" by increasing the

407 Haveman, supra note 404, at 34. In contrast to those who have a better chance of
securing an income upon exit, severely disadvantaged families are those whose heads are
more likely to be without a high school diploma or work history. Id.
408 See id.

409 See Ann Hartman, Out of the Arms of Mothers: What Will Happen to Children if
Proposed Family Income Support Cuts Leave Some Parents Unable to Care for Them? 3-4
(Center on Soc. Welfare Pol'y & L. Pub. No. 812, 1995).
410 See supra notes 352-73 and accompanying text.
411 Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 608(a)(4), (5)).
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state's block grant if the proportion2 of illegitimate births declines
41
while pregnancy terminations drop.
Each of these requirements and funding incentives reflects
conservative views of welfare dependency and its causes. Thus, the
conditions designed to make teens stay at home and in school, and the
financial incentives for states to reduce illegitimacy, encourage use of
welfare payments to induce behavior that conforms to the reformers'
conceptions of mainstream behavior. Single parenting is not part of
the reformers' conception of the mainstream, even though single
parenting has risen steadily in all income groups. Using welfare
payments to induce conformity is consistent with the conservative
view that welfare creates the problems of the poor by providing
incentives to become pregnant, leave home, and forego work at an
early age. Yet, extensive research suggests that the image of the
"typical welfare recipient" is incorrect, as we explained at length in
Part III, and that the reasons for early pregnancy, failing to finish
school, and not working, do not lie in the incentives created by
welfare. Barbara Wolfe, Director of the Institute for Research on
Poverty, summarized an exhaustive review of empirical evidence on
teenage births in this way:
The best empirical evidence on the determinants of
teenage childbearing and of teenage non-marital births
suggests that the generosity of welfare benefits has little
or no effect on the probability of such a birth. This
statement is based on the fact that current differences
across states in welfare generosity are not related to
increases or reductions in the number of births (or
illegitimate births alone) to teenagers. 4 13
If welfare benefits have no effect on births, other factors have been
shown to be important, such as the availability of family planning
414
services, labor market opportunities, and the quality of parenting.
412 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2)).
413 Barbara Wolfe, Teenage Chidlbearing and Economic Incentives, in Welfare Reform in
the 104th Congress: Goals, Options and Tradeoffs, Forum II: Patterns, Causes, and
Consequences of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing: What Can Government Do? 23 (Inst. for
Res. on Poverty Special Report No. 64, 1995).
414 Id. at 23-24.
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While the summary of research quoted above is based on studies
of differences in welfare benefits between states, it does not cover the
effects of eliminating benefits altogether. Conservatives have
encouraged states to use their discretion to impose conditions such as
the controversial "family cap," which bars welfare benefits for any
child bom to a mother on welfare. 415 Such provisions have been
adopted in a number of states under the waiver provisions of the
existing AFDC program. 416 Research on the impact of the family cap
implemented in New Jersey shows that, contrary to the expectations of
417
welfare reformers, the family cap does not affect the birth rate.
Thus, these provisions, which raise significant humanitarian
objections, are likely to be ineffective for the purposes for which they
were intended.
Other provisions intended to keep teens in school and at home will
be difficult to implement. The feasibility of school may depend on the
quality of day care available through the mother's family, unless the
state is prepared to provide day care funding. Further, home may not
be the most appropriate environment for a teen, especially one raising
a family. Ironically, some have objected to federal regulatory
oversight both in welfare provisions and in other matters because of
the federal government's "one size fits all" treatment of such policies
that could have been adapted better at a lower level of government.
Conservatives have created a new federal regulatory structure based on
what they think they "know" about teens in poor families. This
knowledge, however, seems to bear little relationship to the actual
experiences of teen welfare recipients.
E. Refinancing Welfare: Who Benefits From FederalCost Cutting?
Contemporary welfare reform proposals have remained
remarkably true to the interpretation of poverty captured in the
stereotype of the willfully poor welfare recipient. These images, which
415 Congress included such a provision in legislation vetoed by the President. See Personal
Responsibility Act of 1995, supra note 14, § 101 (proposed 42 U.S.C. § 605(a)(4)(A)).
416 See infra note 432.
417 Michael C. Laracy, Anne E. Casey Found., If It Seems Too Good To Be True, It
Probably Is: Observations On Rutgers University's Initial Evaluation Findings That New
Jersey's Child Exclusion Law Has Not Reduced AFDC Birth Rates... Contrary to Previous
Claims by Its Supporters 1, 6 (1995).
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reduce the public's sense of responsibility for the well-being of
welfare recipients, are being made to serve other political ends as well.
Negative images of welfare recipients are as old as welfare itself.
Welfare reform in the 1990s acquires its unique bite from its emphasis
on the need to cut the size and cost of the federal government, and
from its solution to do this by reducing the federal budget for welfare
programs and by transferring responsibility for welfare from the
federal government to the states. Few could miss the connection
between welfare reform and cost cutting in the promise to "end
welfare as we know it." Indeed, a closer look suggests that cost
cutting, not relief of poverty, drives many of the proposals.
Once exclusively a centerpiece of conservative fiscal reform,
reducing the size of the federal government has become the prime
consideration in the public discourse of both major parties and an
uncontested ground upon which policies are framed in the 1990S.418
Strategies for reducing the size of the federal government include
downsizing or eliminating regulatory agencies, privatizing services,
and shifting responsibilities to state and local governments. 4 19 Welfare
reform, with bipartisan support, has followed this pattern, by cutting
federal funding, ending federal entitlements, and transferring some or
all of the responsibility for welfare to state governments. 420 Advocates
418 For example, President Clinton called for an end to "ftJhe era of big government" in his
1996 State of the Union Address. Excerpts From the President's Speech, Chi. Trib., Jan. 24,
1996, at 8.
419 President Clinton's December 1994 budget reduction proposal included a $60 billion tax
cut and $16 billion in program cuts, including significant reductions in funding for the
Departments of Energy, Housing, and Transportation. Robert H. Freilich et al., Federal
Mandates or State and Local Initiatives: Contract and Constitutional Status in the Gingrich
Era, 27 Urb. Law. 635, 648-49 (1995). The Republican proposal to eliminate the federal
deficit in seven years would terminate 180 programs and eliminate 13% of the federal
government's discretionary spending on education, labor, and health in fiscal year 1996. Id.
at 651. The 1995 House Republican budget proposals would have cut federal welfare
programs by $69 billion over five years, leaving the administration of most welfare
programs to the states. Id. at 647.
420 Republicans long have supported ending federal welfare entitlements, and even before
the November 1994 Republican congressional landslide, some Democrats also favored
reducing or ending entitlements. President Clinton supported the Senate proposal to end
federal welfare entitlements in September 1995, Mitchell, President Voices Optimism,
supra note 2, at 1, later changing his mind in response to public pressure. In July, 1996,
President Clinton again voiced support for proposals ending the entitlement to welfare,
Pear, Senate Approves Sweeping Changes in Welfare Policy, supra note 93, at Al, and
eventually signed legislation providing for such in August 1996. Clines, supra note 2, at Al.
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for reform argue that savings will be achieved through increased
efficiency in two ways: (1) unnecessary and expensive federal
bureaucracy will be eliminated; and (2) state and local administrators
will improve upon misguided federal programs that 42have
kept
1
welfare.
of
off
them
getting
of
instead
recipients dependent
Cost cutting itself is a symbolic issue. The talk about reducing the
size and cost of government not only plays on the public's increasing
mistrust of federal government but also on fears that the middle and
working classes will suffer greater economic hardship if attempts at
cutting the federal budget and at relieving tax burdens are thwarted.
The cost cutting rhetoric employed by both parties reaffirms a grand
vision of the American economy in which lower taxes and fewer
government regulations unleash entrepreneurship, redeeming a
declining standard of living from the threat of global competition and
offering well-being for those who are willing to work. 422 This vision
of the private economy and of American well-being has provided the
foundation for a conservative legislative agenda that reduces funding
for welfare, deregulates industries, and reforms taxes to offer larger
tax breaks for the wealthy than for the middle class or working
poor. 423 Although the rhetoric of welfare cost cutting masks complex
421 See, e.g., Gingrich et al., supra note 13, at 72-74. Reforms shift the responsibility to
make and administer welfare policy to the states, and, at the same time, reduce the federal
share of welfare funding. The savings resulting from reduced benefits do not reflect greater
efficiency in administrationx, lhowevle'x.
422 Smaller government has been an article of conservative faith in recent decades. See
David Brooks, Introduction to Backward and Upward: The New Conservative Writing xviii
(David Brooks ed., 1995). No respectable economist believes that jobs are being lost
primarily to international competitionl, however; jobs are being lost as a result of corporate
restructuring to create a larger bottom line. The number of jobs is increasing, but not at
wage levels sufficient to help out those with the fewest skills. See Paul R. Krugman &
Robert Z. Lawrence, Trade, Jobs and Wages, 270 Sci. Am. 44 (1994).
423 See Gingrich et al., supra note 13, at 125-41. See also Iris J. Lay, Reconciliation Bill
Tax Breaks for Upper-Income Taxpayers Mushroom After 2002 (Center on Budget & Pol'y
Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 21, 1995 [hereinafter Lav, Reconciliation Bill Tax
Breaks]. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of investment leading to an improved economy,
reforms offered in the name of cost-cutting clearly serve political purposes, namely shifting
poWer and vweahth among con tuencies. The distribulive effts of tg1h z in taxa&ion,
including the capital gains tax reduction, child assistance tax credit, and reduction in the
EITC would greatly favor higher income families. See id. The net effect on middle or low
income families would be neutral or negative. Id.; see Latest Republican Budget Offer Hits
Low-Income Programs Twice As Hard As Other Programs (Center on Budget & Pol'y
Priorities, Washington, D.C.), 1996. Further, congressional cuts to discretionary spending
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motives, the merit of the reforms as cost cutting measures should be
judged by whether the savings promised are likely to be realized
without sacrificing the benefits promised to the poor.
1. Will Devolution of Welfare Programs Save Money?
Reform advocates have justified reducing the amount states
receive for welfare programs in part by claiming that savings will
occur at the state level from better, innovative administrative
practices. 424 Under the AFDC program, the federal government pays
half of all state administrative costs. 425 In 1993, the federal share of
administrative costs was $1.5 billion, or twelve percent of all federal
AFDC expenditures. 426 The annual amount that the federal
government may make available to each state is capped by the TANF
block grant at approximately the current level through the year 2002,
to pay for benefits and administrative costs even though virtually all
the proposals also require states to assume new administrative
responsibilities. 427 There is little hard evidence that state governments
programs have fallen far more heavily on programs benefiting the poor than programs
providing benefits to the middle classes or to businesses. See Congress Cuts Low-Income
Discretionary Programs Far More Heavily Than Other Discretionary Programs (Center on
Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.); see Iris J. Lav & Richard May, Still Holding
the Bag: State and Local Governments are Squeezed in the Budget Plan Passed by Congress
(Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 28, 1995 [hereinafter Lav &
May, Still Holding the Bag]. Cost cutting can take many forms and may be defended in
many ways. Many liberals defend cutting the deficit and reducing some federal
expenditures, but the redistributive effects of their proposals are quite different from the
cost cutting which has been proposed by conservatives and New Democrats who control the
current legislative agenda. See Freilich et al., supra note 419, at 648-52.
424 See Gingrich et al., supra note 13, at 73, 77. See also Robert B. Carleson, State and
Local Government Program Design and Administration-The Only True Welfare Reform,
in Welfare Reform: Consensus or Conflict? 43, 43-47 (James S. Denton ed., 1988)
(advocating delegating welfare programs to state and local governments). It is apparent,
however, that some legislators seek to reduce welfare funding to achieve moral rather than
fiscal goals. See, e.g., Tim Poor, Rep. Talent Speaks Out Against Welfare Offer, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Feb. 15, 1996, at A8. Benefits should remain at their present levels to test
administrative efficiency gains, but the argument that federal administration is wasteful is
often conflated with misguided assertions that the federal government spends too much on
the poor.
425 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 324.
426 See supra note 357.
427 Federal funding for the TANF block grant for a state is frozen at the highest of three
levels: an average of its spending for fiscal years 1992, 1993 and 1994, its fiscal year 1994
spending, or its fiscal year 1995 spending. See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20,
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91

can administer the same benefits more cheaply. 4 28 Many states already

forgo participation in some aspects of federal welfare programs
because they lack the administrative capacity or financial resources to
meet the matching funds requirement.4 2 9 Local officials, who are in a
position to be most concerned and most knowledgeable about the
impact of proposed reforms, have been critical of congressional efforts
to create block grants that shift responsibility for welfare programs to
the states and reduce federal funding at the same time. 430 Some state

§ 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1)). States may use no more than 15% of their
block grant allocation for administration. Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604(b)(1)).
Under the programs being replaced, the Corngressional Budget Office bas estimated that
TANF will provide the states $1.2 billion less over the next six years than the states would
have received from the federal government for cash assistance and work. Super et al., supra
note 400, at 6. The Congressional Budget Office further estimates that most of the savings
achieved by welfare reform will be derived by terminating the eligibility of legal aliens
($23.7 billion), and by reducing the Food Stamp program ($23 billion). Vee Burke, Cong.
Res. Service, Welfare Reform, summary (1996). See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note
20, Title IV (restricting welfare and public benefits for aliens), Title VIII (regarding Food
Stamps and commodity distribution).
428 Previous block grant experience suggests that the states will make some effort to
maintain programs that serve more than the interests of the poor, e.g., child protection
services or economic development programs, but will not maintain programs targeted solely
at poverty relief, e.g., income maintenance programs or educational programs for children
from deprived backgrounds. See George E. Peterson et al., The Reagan Block Grants: What
Have We Learned? 18-21 (1986). Previous conversions of federal categorical grants to
block grants affected far fewer programs and concerned programs with less impact than the
safety net programs which will be affected now.
429 See 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 356-59.
430 See Freilich et al., supra note 419, at 645-46. See also, Robert Pear, G.O.P. Bills to
Overhaul Welfare Worry City and County Officials, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1995, at Al, B12
(describing local officials' opposition to proposed Republican welfare reforms). The
National Governors' Association, a bipartisan organization, has proposed maintaining
federal funding for child care and other services for welfare recipients at levels above those
proposed by conservatives in Congress. The Governors' Welfare Proposal (Center on
Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 8, 1996 [hereinafter The Governors'
Welfare Proposal]. Further, the Association does not want Medicaid devolved to the states,
and would support devolution of welfare only if maintenance of effort requirements were
reduced. See id. The U.S. Conference of Mayors expressed "serious concerns about how
successful [welfare] reform will be ufnder either the House or Senate-passed bill" in a letter
to the House and Senate conferees drafting the Reconciliation Act of 1996, Elected Officials
Criticize Welfare Bill, CLASP Update (Center for L. & Soc. Pol'y, Washington, D.C.),
Aug. 9, 1996, at 4.
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and local officials frankly acknowledge that states lack the capacity to
431
manage new programs.
Notwithstanding the concerns expressed by state and local
officials, it is plausible to argue that improvements in welfare
administration, as well as improvements in benefit packages, can
result from state experimentation and innovation. 432 Efficient use of
431 On December 12, 1995, the National Conference of State Legislators sent a letter to
President Clinton urging postponement of welfare reform and expressing specific concerns
about the adequacy of contingency funds and the overestimated savings from state level
administration. State Legislators Urge Delayed Welfare Implementation, CLASP Update
(Center for L. & Soc. Pol'y, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 21, 1995, at 8-9. A National League
of Cities survey of major American cities shows that the governments of the nation's urban
areas are overwhelmingly opposed to many of the proposed reforms, including ending
entitlements, that they are skeptical of their state's ability to redesign welfare, and that they
expect welfare reform to increase the burden placed on local communities. See Herbert L.
Green, Jr., The Impacts of Welfare Reform in America's Cities and Towns (Center for Res.
& Program Dev., Nat'l League of Cities), June 1995.
432 States may apply for waivers of federal AFDC regulations to experiment in delivering
welfare benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1991). Under the waiver program initiated during the
Reagan Administration, states were required to submit proposals for welfare demonstrations
in specific areas, such as employment and training, that met requirements for federal costneutrality, i.e., states had to utilize existing federal monies and ensure that costs for the
demonstration did not exceed the amount they would have had without the project. Michael
E. Fishman & Daniel H. Weinberg, The Role of Evaluation in State Welfare Reform Waiver
Demonstrations, in Evaluating Welfare and Training Programs, supra note 381, at 118-19.
In most cases, states were required to utilize an experimental design for the evaluation of
the net effects of their waiver demonstration project. Id. at 118-19. Between July 1987 and
October 1988, 26 states applied for waivers. Id. at 119. However, only 16 states had their
demonstrations projects approved. Id. Many states withdrew their applications because of
the requirement to use rigorous experimental methods within the evaluation of the
demonstration's net effects. See id. at 125.
Under the Bush Administration in 1992, the waiver process expanded the number of
categories in which projects could be approved, thereby increasing state initiatives. See
Mark Greenberg, Welfare Reform in an Uncertain Environment, in Report II: Planning a
State Welfare Strategy Under Waivers or Block Grants 22 (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J.
Kahn eds., 1996). Both the Bush and Clinton Administrations sought to maintain the
requirements of cost neutrality and the use of rigorous evaluation designs while encouraging
state experimentation. See id. As a consequence, 42 states have submitted applications for
waiver demonstrations since 1992; projects in 36 of these 42 states have been approved. Id.
Approval and subsequent implementation of these projects has not been limited, however,
by the federal government's emphasis on evaluation methods so much as it has by states'
willingness to spend their own resources. Id. at 29. The available data do not suggest that
cost cutting and improved delivery can occur simultaneously. See id. at 27-29. For example,
the primary justification for the low participation rate of AFDC recipients in JOBS
activities (only 13% nation-wide participated in 1994) is due to states' unwillingness to
allocate resources to fund their portion of child care costs. Id. at 29.
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resources requires accurate knowledge of the costs and benefits of
particular allocations. In this respect, state and local welfare
administrators may have some significant advantages over their
federal counterparts who have, heretofore, drafted regulations for
welfare programs. For example, support services for welfare recipients
including day care, parent training, or job search assistance are often
delivered through local providers. State and local administrators may
be in a better position to coordinate welfare benefits with locally
provided services. Similarly, with greater emphasis being placed on
transition to work, regulations governing job placement and training
will be particularly important. Appropriate guidelines may be easier to
construct based on the knowledge possessed by state or local
administrators about local labor market and employer needs. These
offset the costs of administering
advantages may help, but will they
433
responsibilities?
new and expanded
Offsetting state and local administrators' advantages in mobilizing
community resources and matching welfare programs with recipients'
needs, current proposals will subject welfare benefits to new
constraints of unprecedented complexity, which the states will have to
administer. As we have described, the new law has many conditions,
including: limiting benefits to legal aliens; limiting the time on which
a recipient can accept welfare; requiring a much larger number of
welfare recipients to work than ever before, which requires the
The Reconciliation Act of 1996 allows states wbose waivers have been appimved, ir are
in the process of being approved, to continue their program. Reconciliation Act of 1996,
supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 615(a)). Under this provision, states with
a "family cap" approved under the waiver program could continue to limit benefits to
children born to a mother receiving cash assistance.
In fact, we are skeptical of the claims concerning the efficiency of local knowledge: As
we have already noted, state and local government administrators' knowledge of local
service providers and employers may be advantageous in some respects. Other local
differences, such as the cost of living, are readily accessible to outsiders. It may be argued
that different states will perceive recipients' needs differently from federal administrators,
since they are in some sense closer to or more familiar with potential beneficiaries. This is
in part what the "community values" rhetoric is about. We doubt that state or local
administrators are in fact "closer" to welfare recipients, however. In any event, we believe
that personal needs are indeed personal in the sense that they vary from individual to
individual, not from community to community. Normative differences, such as preference
for generous or stingy benefits, are not "knowledge" upon which efficiency claims can be
founded; they are simply positions based on dominant political interests within a
community, and, as such, have no special standing in our national policy debates.
433
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development and administration of training, placement, and other
work-related programs; coordination of rewards; and sanctions for
compliance with programs that currently are administered separately.
These requirements will increase greatly the record keeping and
decision making burdens of local administrators. For example,
administrators will have to qualify beneficiaries under the complex
criteria for total time receiving welfare in any state, for compliance
with work, leamfare, or other behavior requirements, and for the
beneficiary's immigrant status. New and costly national systems will
have to be created to track recipients and their awards and to
coordinate benefits under different programs. 434 Federal administrators
will not be relieved of the responsibility to interpret such requirements
and monitor state compliance with them. 435 The administrative and
434 Telephone Interview with Catherine C. Foster, National Association of Child Advocates
(Feb. 7, 1996); see Margaret Trostel & Kelly Thompson, Welfare Reform and Information
Systems 39 (1995); Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Administrative Capacity and Welfare Reform, in
Looking Before We Leap: Social Science and Welfare Reform 75, 79-83 (R. Kent Weaver
& William Dickens eds., 1995) (noting that implementing such systems will be particularly
problematic for large cities). Indeed, the recent experience in implementing creditable
welfare reform at the state level in Wisconsin under the welfare waiver program, see supra
note 432, suggests that achieving reductions in the number of welfare recipients has cost the
state more than the existing AFDC program. Michael Wiseman, State Strategies For
Welfare Reform: The Wisconsin Story (Inst. for Res. on Poverty Discussion Paper No.
1066-95, 1995). See also Peter T. Kilborn, With Welfare Overhaul Now Law, States
Grapple with the Consequences, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1996, A22 (reporting that state
officials believe that the new welfare reforms are tougher on recipients and less flexible for
state governments than hoped); Robert Pear, A Computer Gap is Likely to Slow Welfare
Changes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1996, at Al (describing the practical problems states will
face in complying with the five-year lifetime limit on welfare payments).
435 For example, the TANF block grant requires each state to submit a plan for

implementing, among other things, time limits and work requirements. Reconciliation Act
of 1996, supra note 20, §103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)). The terms of the
block are dependent upon state performance, as well, which requires continued monitoring
by the federal government. For example, a state must maintain funding from its own
sources at 80% of previous levels unless it meets the work participation requirements, at
which point its maintenance of effort requirement drops to 75%. Id. § 103 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7)). Further, the block grant authorizes supplemental grants and
payments from a contingency fund based on complex criteria. Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 602(b)). Implementation of the terms of the grants is a serious concern for both
federal and state government because violation of the terms can result in reduction of future
grant money. Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)). Thus, funding in subsequent
years is dependent upon meeting grant requirements in preceding years. Procedures for
adjudicating non-compliance and penalties are specified in the legislation. See id. § 103 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 609-10). Given the complexities of administering four separate
types of supplemental grants and the contingency fund, implementing the time limits,
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cost implications of the new time, work, and status limits largely have
gone unnoticed in the public debate about welfare reform. This is
for mandate
particularly ironic in the context of political pressure
436
reduction and increased governmental efficiency.
It is difficult to estimate the precise impact of welfare reform on
the costs of federal, state, and local administrations. While the federal
share of administrative costs will be reduced, the states will have to
take up the responsibilities shifted to them by the federal government
and at the same time attempt to manage a reworked welfare program
that requires more complex record keeping and decision making.
to predict significant
Under such circumstances it is not reasonable
437
future.
near
the
in
savings
cost
administrative
2. Ending the Federal Role In Redistributing Costs of Welfare
The proposed welfare block grants are structured to cut the federal
costs of welfare as well as to delegate control of the programs to the
states. 438 Federal spending for the block grants in years 1996-2002
maintaining the effort and work participation requirements, and enforcing the child support
requirements, it is difficult to determine whether the TANF block grant program will
simplify or reduce the costs of federal welfare administration.
436 See Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, S. 169, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(proposing to "curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on States and local
governments").
437 Although states found that a paper work reduction accompanied the shift from
categorical programs to block grant programs, see Peterson et al., supra note 429, at 23-24,
significant savings more likely would have occurred if a fully developed state
administration already performing similar tasks had assumed responsibility. Further, even
in the best case scenarios states continue to experience the same administrative costs, not
reduced costs. See Brodkin, supra note 434, at 75-90 (assessing state administrative
capacities to assume the responsibility for providing welfare benefits). As we have noted,
the proposed block grants will require new administrative systems at the local and state
levels.
438 The Congressional Budget Office estimated in early 1995 that implementing the
Republican Contract With America could require states to enact double digit tax increases
to make up for lost federal grant money. Freilich et al., supra note 419, at 650. New York
and California would lose the most in federal grants each year, losing $26.4 and $38.5
billion, respectively. Id. The Senate Welfare Reform Proposal approved by President
Clinton sought to save $70 billion in welfare spending over seven years. Mitchell, President
Voices Optimism, supra note 2, at 20. The bill passed by both the House and the Senate in
November 1995, would have reduced welfare spending by 7.4% by the year 2002. Lav &
May, Still Holding the Bag, supra note 423, at 5. The Congressional Budget Office
estimates that the Reconciliation Bill of 1996 will reduce federal welfare spending by $54
billion through fiscal year 2002. Burke, supra note 427, at summary. Converting federal

Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 4:3

will be capped at about the current (fiscal year 1995) funding level.439
States may apply for a supplemental grant to handle contingencies
440
created by economic downswings or demographic changes.
While block grants are attractive to fiscally conservative
politicians because they reduce federal spending, the TANF block
grant runs against the grain of two important post-New Deal realities
of American political economy: (1) the strong public commitment to
poverty relief for the truly needy, which we examine further in Part V,
and (2) the vital redistributive role of the federal government in
supporting the private economy. 441
Since the New Deal, the federal government has played an
important role in redistributing the costs of poverty, which are an
inevitable by-product of the national economy. 442 The private
entitlement programs to block grants not only transfer control of those programs to the
states, but usually is accompanied by reduced federal funding. See, e.g., Inst. for Res. on
Poverty Special Report No. 61, supra note 352, at 23.
439 See supra note 427.
440 Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 603(a)(3)). See Robert D. Reischauer & R. Kent Weaver, Financing Welfare: Are Block
Grants the Answer?, in Looking Before We Leap: Social Science and Welfare Reform,
supra note 434, at 24-25 (stating that federal-state programs should share financial risks to
protect against economic downturns).
441 The Social Security Act and the federal commitment underlying it embody the
recognition that the national government must cope with poverty created by the workings of
the national economy. By 1935, business had learned that the welfare state is necessary to
the orderly operation of the economy, a stable work force, and maintenance of public trust
in government. The Social Security Act thus served a broad range of political interests that
only the federal government could perform. See Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse,
supra note 48, at 214-15. Not all representatives of business supported the federal
government's increased role, however. See Edwin Amenta & Sunita Parikh, Capitalists Did
Not Want the Social Security Act: A Critique of the "Capitalist Dominance" Thesis, 56 Am.
Soc. Rev. 124 (1991). Many members of the business community still oppose redistributive
programs. Casebeer notes that, in fact, a majority of workers and the general public in 1935
favored a more comprehensive and generous system of social provision for Unemployment
Insurance that neither Roosevelt nor big business supported. See Kenneth M. Casebeer,
Unemployment Insurance: American Social Wage, Labor Organization and Legal Ideology,
35 B.C. L. Rev. 259, 294-95 (1994).
442 All federal programs for social provision, including the Social Security program,
redistribute the costs of keeping people out of poverty. The old age pension program created
by the Social Security Act not only modestly redistributes benefits from wealthier workers
to the less wealthy, but also redistributes the costs of pensions across regions. Social
Security differs actuarially from private insurance. Pension payments are not funded
directly by past payments but by a reserve fund that is replenished through deductions from
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economy may provide for the needs of most Americans, but it does so
unevenly over time and, even more importantly, unevenly across
regions of the country. While some regions prosper, others experience
depression.443 Since the 1930s, the federal role in poverty relief has
expanded continuously in recognition of the inability of individuals,
businesses, and taxpayers, particularly in depressed regional and local
444
economies, to manage poverty relief without federal assistance.
Prior to the 1930s, welfare programs were funded inadequately and
often failed during economically hard times, just when they were
needed most. The Great Depression's exacerbation of the chronic
structural problems of unemployment and poverty relief generated
massive political support for legislation establishing a federal role. All
of the Social Security Act's programs created federally administered
mechanisms for redistributing the costs of poverty relief by directly
subsidizing state programs, creating national reserves or contingency
funds, and organizing the efforts of wage earners, employers, and
states to reduce the effects of competition that would otherwise
undermine provision on a subnational scale. The AFDC program
clearly was designed to be counter-cyclic, creating a federal
entitlement for individuals and, more important politically, a guarantee
to states that federal funding for poverty relief would be available at
precisely the times it was needed most.
Since the 1930s, the need for national poverty relief programs has
become increasingly apparent. Federal poverty programs of the 1960s
were created largely because some regional and local economies were
failing in the midst of great prosperity for most Americans. Similarly,
the Supplemental Security Income program created in 1972 converted
Old Age Assistance and Aid to the Blind and Disabled to a wholly
the wages of currently employed persons. Ultimate dependence on current payments into
the fund, the fact that payments are not strictly related to contributions, and the involuntary
nature of the payroll tax, make social security similar to tax supported welfare, but with a
dedicated source rather than a private insurance policy owned by the purchaser.
443 Freemarket economists believe that a healthy economy is one in which businesses can
move freely to find the best raw materials, transportation, and labor. John D. Kasarda,
Urban Change and Minority Opportunities, in The New Urban Reality 33, 36-39 (Paul
Peterson ed., 1985). The economy prospers when businesses seize opportunities to profit
from regional differences. As a result, some regions benefit from such decisions while
others suffer severe losses in terms ofjobs and tax base. See id. at 33-49, 65-66.
444 See Fox, supra note 53, at 166-68; Paul Peterson, City Limits 85-86 (1981).
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federally funded, cost of living indexed, income support program. The
federal role in the Unemployment Insurance system, a program with
an important potential counter-cyclic function like welfare, has been
expanded greatly over the years to guarantee supplemental federally
funded benefits during lengthy economic downturns. 445 Significantly,
an earlier version of the TANF block grant was opposed vigorously by
the National Governors' Association because it left states largely on
the effects of demographic change and
their own to deal with
446
economic contingency.
The TANF block grant proposes two ways to address the concerns
of state administrators about contingencies that might increase the
costs of welfare unpredictably. First, TANF permits states to apply for
a supplemental grant if population growth has exceeded the national
average and if the per capita level of welfare spending by the state is
below the national average.44 7 A state automatically qualifies if its
population growth is above ten percent between 1990 and 1994, or if
its per capita level of welfare spending is below thirty-five percent of
445 Unemployment insurance benefits were expanded greatly in the 1970s. The extended
benefits program was established in 1970 to provide additional weeks of unemployment
insurance benefits during periods of high unemployment in a state. See Federal-State
Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 202, 84 Stat.
708 (1970). See also Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-19, § 102, 91 Stat. 39 (1977); Emergency Compensation and Special
Unemployment Assistance Extension Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-45, 89 Stat. 236 (1975);
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-572, § 102, 88 Stat.
1869 (1974); Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-224,
§ 202(b), 85 Stat. 811 (1971) (detailing the requirements for receiving emergency
unemployment benefits). Even though Unemployment Insurance Program benefits are
relatively generous by comparison with welfare, over the past fifteen years, states often
have made it more difficult for terminated workers to qualify for unemployment insurance.
See Lucy A. Williams & Margaret Y.K. Woo, The Worthy Unemployed: Societal
Stratification and Unemployment Insurance Programs in China and the United States, 33
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 457, 481-82 (1995).
446 The acts opposed by the National Governors' Association were the Personal
Responsibility Act and the Balanced Budget Act of 1995. Clinton vetoed the conference bill
of the Balanced Budget Act in November 1995 and the PRA in January 1996. Significantly,
the National Governors' Association proposal, offered as a compromise after Clinton vetoed
the Personal Responsibility Act in January 1996, included a much larger contingency fund.
See Robert Pear, Governor's Welfare Plan Seeks to Close Gap on Bill, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7,
1996, at A] 4.
447 Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 603(a)(3)).
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the national average. 448 The Act allocates a maximum of $800 million
for all states for the fiscal years 1998 through 2001 for these
supplemental grants. 449 Second, TANF permits "needy states" to apply
for up to twenty percent more money from the federal government on
a month-by-month basis, to cover welfare expenses above the level of
"historic state expenditures. '' 450 A state is needy if its unemployment
exceeds 6.5% for the past three months or is at least 110% of the
45 1
unemployment rate during the corresponding period in recent years.
A state is also deemed needy if the number of individuals participating
in the Food Stamp program exceeds the number of Food Stamp
program participants over the same three month period in recent years
by ten percent (taking into account the exclusion of immigrants and
other Food Stamp program restrictions enacted by the Reconciliation
Act of 1996).452 The Act appropriates to the contingency fund a
maximum of $2 billion for the use of all states for the fiscal years
1997 through 2001.453
Although the amounts appropriated to cover demographic and
economic contingency under TANF were increased significantly in
response to pressure from the National Governors' Association and
other groups, the amounts provided are manifestly inadequate. For
example, between 1988 and 1993, state spending for AFDC increased
by thirty-two percent as a result of demographic changes and the
recession of 1990-91.454 During this time, federal AFDC funding
increased by $6 billion over the 1989 level. 455 The Center on Social
Welfare Policy and Law has estimated that if funding had been capped
in 1989, as it will by TANF, states would have had to increase welfare
spending from their own funds by seventy-six percent to maintain
448 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(3)(C)).
449 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(3)(E)).
450 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(b)).
451 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(b)(6)).
452 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(b)(6)(B)).
453 Id. § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603(b)(2)).
454 Left to the Tender Mercies of the States: The Fate of Poor Families Under A Cash
Assistance Block Grant 8 (Center on Soc. Welfare Pol'y & L. Pub. No. 813, 1995)
[hereinafter Left to the Tender Mercies of the States].
455 Super et al., supra note 400, at 7.
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benefits between 1989 and 1993.456 Even if the TANF contingency
fund had an unlimited appropriation, the twenty percent limit on
additional funding would have been inadequate to provide funding for
such a contingency, or to match the support provided by the federal
government under AFDC. In fact, the $2 billion contingency fund
appropriation, which covers the next five years, amounts to just two
percent of total block grant funding. 457 It appears that such an amount
will fall far short of meeting the requests of the states during the next
recession, even under the formula which limits aid to twenty percent
458
of the basic grant.
Further, the most important factor affecting state program costs is
demographic change-increasing populations and an increasing
proportion of single parent households at all income levels. According
to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, national population
growth is projected to be about 4.6% between 1997 and 2002, the
459
period covered by the supplemental grant provisions of TANF.
However, the supplemental grant fund would provide at most $800
million over four years, or an average of a one percent increase in
basic TANF block grants, capping withdrawals far short of the
funding states are likely to require. 460 The threshold criteria which a
state must satisfy to qualify for the supplemental grant-lower than
average welfare costs plus above average population increase, a recent
ten percent population increase, or very low welfare spending-will
further limit the availability of federal funds to states experiencing
higher costs due to demographic changes.
Funding for the proposed welfare block grants cuts against the
grain of twentieth century experience by reducing the federal safety
456 Left to the Tender Mercies of the States, supra note 454, at 8.
457 Super et al., supra note 400, at 7.
458 See id. The Unemployment Insurance program of the Social Security Act provides an
instructive comparison. Unemployment Insurance plays a counter-cyclic role not unlike
welfare. Reischauer& Weaver, supra note 440, at 24. The importance of the federal role in
distributing the risk of job loss due to the unevenness of the economy over time among
regions of the country is evidenced by the structure of the program, which has federally
guaranteed safeguards against economic contingency that far exceed those proposed for the
block grants that will fund welfare. Id. at 24-25.
459 Super et al., supra note 400, at 7.
460 Id.
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net for state and local economies. Only a national program of social
provision can redistribute the changing costs of poverty borne by
different states in a properly working private economy. 46' By failing to
make adequate provisions for economic downturns or for demographic
change, block grants increase the risks and costs of poverty to
individual states. 462 States will bear widely differing burdens in
dealing with poverty and will experience pressure to begin a "race to
the bottom" to discourage low income migrants from seeking higher
welfare benefits, 463 and to keep taxation for welfare programs low in a
464
competitive economic environment.
3. Will the States Maintain Adequate Welfare Benefits?
Under existing categorical programs, "maintenance-of-effort"
provisions require continuation of state funding in order to prevent use
465
of federal funds simply to replace state welfare spending.
Maintenance-of-effort provisions for the new block grants have been
461 Our economy continues to produce economically depressed areas where there are
insufficient numbers ofjobs for those willing to work. See, e.g., Virginia Carlson & Nikolas
Theodore, Illinois Job Gap Project, Are There Enough Jobs?-Welfare Reform and Labor
Market Reality (1995); Jobs Now Coalition, Is Minnesota Creating Enough Jobs that Pay a
Livable Wage? Phase Four: Underemployment (1996). Nationally, increasing numbers of
jobs are low wage, have minimal health care or other benefits, and are considered
contingent, i.e., the companies have little commitment to maintaining the jobs over the long
run, and they provide few incentives to workers seeking to build a career or to become
upwardly mobile. See Jared Bernstein & Lawrence Mishel, The Growth of the Low-Wage
Labor Market: Who, What, and Why, 3 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 12 (1994). In 1973, a
minimum wage job could maintain an employee at about the poverty level. In 1996, a
minimum wage job provides only about two-thirds of what is required to maintain an
individual at the poverty level, and, of course, far less than that required by a family. Since
1980, the number of low wage workers has increased, while the real value of their wages
has fallen. See Burtless, supra note 344, at 88, 91-92.
462 Paul Peterson, State Response to Welfare Reform: A Race to the Bottom?, in Welfare
Reform: An Analysis of the Issues, supra note 266, at 9; Vroman, supra note 358, at 11-12.
463 See Reischauer & Weaver, supra note 440, at 19-22.
464 The empirical evidence supporting the actual effects of state tax rates on business
migration is modest and suggests a much greater effect on business relocation within
metropolitan regions than relocation between states. Timothy J. Bartik, Who Benefits From
State and Local Economic Development Policies? 36-44 (1991). Whatever the empirical
evidence shows, the perceptions of political leaders and the public have an important impact
on tax policies.
465 Maintenance of effort provisions have not prevented states from allowing the value of
benefits to decline as long as the nominal dollar value is not reduced. See infra note 475 and
accompanying text.
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the subject of intense dispute. While Senate proposals and the Clinton
Administration have argued for high maintenance-of-effort standards,
the House and the National Governors' Association have pressed to
relax the requirements. The National Governors' Association proposal,
offered in February 1996 as a possible compromise, would have
eliminated the maintenance-of-effort requirement altogether while
recommending increased overall federal funding, which the states
would be free to use to replace, rather than to supplement, their own
spending for welfare. 466 The TANF block grant requires states to
maintain only seventy-five percent of their 1995 funding, and permits
the states to transfer up to thirty percent of the federal share to pay for
supplementary services currently paid for by the states. 467 Thus, the
net reduction in required state contributions to cost-sharing under
TANF may be large. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
estimates that states could divert as much as $40 billion from lowincome programs between 1997 and 2001.468
Ending federal entitlements by creating block grants will not end
all poverty programs, but merely end the federal guarantee of welfare
benefits. Similarly, capping block grant funding below the actual costs
of welfare programs and making limited provision for contingencies in
times of economic downturn merely reduces the importance of the
federal role in funding welfare. Under the block grant programs, states
will have the responsibility to determine the scope of poverty relief
and will shoulder both an increasing share of the funding for welfare
and all but exclusive responsibility for dealing with economic
contingencies. If this places a greater potential strain on state fiscal
resources, states will now have the discretion to reduce that stress
through direct changes in programs and benefits. Responsibility for
creating poverty policy will be left to state governments, which, like
the federal government, broker competing values and interests.
It is unclear that the political brokering process at the state level
will result in welfare administration that is efficient or in policies that
466 The Governors' Welfare Proposal, supra note 430.

461 Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 609(a)(7)). States failing to meet mandated work participation goals will be required to
maintain 80% of prior funding. Id.
468 Super, et al., supra note 400, at 2.
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will address the needs of the poor more effectively. 469 Faced with
reduced funding and no easy way to achieve more efficient welfare
administration, each state's commitment to providing for the poor will
be tested.47 0 Cutting benefits may be defended as a means of achieving
efficiency only if poverty relief can actually be achieved more
effectively by that means.
It may be argued that state administrators will perceive recipients'
needs differently than will federal administrators. That is, in part, what
President Reagan intended to convey when he employed rhetoric
about bringing "government closer to the people" to introduce his
block grant proposals in 1981.471 Normative differences, however,
such as preferences for generous or stingy welfare benefits, are not
evidence of greater or lesser efficiency; they are simply positions
based on dominant political interests within a community, and, as
such, should have no special standing in national policy debates.
469 But see Peterson et al., supra note 428, at 23-25 (finding that handling welfare on the
state level will be more efficient). Professor Anthony Szczygiel, an expert on Medicaid
funding, concludes that if Medicaid funding falls to the states under a similar block grant
program, then the financing of welfare will be even trickier because of the strong
constituencies, such as the medical profession and health care organizations, that are
invested in Medicaid but not in welfare payments. Private communication from Professor
Szczygiel, State University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law (Feb. 28, 1996) (on file
with authors).
470 In the present political climate, devolution will move programs out of the hands of
federal administrators who are committed to the continued existence of entitlements and
into the hands of cost-conscious state and local constituencies, or more accurately, largely
into the hands of Republican-controlled state legislatures. Although each state's
commitment to maintaining welfare benefits after devolution depends both on financial
capacity and political will, reformers often have deflected questions about capacity and will
in the public debate about reform by invoking democratic values, e.g., a government that is
closer to the people is better government. In 1981, President Reagan introduced proposals
for devolution of responsibility for welfare by drawing on general themes of his campaign,
including promises to reduce the size of the federal government and to return government to
the people. See Peterson et al., supra note 428, at 5. Proposals to "return government to the
people" and claims that local communities do things "better" appeal not only because of the
public's widespread mistrust of the federal government, but because of the strong faith in
local values. These phrases evoke images of a caring community with a strong sense of
family values, personal responsibility, and social ties without directly addressing how these
characteristics apply to provision for the poor. We may agree that welfare policy should be
more closely linked to community values, but to whose community? Neither President
Reagan's proposals in the early 1980s to return welfare responsibility to the states, nor the
underfunded welfare reform mandates of the 1990s help to resolve these difficult issues.
471 See Peterson et al., supra note 428, at 5.
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"Community values" may express regional or local preferences
and needs for social provision, but they also embody historic
exclusions, such as racial discrimination. 472 Although the Social
Security Act primarily left administrative responsibility for welfare in
the hands of state and local administrators, federal requirements forced
the states to extend programs to counties in which minorities resided
473
and gradually became a strong bulwark barring arbitrary exclusions.
If control over welfare programs was delegated downward to local
government, these and other historically significant factors would be
likely to dominate. While local control of programs may in principle
create opportunities for effective use of local knowledge, the interest
that most frequently prevails is that of the property owner and
taxpayer. Nor should we expect adjacent communities willingly to
pool resources to resolve problems of regional and urban poverty that
are beyond the capacity of taxpayers in a single community. If social
provision is devolved to the community level, can we realistically
expect communities to pay more attention to poverty relief than they
have been willing to bestow on the needs of school children or low474
income families seeking homes?
472 See generally Michael N. Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion 1-26 (1976) (describing
segregation along economic and social lines in urban cities, and the role that local public
policies have played in creating such separation); Robert C. Lieberman, Race, Institutions,
and the Administration of Social Policy, 19 Soc. Sci. Hist. 511 (1995) (describing how
institutional features of New Deal social policies affected African Americans); Douglas S.
Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and
Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions, 26 Demography 373 (1989) (arguing that
blacks are distinctly disadvantaged because they are more segregated than other ethnic
groups); Douglas S. Massey & Mitchell L. Eggers, The Ecology of Inequality: Minorities
and the Concentration of Poverty, 1970-1980, 95 Am. J. of Soc. 1153 (1990) (analyzing the
poverty and income inequality among different races in sixty metropolitan areas in the
United States); Quadagno, The Color of Welfare, supra note 69, at 10-15 (outlining the
history of racial discrimination and inequality in social benefits).
473 See Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, supra note 48, at 244-45 (stating that
although the New Deal failed to prohibit racial discrimination, the programs did not exclude
blacks from benefits).
474 The 1995 National League of Cities survey shows that 80% of the nation's largest and
middle sized cities already feel burdened by welfare. Green, supra note 431, at 1.
Communitarians present an appealing argument in favor of placing greater trust in
communities and less in absolute rights and entitlements. See, e.g., Mary A. Glendon,
Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (1991) (arguing that reliance on
rights exacerbates Americans' historical concentration on the individual and the state, at the
expense of groups, dialogue, and community). While the appeal of devolution is based in
part on the Communitarian vision, Communitarians do not account for the effects of
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The best evidence of what states are likely to do with greater
discretion is what they have done in the past with the discretion
permitted under the AFDC program. Unlike Social Security, Food
Stamps, and SSI, AFDC benefit levels are set by the states and are not
automatically adjusted for inflation. While federal maintenance-ofeffort requirements have prevented reduction in the nominal dollar
amount spent by each state, the federal government has not required
states to increase benefits to keep pace with inflation. Under the
program, each state dollar spent is enhanced by matching federal
dollars, creating an incentive to spend more on the poor, but even this
incentive has not induced states to increase benefits to offset
inflation. 475 Benefit levels were more generous in the 1970s. During
the early 1980s, combined state and federal expenditures declined
even though more families were receiving aid. Spending increased in
the late 1980s in response to the interest shown in welfare by passage
of the 1988 Family Support Act, but recent spending for AFDC
declined again even though the number of families receiving
assistance was greater then than ever before. The pattern of increasing
caseloads and declining benefits dramatizes the states' lack of
commitment to maintaining benefit levels. Between 1970 and4761993,
the real value of welfare benefits declined by forty-five percent.
Further, under the Family Support Act of 1988, states were
granted expanded permission to apply for waivers of federal
property ownership that severely limit the degree to which citizens in any community can
be mutually regarding in their actions. See David Abraham, Are Rights the Right Thing?
Individual Rights, Communitarian Purposes and America's Problems, 25 Conn. L. Rev.
947, 964-65 (1993) (reviewing Glendon, supra).
475 By limiting maintenance of effort requirements and capping federal funding for welfare
block grants, the financial incentives to maintain or extend welfare to the needy will end.
Indeed, because the quality of a state's welfare program depends on federal funding to a
large extent, the declining value built into the block grant will insure that benefits rapidly
deteriorate. See Reischauer & Weaver, supra note 440, at 19-22. Because the block grant
does not require states to maintain their previous cash benefit contributions and does not
create any incentive for them to do so, states may be tempted to save money by limiting
eligibility and reducing state funding. See id. at 19-20. Block grants may thus create an
incentive for states to reduce benefits. Id. at 20. When AFDC benefits declined in value
between 1970 and 1993 due to inflation, the difference was partially made up by ineyeases
in Food Stamp benefits. Id. at 19. if such federal programs continue to take on this burden,
states will have an additional incentive to use their newly acquired discretion to set benefit
levels lower. See id. at 20.
476 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 324.
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requirements in order to experiment with welfare administration and
benefits. The waivers granted to the states typically reduced or limited
welfare benefits, strongly suggesting that benefit reform rather than
administrative reform will dominate state program changes under
block grants. 477 As we already have mentioned, many states have
already authorized
chosen not to participate fully in federal programs 478
due to lack of state administrative or fiscal capacity.
The pattern established by the declining value of benefits and the
use of discretion to restrict access to welfare suggests that powerful
incentives were already at work to reduce welfare expenditures in each
state prior to the recent round of conservative welfare reform
proposals. Many state and local officials have expressed concerns that
the elimination of federal entitlements will pressure states to cut
benefits, in order to stay ahead in a tax-saving "race to the bottom,"
and to avoid the risk of becoming a welfare magnet. 479 While research
has left unanswered the question of whether a state with relatively
high welfare benefits becomes a "welfare magnet, '480 perceptions
drive politics. 48 ' Some states already have lowered benefit levels,

477 See Liz McNichol & Iris J. Lav, Will States Maintain the Safety Net? Evidence From
Bad Times and Good (Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 20,
1996, at 1. See also Racing to the Bottom?: Recent State Welfare Initiatives Present Cause
for Concern (Center for L. & Soc. Pol'y, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 21, 1996 (expressing
concern that proposals to eliminate AFDC with a federal block grant would encourage states
to sharply reduce the availability of assistance to poor families). The TANF block grant
allows a state whose waiver is approved before July 1, 1997, or is in the process of being
approved before its state plan for a program funded under the TANF is submitted, to
maintain its program until its waiver would have expired, even if that waiver program does
not conform with the current statute. See Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 615(a)(2)(A)).
478 See Supra note 86.
479 See supra notes 430-31 and accompanying text.

480 See Paul E. Peterson & Mark C. Rom, Welfare Magnets: A New Case for a National
Standard 50-83 (1990) (concluding that state and local governments provide fewer welfare
benefits than a national government would because each state government would prefer
other governments to provide the services, and fears that it will become attractive to the
poor if it provides greater benefits); Inst. for Res. on Poverty Special Report No. 61, supra
note 352, at 25-26 (stating that the evidence shows that welfare magnets do not affect poor
families).
481 See Rebecca M. Blank et al., A Primer on Welfare Reform, in Looking Before We
Leap: Social Science and Welfare Reform, supra note 434, at 73.
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while others are proposing to do so in order to reduce482 their
attractiveness relative to neighboring states with lower benefits.
What seems abundantly clear is that by reducing federal funding,
welfare reform will require each state to pay more for welfare or to
reduce the cost of welfare by upgrading administrative efficiency or
by reducing benefits. The present political climate suggests that
spending more on welfare will be difficult unless the public discourse
of reform is recast by political leaders so that the welfare issue is
reframed as a problem of poverty relief for the deserving poor, a risky
undertaking because of welfare's identification with
political
increased taxes and special interests. In the alternative, experience
suggests that achieving greater administrative efficiency is far less
predictable 483 and offers fewer political rewards than simply cutting
benefits to the poor. At least one governor has proposed ducking these
choices altogether by proposing to offer counties the option of
receiving block grants from the state to support welfare and
services 484-- there is quick learning in the devolution game.
States may respond differently to the fiscal and political pressures
described above, but the process of devolution creates few incentives
and many disincentives to giving priority to poverty relief over tax
relief, and to giving priority to long term solutions over a short term
reduction of state responsibilities for welfare. Further, states face
financial hurdles not faced by the federal government. States lack the
capacity to redistribute the costs of alleviating poverty and
maintaining quality of life over the entire national economy.
Significantly, the redistributive effects of welfare reform will leave
many states at a relative disadvantage in managing regional or ,16cal
problems of poverty that are inevitable in a successful national
economy; the reform may encourage the states with relatively
depressed economies or relatively high welfare expenses to begin the
race to the bottom.

482 See Joel Stashenko, Pataki Warits to Slash Welfare Aid, Buff. News, Dec. 11, 1995, at
A9.
483 See Peterson et al., supra note 428, at 23-24.
484 See Clifford J. Levy, Pataki Budget Has Sharp Cuts in Aid to Poor, N.Y. Times, Dec.
16, 1995, at 1, 28.
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F. Reforming the EITC: Raising the Taxes on the Poor
Redistributing the burden of taxation has been a leading issue in
the politics of the 1990s. Much of the appeal of cost cutting through
welfare reform and other government downsizing is its promise of
reduced taxation and improved economic opportunity. While tax relief
for the wealthy is a certainty if the conservative agenda embodied in
the Contract With America is enacted, tax relief for the middle and
working classes will be illusive. 485 For example, the child tax credit
enacted by both houses of Congress as part of the Balanced Budget
Act of 1995 would have had little or no effect on working class wage
earners because they earn too little to take advantage of the full
credit. 486 Between 1995 and 2000, the wealthiest twenty percent of
taxpayers would have received $38 billion more from the credit than
the bottom forty percent. 487
The EITC, a measure affecting only poor and near-poor members
of the working class and welfare recipients, also will be reduced. 488
The EITC is an important part of the safety net for poor working
families. As poverty has increased, both Congress and the President
have attempted to use the tax code to increase the after tax income of
poor workers with this refundable credit. Although the Reconciliation
Act of 1996 did not cut the EITC, 48 9 the program remains vulnerable.
Conservatives in Congress have proposed to limit eligibility and
reduce the amount of the tax credit. 490 This change will not correct the
abuses that conservatives have criticized, however. In fact, the
complained about abuses largely have been rectified by the IRS since
485 See Lav, Reconciliation Bill Tax Breaks, supra note 423; The Administration Releases
New Estimates of House and Senate Budget Bills' Effects on Poverty and Income
Distribution (Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington D.C.), Nov. 13, 1995, at 2
[hereinafter The Administration Releases New Estimates].
486 Lav, Reconciliation Bill Tax Breaks, supra note 423.
487 New Congressional Priorities Would Deepen Poverty for Working Poor--Continuation
(Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), 1995, at 1.
488 Id. at 4. Figures released by the Joint Tax Committee show that under the EITC
modifications included in the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, taxpayers with incomes up to
$10,000 would lose $2.7 billion by 2000, while taxpayers with incomes between $10,000
and $30,000 would gain about $1.7 billion dollars. Id. at 3.
489 See supra part III, section C.
490 Greenstein, The Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 297, at 30-40.

1996]

Fooling All of the People Some of the Time

the 1995 GAO study. Cutting the EITC would not assist poor working
families, particularly former welfare recipients trying to retain
employment.
Recall that the 1993 EITC expansions increased the credit
available to families with one child and incomes between $6340 and
$11,620 to $2158, and for those with two or more children and
incomes between $8900 and $11,620, to $3560. 491 These credit
increases effectively brought a family of four with a full-time
minimum wage worker to the poverty threshold, provided the family
also received Food Stamps. 492 In addition, the 1993 legislation
allowed poor single individuals and welfare recipients who worked
during the year to receive the transfer. When finally phased in, the
1993 legislation will provide poor working families with two or more
children with a credit of forty percent of their first $8640 in
earnings. 493 Reform proposals would have ended under the EITC's
disregard for purposes of determining welfare eligibility, eliminated
the credit for poor individuals without children, stopped indexing the
EITC it for inflation, and reduced the credit for families with children.
The proposed reforms would have lowered the credit to thirty-five
percent, effectively reducing the benefit they received by $356. 49 4 The
credit for those with one child and earnings below $7150 would have
been reduced by nearly $244.4 95 As a consequence, if these rollbacks
had been enacted, the antipoverty effectiveness of the EITC would
have been reduced greatly.
The national and global nature of the economy continues to
encourage companies to restructure their work forces. The importance
of a federal presence in the coordination of assistance and services to
people adversely affected by these changes cannot be ignored. State
and local jurisdictions find themselves competing for jobs and chasing
scarce dollars to maintain basic services. The national trend is that of
growing income inequality and the erosion of low skilled jobs that
provide adequate income and health benefits. More than fourteen
491 26 U.S.C. § 32(b); Greenstein, The Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 297, at 6.
492 Id. at 27.
493 Id. at 31.
494 Id.
495 Id.
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million poor households with workers would have been affected
adversely by the proposed changes to the EITC alone. 496 These
changes would not reduce poverty for working families; they would
increase it.
G. How the Least Able Will Payfor Welfare Reform: Taxpayers and
Low Wage Workers
While achieving overall cost reduction has been an explicit goal of
welfare reform proposals, the proposals also will redistribute the costs
of welfare among the states and among different classes of taxpayers,
just as they will place more responsibility for bearing the costs of
poverty on the poor. The public has paid little attention to the
redistributive effects of welfare reform, although these effects will be
substantial. 497 The conservative vision of economic reform in the
Contract With America inspired proposals which were purposefully
redistributive to increase incentives for investment, entrepreneurship,
and labor force participation. 498 By contrast, much of the redistribution
of economic burdens caused by welfare reforms will result from block
grant funding formulas and indirect "trickle-down" effects of cuts in
496 Id. at 30.

497 These direct redistributive effects have received very little attention in the public
debates about welfare because issues of block grant funding are technical and difficult; local
tax equity is an arcane subject even among legal experts.
498 For example, both the House and Senate proposed large tax breaks for the wealthy and
for corporations, very modest tax relief for the middle classes, and, ironically, a greatly
increased effective tax rate for many working poor families. The Clinton Administration
found that these tax proposals, when linked to proposed welfare changes, would affect the
bottom 40% of households disproportionately, those with incomes less than $30,000 a year.
See The Administration Releases New Estimates, supra note 485, at 2, 10. On average the
incomes of these households would be reduced by $893 per year under the House proposal
and $801 a year under the Senate proposal. Id. at 10. Those with incomes between $30,000
and $50,000, the next 21% of households, would lose only $43 a year under the House and
$136 under the Senate proposals. Id. at 10-11. In sharp contrast, households with incomes
above $50,000 would experience an increase in their after tax income. Households with
incomes between $50,000 and $100,000, the next 27% of households, would gain an
average of $488 per year under the House measure, while under the Senate version their
incomes would increase an average of $439 a year. Id. at 11. The remaining 12% of
households, those with incomes exceeding $100,000 a year, would reap the highest benefit
from these reform and tax proposals. Under the House package, the incomes of these
households would increase on average by $1458; under the Senate measure they would gain
$1266. Id.
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services, increased local taxes, and a lower floor for low-wage jobseffects that are too far removed from the public debate to receive
attention from the media or the public.
In economic terms, the reforms will change welfare from a
national cost sharing system to a system in which the costs of poverty
created by the national economy will be borne by those least able to
bear them. States and localities experiencing greater poverty
increasingly will be left to deal with their burdens. 499 Families in
economic distress will have a smaller public safety net to rely on, and
thus will have to rely on themselves or on private charity. The
movement of vast numbers of welfare recipients into the labor market
particularly will affect the most neglected of the poor, the working
poor, who will face greater competition for jobs and who will, as a
500
result, receive lower wages.
1. Poorer Taxpayers Will Pay More
As we already have described, the changes proposed in the form of
tax reductions, tax credits, and the EITC reduction would reduce the
tax burdens on the wealthiest taxpayers while increasing the effective
tax rates of poor and near-poor workers and working welfare
recipients.50 ' The indirect effects of welfare reform on tax burdens
will also be substantial. The changes in welfare will alter tax burdens
on the states and within states at the local level. The alternative to
drastic cuts in benefits is making up the lost revenues from state
sources, primarily taxation. As we already have explained, these
burdens will fall disproportionately on states with large numbers of
poor families and states that experience economic downturns, and the
"rainy day" fund provided in the block grant proposals is inadequate.
Virtually all of the increase in the cost of welfare due to increasing
administrative responsibilities or due to recessions would be borne by
the individual state and its taxpayers.
499 Shifting financial responsibility from state to local governments will cause costs to be
borne by the most regressive system of taxation, local property taxes, and thus will yield
enormous inter-community inequities similar to those already apparent in local school
financing. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I--The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 24-39 (1990) (describing constitutional challenges to the local
property tax financing of public schools).
500 See supra notes 398-401 and accompanying text.
501 See supra part IV, section F.
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The net losses in state revenues due to welfare and related federal
program reductions will be large. For example, The Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities has estimated that under the block grant
provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, which would have
provided funding at levels similar to TANF, the net loses of revenues
to New York would have been about $3.5 billion, or eleven percent of
projected state revenue from sales, personal, and corporate taxes
combined. Colorado would have lost an estimated $428 million
(eleven percent of revenues), Louisiana an estimated $2.1 billion
(sixty percent of revenues), and Michigan an estimated $915 million
(eight percent of revenues). 50 2 The Congressional Budget Office
estimates that the federal government will save more than $54 billion
from reforms in the Reconciliation Act of 1996.503 For reasons already
explained, however, it is very unlikely that this reduction in federal
funding will be compensated for by increased efficiency in state
administration. If welfare benefits are reduced proportionately, already
meager benefits will erode further. States that require counties to share
the costs of welfare and Medicaid automatically pass a proportion of
the increased costs of welfare to local taxpayers, primarily to local
property owners, and distribute the rest of the increased costs among
state taxpayers. Local property taxation for state welfare mandates will
50 4
increase, limiting revenues available for other purposes.
Not only will the proposed welfare reforms reduce services and
benefits available to working poor and middle class families, but they
will also place new burdens on state and local taxpayers. 505 Taxpayers
want lower taxes. Instead, they may get higher local property taxes as
states shift welfare costs downward. Property taxes have a regressive
impact, and consequently the least able will pay the most.
502 Iris Lav, The New Fiscal Agenda: What Will It Mean? How Will It Be Accomplished?

(Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 18, 1995.
503 Burke, supra note 427, at summary.
504 See Lav & May, Still Holding the Bag, supra note 423. As we have noted, some states
already have greatly reduced welfare benefits as a cost reduction measure. See supra note
432. Counties in some states have the option of maintaining assistance and have chosen to
do so, but like state governments being pressed to begin a race to the bottom, counties will
experience pressure from local taxpayers to avoid becoming a welfare magnet within the
state. See State Notes, CLASP Update (Center for L. & Soc. Pol'y, Washington, D.C.), Dec,
21, 1995, at 13.
505 See Lay & May, Still Holding the Bag, supra note 423.
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2. Low Wage Workers Will Face Increasing Competition For Jobs
and Wages
A hidden cost of the new welfare to work requirements, which will
be imposed on a larger number of welfare recipients than ever before,
is the impact they will have on the low-wage labor market. A twentyfive year decline in the value of the minimum wage, combined with
falling real wages for low wage workers, has swelled the numbers of
working poor. In 1990, there was an average of two million job
vacancies, and a gap between the supply of jobs and demand for
employment of more than ten million jobs.50 6 The ratio of heads of
families receiving welfare to job vacancies would have been more than
three to one (see Table 1). The TANF block grant requires a thirty
percent participation rate by 1998, increasing to a fifty percent
participation rate by 2002, in a workforce program for a single parent
family, and a seventy-five percent participation rate in 1998,
increasing to ninety percent by 2002, for two parent families. 50 7 More
than a million welfare recipients will be required to find some form of
work within two years of the effective date of the block grant, and will
compete for jobs with a large number of workers who already are
underpaid and, often, underemployed. 50 8 According to estimates of the
Economic Policy Institute, welfare reform could cause a greater50 than
9
ten percent decline in the wages of low-wage workers nationally.

506 Gordon Lafer, The Politics of Job Training: Urban Poverty and the False Promise of
JTPA, 22 Pol. & Soc'y 349, 351-52.
507 Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra note 20, § 103 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)).
In 1996, participation for a single parent household is defined as 20 hours per week in a
work related activity, and for a two parent family as 35 hours per week. Work related
activities are more narrowly defined in TANF than in the JOBS program, so that education
and on-the-job training are restricted to no more than the first four weeks of participation.
Eligible activities under TANF include unsubsidized employment, subsidized employment
in the private sector or in the public sector, and work experience. Id. § 103 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 607(d)).
508 See Burtless, supra note 344, at 92-94.
509 Lawrence Mischel & John Schmitt, Cutting Wages by Cutting Welfare: The Impact of
Reform on the Low-Wage Labor Market 5 (Econ. Pol'y Inst. Briefing Paper, 1995). In some
states the effect would be much greater. For example the estimated decline in low wage
levels in New York could be as high as 17%. Id.
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H. The QuestionableBenefits of Welfare Reform
Welfare reforms are said to benefit welfare recipients;. yet most
recipients are children, and the federal funding for many programs
benefiting children will be reduced sharply by the reforms. The
explanation is always that greater efficiency will be achieved and
children will benefit. However, close examination shows that gains in
efficiency, which might make delivery of the- same or better benefits
for less money possible, are unlikely to result from the proposed
welfare reforms. If any reduction in cost is achieved, it will result
primarily from cuts in benefits.
Moreover, states which maintain benefits will be required to bear
the increased costs, placing new burdens on state taxpayers. States'
and localities' burdens in the new world of welfare program
devolution will be uneven, and the federal government will no longer
redistribute risks or costs associated with maintaining the economic
safety net provided by welfare across the entire economy. Welfare
reform also will redistribute tax burdens among families of varying
levels of wealth, placing disproportionate burdens on families with
less wealth. Finally, welfare to work reform, as proposed, will lower
wages significantly for the lowest wage workers in the American labor
force.
While the talk of welfare cost cutting reinforces concerns about
economic security, it is far from clear whether the proposed reductions
in benefits and services, and redistribution of responsibilities among
federal, state, and local governments, will reduce the overall cost of
welfare or increase the economic security of Americans most
concerned about this issue. Indeed, even for many who do not depend
on welfare, the proposed reform packages may lead to new tax
burdens as well as other costs, including the costs of replacing lost
government services and subsidies, lower wages, and increased risk of
personal disaster in times of economic instability.
The bottom line is that there are many unknowns about the effects
of reform, and there are many reasons to doubt the claimed benefits of
the welfare to work proposals, other behavior modification proposals,
and in particular the shift to state and local financing and control.

1996]

Fooling All of the People Some of the Time

V. THE UNDESERVING POOR: A FALSE CONSENSUS

Our arguments about welfare reform are addressed primarily to
those who make the law. We have criticized contemporary welfare
reform by comparing the claims and assumptions underlying welfare
reform proposals with a multitude of facts established by economic,
social science, and historical research. We have found that the rhetoric
of politicians mischaracterizes and stereotypes both the poor and those
who receive welfare. We showed that the reforms are unlikely to have
the promised benefits for welfare recipients or for society. Federal
welfare programs have many defects, but restricting or terminating
them in the manner proposed will not remedy the defects and instead
will cast the poor into the private economy where no relief from
poverty awaits them.
The final refuge of the politician confronted with the irrationality
of policies is that the public dictates what legislatures do. If this
transfer of responsibility is accepted, on grounds that the public is the
final arbiter of pubic policy, the facts we describe are just the views of
another special interest, irrelevant until accepted by the mainstream
public. Some critics of contemporary welfare reform, on the other
hand, claim that the false impressions about welfare recipients and the
poor which are held by the public and legislators alike have been
510
strongly influenced by the media's selective reproduction of images.
The media, for its part, describes its activities as reporting, rather than
510 Here we part company with Lucy Williams, on whose research we have placed so much
value and cited extensively in this article. Professor Williams' analysis of the role of media
images in public perceptions and policy making seems to make the media the prime movers
in what seems to us a far more complex historical process of value and fact creation. We
find support for our argument that politicians themselves play a critical role in the
formation of political agendas. As Deborah Stone has argued:
Problem definition is a process of image making, Where the images have to do
fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility. Conditions, difficulties, or
issues thus do not have inherent properties that make them more or less likely to be seen as
problems or to be expanded. Rather, political actors deliberately portray them in ways
calculated to gain support for their side. And political actors, in turn, do not simply accept
causal models that are given from science or popular culture or any other source. They
compose stories that describe harms and difficulties, attribute them to actions of other
inrdividuals oT organizations, and thereby claim the right to invoke government power to
stop the harm.
Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 Pol. Sci. Q.
281, 282 (1989) (emphasis in original).
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making, what is newsworthy. They claim that what is newsworthy is
what draws viewers, and is a product of public tastes and perceptions
of issues. At worst, the media may argue, it exploits the public's
misperceptions of welfare recipients, but it does not create them.
Behind these conflicting apologetics and explanations lies the
reality of politics. The responsibility for providing leadership in
directing public debate, we argue, lies with political figures, who
manipulate issues. for their own purposes, reflecting the partisan and
entrepreneurial realities of our political system. Although often
claiming they merely follow the polls, political leaders are likely to
take more extreme positions than the public on carefully selected
issues to distinguish themselves from other candidates, and to do so by
choosing issues that appeal widely in order to create as broad a
consensus as possible. In the abstract, welfare reform is ideal for the
1990s because it appeals to critical swing voters-white working and
middle class Americans. Additionally few members of the public
favor welfare while many have negative associations with welfare
recipients. To enhance this appeal both Republicans and New
Democrats subtly have linked welfare reform to widespread concerns
about economic well-being among the middle and working classes.
Both parties have tended toward the same strategy for constituency
building, appealing to the same swing voters, ignoring the racial and
class implications that would have differentiated their traditional
constituencies and which had, in past times, pushed the parties in
different directions and towards more complete representation of
societal interests.
As a result of this political convergence, we have argued, critical
issues have been left out of the discussion. In this concluding section,
we address some political consequences of leaving those issues out of
the public debates. We argue that the logic of welfare dependency has
pushed the proposals for welfare reform to such an extreme that public
reaction is now likely to return the debate to the historical mainstream.
The historical mainstream, including federal entitlement to and cost
sharing for welfare, is becoming more attractive, not because of the
array of research findings we have cited, but because the extreme
proposals that dominate present discussion no longer accord with the
public's common sense. We focus on the emerging public view of
welfare reform and the political consequences that are likely to follow.
In American politics, common sense is a better ally than academic
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research, but the two are converging. We hope that conscientious
political leaders will discover ways of mobilizing both for the
common good.
A. The Limit of Stereotypes: MoralJudgments About Welfare
Recipients
Even though the public seems to have been persuaded by the new
"get tough" philosophy of welfare reformers in both main parties, 511 a
majority of Americans oppose many of the specific reforms that have
been proposed.512 Shortly after the 1994 mid-term elections that gave
Republicans control of both houses of Congress, a Times/CBS poll
showed that the public favored reducing spending for "welfare" by a
four to one margin. The same poll also showed that six in ten favored
better job training for the unemployed even if it meant raisingtaxes,
while seven in ten opposed time limits on welfare as long as welfare
recipients worked for their benefits.' 13 Other polls have shown that the
public supports providing day care for welfare recipients and
continuing benefits for adolescent mothers. 51 4 Thus, even at the height
of the reformers' political strength, a majority of the public believed
that benefits should continue for a great number of persons whom the
reformers' theory of welfare dependency brands as morally
undeserving. This apparent contradiction has received too little
attention in the current debates. When confronted with welfare
dependency in the abstract, Americans are disapproving and punitive
in their policy preferences, but when the public considers specific
511 The public has a negative view of welfare in general. The public is in favor of denying
benefits for additional children born to welfare mothers. Even welfare recipients support
such a limit, belying the claim that welfare recipients have values differing from the
mainstream. The use of the word welfare triggers very negative responses. In some polls, a
majority of the public believes that recipients could get along without welfare and by a four
to one margin favor reducing funding for welfare. When the question is worded to ask about
funding for relief of children's poverty, the same poll showed strong support for increased
funding by a five to one margin. Maureen Dowd, Americans Like G.O.P. Agenda But Split
on How to Reach Goals, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1994, at Al, A24.
512 This paradox was evident beginning with polls taken shortly after the Republican
landslide in the 1994 mid-term elections. Id. at A24.
513 Id.

514 R. Kent Weaver et al., Public Opinion on Welfare Reform: A Mandate For What?, in
Looking Before We Leap: Social Science and Welfare Reform, supra note 434, at 118.
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needs and barriers encountered by the poor, common sense seems to
suggest many of the same conclusions suggested by extensive social
science research.
Even if welfare recipients matched their stereotype, the qualities
on which the stereotype is built say little about the real causes of
poverty or the redeeming qualities individuals possess now or may
display at later points in their lives. Bearing a child, being an AfricanAmerican teenager, being unemployed, or failing to finish school does
not mean that the life of the individual has been or will be misspent or
unproductive. Moreover, even if they signal a life at-risk because of
the serious social problems associated with each, they are not caused
by welfare. The moral qualities and dilemmas of welfare recipients are
more complex than the stereotype. The public's rejection of many of
the implications of the stereotype reflects the false note sounded by
welfare reformers in relying upon the stereotype.
Even if the welfare recipient stereotype accurately portrays public
suspicion of particular social groups and the disfavor in which
particular behavior is held, 515 the public's continuing support for the
relief of poverty suggests a more sophisticated understanding of its
causes than the stereotype implies. The public's support for a broad
range of services that ease the situation of welfare mothers and make
transition to work more compatible with child-rearing suggests that
many Americans understand that the difficulties experienced by
working welfare mothers are similar to those experienced by mothers
not receiving welfare. The deserving and undeserving share a common
framework of need.
There is sound evidence that the public recognizes that at least
some of the stereotyped characteristics relied on by the reformers are
not true of welfare recipients generally. While the stereotype suggests
that welfare recipients lack motivation to work, polls show that the
public ranks lack of motivation last among causes of poverty and gives
greater weight, by a two to one margin, to lack of jobs and single
parenting. 516 When the image of the poor is stripped of its
515 In general, hostility to welfare and to mothers who do not match mainstream norms is
undeniably high. The break-up of the traditional family troubles the public the most,
accurately pin-pointing an area of great general tension in American culture, hardly limited
to the situation of welfare recipients. Id. at 112.
516 Id. at 116.
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stereotypical qualities, a substantial majority of the public support
government relief for those who cannot take care of themselves and
support guaranteeing every citizen enough to eat and a place to
sleep.5 17
As successful as the theory that welfare produces dependency has
been in eclipsing alternative perspectives on poverty, the very breadth
of the theory carries the seeds of its own destruction. Welfare policies
are always fraught with inherent tensions.518 However, the moral
theory driving current reforms has supported proposals that are so
extreme that they run counter to values held by the public, and they
are being met with great ambivalence. One explanation for the
public's ambivalence is that while the reforms reinforce the strongly
held moral value of self-sufficiency, the public is quite discriminating
about lack of opportunity and its impact on the deservingness of the
poor. In other words, the public appears to have a much more nuanced
moral theory than advocates for many of the current reform proposals.
B. The Invisible Poor:Low- Wage Workers
The stereotype holds that the poor are dependent welfare
recipients. The reality is that widespread poverty among low-wage
workers who do not receive AFDC forces a large number of
Americans to rely on federally funded poverty relief programs such as
Food Stamps and Medicaid. 519 Confounding Roosevelt's careful
distinction between programs for the deserving and undeserving, many
working Americans in fact rely on public assistance during their
working careers to supplement low wages or as a form of poor
person's unemployment compensation.5 20 Widespread poverty among
517

Times-Mirror Center, supra note 123, at 32.

518 See generally R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Welfare Reform, in Looking Before We
Leap: Social Science and Welfare Reform, supra note 434, 93-104 (describing the inherent
tensions in welfare due to conflicts between, among other things, the needs of parents and
children, short term and long term political payoffs, and federal and state interests).
519 See supra part III.
520 Until the late 1980s, the Unemployment Insurance program covered more than 40% of
unemployed workers. Marion Nichols & Isaac Shapiro, Unemployment Insurance
Protection in 1994 1 (Center on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), May 15,
1995, at 1. At the height of the recession in the mid- 1970s, with an unemployment rate of
8.5%, coverage reached a high of 75.5% of unemployed workers. Id. at 7. With the advent
of the Reagan Administration this coverage began to erode; only 45.3% of unemployed
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full-time workers and reliance on welfare programs creates a problem
for simple moral labeling of the welfare poor. If failure to work or
failure of individual responsibility was to blame for working class
poverty, then treatment of the working poor as undeserving would be
consistent with our moral values. But if joblessness, low wages, and
underemployment are at the causes of poverty, then the New Deal
solution for the deserving---entitlement to federal assistance adequate
for maintaining a minimum standard of living--becomes more
compelling.
Conservative welfare reformers have ignored the tension between
policies for the working poor and policies they have designed for
stereotypical welfare recipients. Further, they have attacked income
supplements for the working poor directly, greatly weakening the
logic of their reforms. Conservatives have not stopped at rollbacks of
AFDC, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and other welfare entitlements, but
also have proposed reducing the EITC. 521 Because the EITC offers a
wage supplement for some workers above the official poverty level
and will be costly as the subsidy rises to its scheduled maximum in
1996, conservatives claim that it is a handout that is too expensive and
that it too is likely to undermine the work effort of wage earners who
are perfectly capable of supporting their families.
Cutting welfare for the poor, a group the public deems deserving,
and proposing to reduce the EITC reveal a deep contradiction between
the extreme view of welfare taken by the most conservative
contemporary reformers and mainstream values. There is little doubt
about public support for programs for the deserving-those who work
or who have been excused from work by reason of age or disability.
Contributory social insurance receives nearly unanimous support. Any
workers received UI benefits in 1982, even though the unemployment rate was 9.7%, the
highest it had been in nearly 30 years. Id. In the late 1980s, less than one-third of
unemployed workers received UI in an average month. Id. at 6-7. Over time federal law has
increased state discretion in the design and administration of the UI program. As a
consequence in late 1994 less than 25% of unemployed workers in 14 states received UT
during an average month. Id. at 2.
521 As we have explained in part III, supra, the EITC was first proposed in 1975 on a
limited basis as a subsidy for families with children. By 1996, the amount returned to the
working poor will be greatly increased as a result of the 1993 amendments, and the program
will include the childless and working welfare recipients in order "make work pay." See
Greenstein, The Earned Income Tax Credit, supra note 297, at 26-28.
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rollbacks in Medicare benefits or increase in Social Security premiums
will be politically costly because they attack entitlements the
mainstream does not question. But the element of contribution is no
longer essential to public support for entitlements. The entitlement of
the elderly poor to a federally financed minimum income has been
supported by a public consensus for two decades. 522 A majority of the
public has favored national health care since the 1930s.5 23 There has
been long standing (if only slightly less universal) public support for
governmental relief of poverty, shorn of negative stereotypical
characteristics. 524 Clearly, this is evidence that the ranks of the
deserving are not limited to a technically defined class of contributors
to Social Security and Medicaid. 525 More recently, polls show that
sixty-eight percent of Americans favor continuing the EITC. 526
The dilemma that contemporary welfare reformers face in dealing
with the working poor is two-fold. First, while the moral logic of the
reformers depends on making a sharp distinction between deserving
and undeserving poverty, the welfare poor are in fact indistinguishable
from the working poor. The welfare poor are both undeserving and
deserving--morally undeserving because they are receiving welfare
and yet deserving because many do work, many more want to work,
and after child rearing, they will work. Indeed, as workers and
potential workers, most recipients of welfare should be in the ranks of
the morally deserving but for the stigma of receiving welfare. The
discovery that most welfare recipients either work or want to work,
and that joblessness and below poverty wages are a major factor in
creating the need for welfare, means that many welfare recipients
properly should be viewed as unemployed or under-employed

522 See Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 34, at 108-10; John Myles, Postwar Capitalism
and the Extension of Social Security Into a Retirement Wage, in The Politics of Social
Policy in the United States 270, 283 (Margaret Weir et al., eds., 1988).
523 See Richards, supra note 24, at xii.
524 Times-Mirror Center, supra note 123, at 152-53.
525 The public strictly equates benefits and contributions under these programs. Even Social
Security benefits have been transformed by public pressure from contractual rights to
retirement wages based on need rather than individual payments. See Handler & Hasenfeld,
supra note 34, at 109.
526 See supra note 315.
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workers, not self-willed dependents. 527 Second, to acknowledge that
the problems of those receiving welfare and the problems of economic
insecurity of low wage workers and their families are closely related is
to acknowledge the enormity of the problem of poverty and the critical
nature of the federal government's role in poverty relief. Such an
acknowledgment would require admitting that the private economy
will not solve the problem of poverty and that poverty relief will be
costly. These two problems render the approach being taken by
reformers incompatible with the needs of the poor.
C. The Subtext of Welfare Reform: Discipliningthe Mainstream
The attack on poverty-relief programs now threatens many
Americans who count themselves among the deserving. So far the
public has been receptive to reform rhetoric emphasizing the failure of
welfare. Why has a political strategy that avoids public discussion of
poverty and joblessness by focusing on the moral deviance of welfare
recipients succeeded? As we discussed in Part II, the arguments of
reformers have succeeded in part because they offer an implicit reason
for the plight of many impoverished working Americans not receiving
welfare--namely blaming tax burdens and ghetto poverty on those
who are perceived as deliberately living off of others' hard work.
They also have succeeded in part because both major political parties
have presented government cost cutting as the general solution to
poverty, and there is as yet no public pressure to deal with poverty
through government intervention as there was during the 1960s. The
logic of welfare reform and cost-cutting, however, has overlooked the
strong ideological foundation for social provision for the deserving,
which is on a collision course with present welfare reforms.
As we described in Part IV, the mainstream is likely to be affected
both directly and indirectly by many of the proposed rollbacks. Many
non-poor families have annual incomes which are only marginally
527 Our concept of deserving has expanded so that it is possible to argue that even reliance
on welfare should not render the working poor undeserving. Indeed, a majority of the public
would support continuing welfare benefits for the working poor. See Dowd, supra note 511,
at A24. As the ranks of the working poor have grown, it has become more clear that the
problem of welfare is synonomous with the problem of poverty, i.e., for many, the private
economy does not provide enough resources to raise a family. The growing numbers who
work and receive welfare now create enormous tension as the boundary between deserving
and undeserving poor threatens to dissolve.
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above poverty. In 1993, nearly sixteen percent of all American
households had incomes below 125% of poverty, and the number of
such families has increased greatly in the past fifteen years.5 28 These
families often slip below the poverty line if, for example, a family
member loses a job or becomes seriously ill. A family with an income
only slightly above the poverty level is often eligible for benefits
under programs such as Food Stamps, Medicaid, and the school lunch
program. 529 Families with incomes above the official poverty
threshold are among the most numerous beneficiaries of the EITC.
These programs are intended, in part, to help marginally non-poor
households maintain economic stability. Similarly, the EITC is
intended in part to maintain the income of working poor families
which might otherwise experience substantial spells of poverty as a
result of irregular employment.
Many non-poor families will be affected indirectly by the proposed
reductions in federal programs. Medicaid is the largest single source of
benefits for the elderly in nursing homes; 530 if these beneficiaries lose
benefits, their families will bear the burden of making up the
difference. Least direct, but bearing the largest price tag, will be the
devolution of welfare programs to the states with reduced federal
528 In 1977, about 7.7 million families bad incomes 125% or less than the official poverty
threshold, while in 1992, more than 10.7 million had incomes this low. 1994 Statistical
Abstract, supra note 134, at 479.
529 Families with incomes less than 130% of the poverty level are eligible for Food Stamps
and free school lunches. Families with incomes between 130 and 185% of the poverty level
can receive partially subsidized school lunches. 1994 Green Book, supra note 28, at 824.
Medicaid eligibility is linked to qualifying for benefits under AFDC or Supplemental
Security Income ("SSI"), or established by state standards for optional benefits to the
medically needy. Id. at 783, 787. Both groups included members whose incomes are above
the poverty level. Id. at 788. AFDC and SSI recipients receive Medicaid automatically. Id.
at 784-85. In addition, all states are required to cover pregnant women and children under
the age of six whose family income is less than 133% of the-poverty level. Id. at 784. Since
1991, states also have been required to provide Medicaid coverage to all children less than
19 years of age whose families have incomes less than 100% of the poverty level. Id. at
785. States also may cover pregnant women and infants under the age of one year whose
family incomes are below a state established level that is between 133 and 185% of the
poverty level. Id. Slightly more than 11% of the U.S. population received Medicaid
coverage in 1992, and 47% of those had incomes below the poverty level that year. Id. at
787.
530 Anthony Szczygiel, Long Term Care Coverage: The Role of Advocacy, 44 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 721, 733 (1996). In addition to paying a substantial part of the cost of nursing home
care and in home care, the federal government provides regulatory oversight. Id. at 734.

Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law

support. Even if decentralization reduces
welfare, as reformers promise, a greater
benefits will be borne by state and
disproportionate burden being borne by the
least affluent property owners.

[Vol. 4:3

the cost of administering
share of the funding for
local taxpayers, with a
poorest regions and by the

Legislators are applying rhetoric appropriate for programs for the
undeserving poor to benefits that affect the mainstream. Such a
strategy seems to have worked well historically to curb expansion of
public benefits. 531 Unlike the successful strategies which defeated
earlier welfare proposals, however, contemporary reformers are
attempting to do something quite different. They are attempting to
justify cutting back benefits on which many working Americans have
come to rely by calling the benefits welfare. Characterization of
benefits that affect the well-being of families of the middle and
working classes as welfare accords the middle and working class
citizens the status of undeserving welfare recipients, and this is deeply
532
at odds with their beliefs.
V1. CONCLUSION

The welfare reforms proposed for the 1990s will not achieve the
goal of reducing poverty while lowering the cost of welfare for
taxpayers. The promised benefits of welfare reform are based on false
characterizations of the poor and welfare recipients and on improbable
claims about the efficiency of decentralizing control and funding of
welfare. On the contrary, the welfare reforms proposed by
conservatives are likely to leave welfare recipients worse off than they
531 During debates about earlier welfare reforms, characterizations of beneficiaries as
deserving or undeserving played a critical role. A strong appeal was made by advocates of
the well-supported Townsend Movement in 1935 to extend benefits under the Social
Security Act to all elderly poor, but Roosevelt's argument--that only those who "earned"
benefits by making contributions were deserving-successfully narrowed his program to
exclude the non-contributing elderly poor. See Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, supra
note 48, at 235-38. Nixon's Family Assistance Plan proposed in 1971 would have provided
a social wage to the working poor as well as the unemployed welfare poor.
532 There already is evidence that fear of loss of benefits under federal programs is turning
working class voters away from the Republican Party or third party alternatives and is
increasing their support for President Clinton, who recently has begun to respond to the
backlash to conservative cuts in the safety net. See Berke, Clinton Showing Strength
Among Michigan's Voters, supra note 128, at A1, A14.
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are now, without jobs or welfare, or with jobs which pay a below
poverty wage and have no future. If the proposed block grants replace
current federal welfare programs, the states will have to manage with a
smaller and less redistributive federal subsidy, and many will have to
increase welfare expenditures or decrease welfare benefits, a choice
falling particularly on states with rapidly rising numbers of poor.
Anti-welfare rhetoric has always made good politics, but in the
1990s this anti-welfarism has gone much further than before. Ending
welfare became a lightening rod for the economic insecurities of large
numbers of lower and middle income Americans who lost ground in
the 1980s. Welfare reformers have exploited the prevailing economic
insecurity of the non-poor by suggesting that all federal programs for
the poor are morally suspect, both because they are unfair to those
who work and are still insecure and because they hurt the poor
themselves by increasing their dependency. Like a bus out of control,
the first proposals have been superseded by others that threaten to
repeal a large part of the federally supported safety net because it is
said to be a cause of welfare dependency. The problems that will be
created by this expanded concept of welfare reform do not stop with
the effects they are likely to have on the poor. Programs which will be
downsized in the name of ending welfare dependency will hurt a large
number of working class families that often rely on Food Stamps, the
EITC, or Medicaid.
The prevailing welfare reform rhetoric contains the seeds of its
own destruction. As we have demonstrated, the implications of the
welfare dependency ideology and its support for the punitive
administration of welfare is contradicted by research and increasingly
is at odds with the opinions of a majority of Americans who have been
polled about the desirability of specific reforms. While we believe that
the research we have presented on the effects of the proposed welfare
reforms speaks the truth, we also have great faith in common sense.
The moral sense of the American public requires self-help and
condemns dependency on welfare, but it also understands the plight of
the poor who remain poor because they do not have realistic
opportunities for self-improvement---similar to an increasing number
of the working poor and formerly middle class who have lost ground
economically in the last decade. We believe that many Americans not
only perceive welfare reforms as too punitive but also are beginning to
understand the threat posed to themselves by the dismantling of the
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welfare state and by the false promise that the private economy will
eventually provide the security and benefits which they currently lack.
Accountability for dismantling the welfare state rests squarely with
the politicians who have supported it, deploying welfare dependency
in aid of a much larger agenda of tax reduction and redistribution, and
government downsizing that is favored by entrepreneurial and investor
constituencies. The false note in welfare reform that ignores the
extreme shortage of living wage jobs and the diverging futures of high
wage and low wage work has been noticed by many members of the
public, and the question is where will politicians lead us next. It is
time to have a conversation about a system of social provision that
distributes economic burdens fairly, and, with appropriate political
leadership, the issues, problems, and dilemmas of poverty may now
receive the attention they deserve.

